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Abstract 
Concern over greenhouse gases and the onset of global warming has become 
international in scale. Business opportunities arising from greenhouse gas abatement have 
been correspondingly recognised, and the potential advantages of less greenhouse 
intensive processes are being explored for any available market advantage. With this 
recognition comes a need to ensure that abatement is occurring, and that environmental 
benefit is a real outcome. 
Ecological modernisation theory posits that capitalist business behaviour can benefit by 
building into its activities environmental stewardship, thereby contributing to long term 
conservation of global ecosystems. The theory is explored, defining terms and discussing 
insights and limitations. The nature of greenhouse policy and definitions of what might 
comprise a greenhouse abatement industry are then established. This background 
provides a basis from which to investigate the business opportunities and constraints of 
genuine ecologically driven greenhouse reform. 
The thesis employs two case studies from the small Australian state of Tasmania. They 
depict how the theory of ecological modernisation is translated into practice. The 
Tasmanian government owns two businesses that significantly influence the state's 
greenhouse profile - one managing forests, the other renewable energy resources — and 
these have been chosen. Each case is tested against a history of environmental conflict 
and in the context of current marketing of a 'clean and green' image for the state. On this 
basis an assessment of what ecological modernisation can achieve is made. 
It is concluded that the environmental discourse characteristic of greenhouse policies 
cannot be translated into significant business opportunities due to difficulties involved 
with investment risks and with breaking from traditional development paradigms. 
Outcomes tend to constitute technological add-ons (evidence of weak ecological 
modernisation), or, in the worst case, a continuation of existing unsustainable practices 
within an environmental guise. This confines policy goals and production outcomes, and 
directly results in overstating environmental gains, a constriction of socio-political 
discourse, and undermined marketing potential in terms of environmental care. The 
promotion of greenhouse potential is therefore likely to be little more than rhetoric. The 
study concludes that, while ecological modernisation provides a theoretical framework 
through which trends can be ascertained, it fails in a prescriptive sense, for it does not 
explicitly cater for the uptake of environmental stewardship in the confines of strained 
economic circumstances similar to those of Tasmania and, perhaps, other types of 
economies. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Thesis 
In the three or so decades since the birth of the modern environment movement, 
environmental problems have become more global both in scale and nature. Many 
environmental problems can no longer be managed by countries in isolation as they 
transcend national boundaries and have become truly global. At the same time, nation 
states have lost much of their sovereign capacity to shape or influence their own 
economies as these have become more entangled with an increasingly globalised 
economy controlled not by governments but by transnational corporations. 
Towards the end of this period expressions of environmental consciousness also 
became mainstream. Politically, there have been world environment summits and 
world environment days and in industry, Environmental Management Systems and 
associated technologies and practices have grown to become almost universally 
applied tools. Within this context, the language of environmentalism has become part 
of the everyday parlance of both governments and corporations. 
This phenomenon, a near-universal adoption of concepts such as sustainability by 
governments and industry, constitutes a discontinuity. That is, it appears that a new 
era of environmental consciousness just suddenly erupted. This has led to significant 
academic debate among environmental and political theorists. How and why this 
phenomenon has occurred has become a topical question and within this debate the 
concept of Ecological Modernisation (EM) has gained currency. EM is a conceptual 
framework that acknowledges this move of environmental consciousness to the 
mainstream and accounts for the institutional uptake of sustainability ethics, doctrines 
and strategies. It is an optimistic environmental prognosis postulating that through 
technological advancements, market pressures and government policies positive 
environmental outcomes can be achieved. Central to EM is acceptance of the global 
capitalist economy and a core belief that critical environmental change will need to 
occur through capitalist endeavour. 
This study examines what EM as a theory is able to achieve. EM theory is outlined 
through a review of the literature, and an exploration of definitions, criticism and 
appraisal. Strong and weak versions of EM are identified. The debate largely revolves 
around the degree to which EM is a useful ideology to achieve positive environmental 
reform or a doctrine reinforcing business as usual. Analysis of EM arguments will 
attempt an understanding of the extent to which EM actually occurs. It investigates the 
capacity for EM to be used as a guide to the interpretation of organisational behaviour 
and asks the question of whether EM and the particulars of ecologically modernised 
behaviour are successful in achieving good environmental outcomes in general. 
The study then posits that, at least within certain economies, EM is unlikely to 
translate into a strong commitment to the requisite environmentally benign behaviour. 
In particular, smaller, more peripheral and more resource-dependent economies, it will 
be argued, are more constrained in what they are able to achieve in terms of EM. The 
thesis of this study is that within isolated economies that are dependent on commodity 
prices and other global processes, governments and corporations will tend to take on 
the rhetoric of EM both to legitimise attitudes and as a necessary tool of competition. 
The thesis uses Tasmania as a case study and within Tasmania, two studies focusing 
specifically on the Government Business Enterprises (GBEs), Forestry Tasmania 
(formerly the Forestry Commission) and the Hydro Electric Corporation (trading as 
'Hydro Tasmania', formerly the Hydro Electric Commission — colloquially know as 
'The Hydro') that manage resources with significant greenhouse implications. 
The core thesis question is to what extent environmental concerns are a genuine driver 
of reform rather than something that is superimposed on a business-as-usual approach 
that largely ignores environmental issues but attempts to legitimise its activities on the 
basis of perceived environmental benefits. To test this thesis EM is used as a tool to 
evaluate greenhouse abatement strategies and the discourse of both Tasmanian GBEs. 
The greenhouse effect is a naturally occurring process whereby solar energy which has 
entered the earth's biosphere, is trapped by carbon and other trace elements in the 
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atmosphere which absorb radiant heat and in turn may result in general raising of 
global temperatures. Primarily, contributing elements result from the combustion of 
fossil fuels and the release of carbon from naturally stored pools (reservoirs or sinks) 
such as forests or oil deposits. In the following discussion 'greenhouse abatement' is 
sometimes shortened to the single word 'greenhouse', as commonly used in policy 
discourse. 
Chapter three defines a 'greenhouse industry'. This is because 'greenhouse' has 
rapidly become a globally-embraced environmental issue, with government policies 
and environmental reform strategies looking to reduce the greenhouse effect, 
particularly by encouraging acceptable non-punitive commercial reform. Once the 
greenhouse industry is defined and the precarious state of international environmental 
politics and global pollution reform discussed, application of greenhouse policies 
within the Tasmanian case study will be observed. This will form a basis from which 
to critically assess both opportunities for business development through 
environmental reform, and how the two GBEs are placed to embrace this. Chapters 
four and five will respectively examine greenhouse opportunities in public forestry 
and public electricity management, while at the same time exploring the political and 
policy backgrounds of both. This will demonstrate how EM can be used to justify 
business-as-usual behaviour. 
These cases have been chosen primarily because of the impact of their development 
paradigms on the environment and upon the emergence of the environment movement 
in Tasmania. On the one hand a government managed forest agency has been 
historically committed to such practices as clearfelling old growth forests for 
woodchip production, and on the other, a government-managed energy agency has a 
development regime historically based on the inundation of large tracts of wilderness 
for the generation of hydro-electricity. The irony is that to participate in global 
markets, the two GBEs have seen their contemporary competitive edge in making 
claim to a 'clean, green' mode of production, conveniently overlooking the fact that 
their past disregard for the principles of environmental management provided the key 
impetus to one of the world's most high profile environment movements. 
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While the pressures of environmental stewardship exist, business as usual arguably 
persists. Forestry management in Tasmania has, for example, seen a transition from 
concessions for saw-log supply, to woodchips for pulp, and most recently, to 
establishing new plantations in order to retain a market for woodchips. In the case of 
hydro-electricity, large blocks of subsidised electricity produced by the inundation of 
wilderness areas have attracted greenhouse intensive industries to rocate in Tasmania 
— a process commonly referred to as hydro-industrialisation. While it is widely 
conceded that hydro-industrialisation has reached its development potential in the 
island state, Tasmania's entrenched ideological commitment to increasing energy 
availability to attract industry has never ceased, and hydro-electric power is heralded 
as ecologically sustainable even by the Tasmanian Greens. 
The thesis asks how applicable EM is to the two Tasmanian GBEs. It is argued that 
EM is unable to take account of the politics and strategies that isolated resource 
extractive economies must use to survive global pressures. Thus, central to this thesis 
is the notion of policy debt. For the purposes of the thesis 'policy debt' is defined as 
the historical and ongoing deficit in knowledge, expertise and strategies. Because 
local policies often evolve by following trends generated externally, by the time 
concepts, issues or information become entrenched, the practices and paradigms on 
which they have been based will themselves have been superseded elsewhere in the 
world. This creates a reactive policy environment that is often in a situation of debt - 
governments and businesses characteristically showing a lack of initiative and 
innovation, seeking answers from elsewhere. Circumstances such as this are later 
described as symptomatic of weak EM. If EM is adopted by businesses in economies 
like Tasmania it is more likely to be at the level of rhetoric than real environmentally 
positive action. This is because the disjunction between rhetoric and real change is 
much larger in resource-rich peripheral economies which characteristically better 
evidence the extremes of environmental assets (such as the presence of wilderness) 
and extractive resource industries (primarily because the resources are still there). 
Specifically, Tasmania has a history of resource extraction on a grand scale, and 
because this has caused social tension and created an advanced environmental 
awareness it puts EM and those espousing it in a difficult position. Businesses 
suggest they are environmentally-responsible corporate citizens in a number of ways, 
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including one-off ecologically sensitive activities, seeking forgiveness for past sins 
and proudly pursuing technological fixes to long running environmental problems. 
EM theorists note these developments and use them as evidence for change. But this 
is only really change if clear environmental betterment independent of the claims of 
rhetoric, is an observable consequence. Other aspects that clarify the uptake of EM 
include: understanding the values particular economies or societies place on the 
environment (by observing such things as environmental activism and environmental 
policies); the capabilities and opportunities that exist for ecologically sound economic 
growth (such as a mature environmental industries sector supporting development); 
and other factors such as quality employment opportunities in green jobs, and 
greenhouse profiles (such as carbon sinks and abatement programs). It will be shown 
that the GBEs responsible for forest industries and hydro electricity in Tasmania are 
taking all available opportunities to publicise stories concerning their greenhouse gas 
(GhG) reducing role, and it needs to be acknowledged that their activities do have 
profound greenhouse implications — growing trees absorbs carbon and hydro-
electricity is renewable energy. 
The irony is that it is exactly in the small peripheral economies that the extent of 
environmental damage has tended to be most significant. This, in turn, has generated 
significant community opposition within such economies to developments and 
activities that are damaging to the environment. Hence, such locations have made a 
considerable contribution to the emergence of the modern environmental movement. 
Whilst this has led many to assume that it is precisely in such locations that EM 
should occur, such an assumption is problematic. One could reasonably expect that 
EM would occur in these locations because all the right elements seem to exist — an 
effective modern environment movement and significant impacts resulting from 
resource extraction activities. In such environments companies might reasonably be 
expected to respond to pressure and meet environmental expectations. However, at 
the same time, companies and governments are driven by economic and community 
pressures to continue with the development paradigms, with which people are familiar, 
and in which many people have an investment, and resource extraction, so that in the 
end no real change occurs. Companies and governments take on the trappings of EM 
in order to placate the environment movement, or more broadly, to undertake a public 
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relations exercise to make it appear that they are ecologically modernising, whilst in 
reality they avoid or limit as far as possible any change. That EM does not take 
account of differences in regional capacity, or explicate the contradictory pressures of 
business-as-usual and the move to environmental stewardship held to emerge through 
pressures to increase efficiency, demonstrates theoretical inadequacy — though I will, 
nevertheless, find a useful analytical purpose for EM. To test this, I utilise case studies 
from Tasmania, a resource-dependent peripheral economy. 
1.2 Background Context to the Study 
There are legitimate reasons for investigating potential greenhouse-based development 
opportunities. From the perspective of government, the core issues are developing 
instruments of policy to deal with GhG abatement, while for business the core issues 
relate to maximising benefits over the costs resulting from these policies. 
Interestingly, governments developing greenhouse policies behave like businesses in 
that they attempt to maximise benefit and minimise impacts of punitive greenhouse 
measures in order to achieve an attractive, globally competitive economic 
environment. 
Greenhouse gas abatement goes beyond traditional pollution control in that the 
scientific community has generally accepted (not without contention) that certain 
gasses stimulate the process of global warming. Greenhouse abatement focuses on 
preventing the release of greenhouse gasses (emissions reduction), and enhancing the 
storage of the primary greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, in the form of 'carbon sinks'. 
The opportunities for environmental benefits and the potential to develop business 
based on these processes are contingent on a number of conditions and forces ranging 
from local environmental factors to international economics. 
Opportunities for reducing emissions range from individual companies abating 
industrial outputs to whole communities switching from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy sources. At present development opportunities'land liabilities can be identified 
only on a speculative basis. However, a number of issues merit exploration. Examples 
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include carbon sinks, alternative fuels, renewable energies, efficiency measures and 
emissions reduction. 
There are several instruments that can be used to either encourage or mandate a switch 
to renewable energy sources. Essentially, activities that displace fossil fuel usage can 
be rewarded or regulated, either through national tax based system, regulatory 
measures, voluntary measures, by international protocol (such as the yet to be ratified 
Kyoto Protocol), or a mix of these. Economic incentives, combined with a concrete 
understanding of who owns 'the abatement' or stored carbon, will underpin profit 
margins in the future. It should also be noted that failure to reduce greenhouse gasses 
is likely to incur commensurate liabilities, including potentially substantial costs: 
Company directors who ignore greenhouse issues could be in breach of 
their duties under Corporations Law... companies which cannot show they 
are working to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions can expect to 
suffer... (Horden 1999:23). 
Environmental duty of care as statutory obligation has evolved in various ways. The 
emergence of such legal obligations has occurred in conjunction with demands for 
environmental reporting and demonstrable environmental stewardship which are part 
of normal contemporary corporate practice. Examples include the advocacy of 
organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce for the Business 
Charter for Sustainable Development; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development both 
advocating eco-efficiency; and global environmental reporting initiatives by the 
United Nations. A large number of global companies are taking on environmental 
corporate citizenship seriously, and in doing so, recognise that aspects of 
sustainability include using less energy, less resources and producing less waste, and 
hence improving bottom line and increasing profits. Evidence that these aspects of 
production are becoming entrenched in contemporary business behaviour (as opposed 
to mere wishfulness within policy statmentds) can be found in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, which has shown that many companies listed on the stock 
exchange and reporting environmental performance are not only producing 
environmental benefits, but also increased profits (ACF 2000). This trend is a central 
theme of EM theory. 
How Tasmania's political institutions are attempting to react to (or exploit) this trend 
will be examined by a process of questioning core motivations. Real and measurable 
opportunities for greenhouse emission reductions will be examined, and the analytical 
approach offered by EM will be applied. 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
The thesis proceeds thus. In Chapter 2 the key themes of EM theory are summarised, 
as is its place in environmental discourse. Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework 
for interpreting EM through the environmental discourse of governments and 
industries. A framework will be developed from which environmental credibility in 
general can be assessed, via identification of certain environmental practices. This 
will provide a basis for determining greenhouse credibility specifically, so that it can 
be seen whether policy and practice are soundly based, leading to measurable 
greenhouse reduction, or whether greenhouse is a marketing ploy based on the 
construction of false perceptions. Combining the theoretical background of EM and an 
analysis of the greenhouse industry provides a basis from which to investigate two 
Tasmanian case studies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively explore the historical background and development 
ethos of the two GBEs whose business has profound greenhouse implications for 
Tasmania. Chapter 4 is about forestry and carbon sinks, exploring the opportunities 
associated with forests as a key natural greenhouse reducing resource. At the same 
time forestry is a major Tasmanian industry to which government contributes 
significant resources to ensure continual development, economic surety and 
employment. It will be demonstrated that the state's significant carbon sinks and 
timber industry are unlikely to be able to benefit from the real greenhouse 
opportunities likely to be available under current global greenhouse policy discourse, a 
discourse based on green credentials and the rewarding of carbon sequestering 
activities. In a similar manner, in Chapter 5, 'renewable-industrialisation' is presented 
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as a new hydro-industrialisation paradigm. The chapter explores the potential benefits 
of Tasmania's renewable hydro-electricity energy resource and assesses new 
greenhouse-driven 'renewable-industrialisation' opportunities. I question whether an 
organisation can maintain a shift from 'environmental vandal' and key driver of 
economic growth in Tasmania, to renewable 'green' energy for a new economic 
paradigm, and thus, whether 'historical' hydro-industrialisation can really be 
supplanted by a qualitatively distinct paradigm of 'renewable' industrialisation. 
Ecological Modernisation provides a useful conceptual framework to explore the 
diverse literature on environmental industries and green jobs and to discuss those 
activities that might comprise the 'greenhouse industry'. This will provide a basis 
from which to evaluate Tasmania's green credentials and a methodology for analysing 
policy. An exploration of Tasmania's capacity to perform greenhouse gas reducing 
activities through carbon sinks, and the extent to which greenhouse opportunities 
provided through its forest resource base can be maximised, is discussed as a first case 
study, in Chapter 4. 
The second case study, that of Tasmania's hydro electricity GBE (Hydro Tasmania), 
will be used to further illustrate the way institutions learn the discourse of 
environmental good practice, and to demonstrate the attractiveness of the discourse of 
greenhouse to institutions anxious to establish environmental credibility. The learning 
of a greenhouse discourse by 'The Hydro', demonstrates what is perhaps a global 
phenomenon in evolving environmental awareness as traditionally exploitative 
industries about-face and embark on environmental 'crusades'. Traditionally the 
Hydro has operated on the premise that increased hydro-electric capacity will provide 
a platform from which to attract further industrialisation. This reflects the traditional 
economic paradigm of an assumed 1:1 correlation between increased energy 
consumption and increased Gross Domestic Product. The more manufacturing activity 
that could be attracted to the state via cheap bulk power, the greater the wealth 
generated locally, including employment and associated business activity. Such hydro-
industrialisation is now widely considered to have reached its capacity, with 
corresponding development potential - and policies - ceasing with it. But hydro-
industrialisation is not dead - indeed, I will submit that the ideology that drove hydro- 
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industrialisation continues to thrive and has appropriated a green rhetoric of 
greenhouse sensitive development to justify the continuation of a traditional economic 
development approach. 
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2. Ecological Modernisation: identifying an ideology of 
ecologisation 
This chapter considers broad eco-political concepts and evolving eConomic 
development paradigms that can be used to critically assess greenhouse opportunities 
or liabilities for Tasmania based on its economic and industrial capability, and its 
record of institutional intervention in greenhouse reform. Analysis of Ecological 
Modernisation (EM) will demonstrate its usefulness for illuminating the historical 
accumulation of institutional policy debt in a greenhouse context, to be explored 
through two case studies forming the latter half of the thesis. It will inform the 
specific observations to be made in later chapters on Tasmanian greenhouse policy, 
forest management and renewable energy management. The extent to which EM has 
been adopted in Tasmania will be demonstrated by assessing greenhouse credentials 
in these policy domains. EM will inform an analysis of the Tasmanian government's 
prolonged development focus in all spheres of management, whether it be public 
goods (for conservation), private goods (buying and selling) or natural goods 
(evolution/contingent biodiversity), and in the context of the contemporary 
relationship between environmental destruction and economic growth in Tasmania. 
2.1 What is Ecological Modernisation? 
In the words of Martin Hajer: 
In the most general terms ecological modernisation can be 
defined as the discourse that recognises the structural character 
of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes 
that the existing political, economic, and social institutions can 
internalise the care for the environment (1995:25). 
In his interpretation of Hajer's definition, Dryzek notes: 
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Ecological modernisation refers to a restructuring of the 
capitalist political economy along more environmentally sound 
lines. Environmental degradation is seen as a structural problem 
which can only be dealt with by attending how the economy is 
organised, but not in a way that requires an altogether different 
kind of political-economic system (1997:141). 
EM has emerged through a general acknowledgment that sustainable development has 
become a universal concept and EM goes one step further: 
... sustainable development would surely lose unless it could be 
demonstrated that environmental conservation were obviously 
good for business profitability and economic growth everywhere, 
not just that these competing values can be reconciled ... this is 
exactly the claim of ecological modernisation (Dryzek 
1997:1136). 
To achieve the maintenance of current systems but promote environmental care, a 
radical transformation is not required. EM: 
implies a partnership in which governments, businesses, 
moderate environmentalists, and scientists cooperate in the 
restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more 
environmentally defensible lines (Dryzek 1997:144). 
So far, so simple. But there are complications. When used by academics as set of 
theoretical tools for explanation or policy analysis, the aim is to identify ecologically 
inspired change. The difficulty with this is that change can be viewed across multiple 
dimensions and thus: 
... [EM] can be used descriptively, analytically or normatively 
(Christoff 1996:480). 
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Because it can have these different applications, and each may observe strong and 
weak elements, there are issues 'relating to the relationship of the term to its 
ecological and modernist references' (Christoff 1996:476). 
'Modernisation' refers to a process of change toward the modern (embracing the 
sciences, technologies and economic growth). The 'ecological' refers of course to the 
science of relationships between organisms and their environments, and specifically 
the interdependence of living organisms in the environment. By implication, use of 
the term 'ecological' often implies 'ecosystem' and the corresponding succession of 
orderly and interrelated observable patterns of change. Among the various sciences 
multiple forms of ecological study exist, in which the common thread is 
interrelationships in some form or other with habitat. In sociological terms, human 
ecology pertains to analysis of human groups and their physical and social 
environments. Ecology is often used to denote impacts of humans on the environment, 
or protection of the environment from human effects, usually with the implicit 
intention of rectification through conservation, or prevention through precaution. In 
the case of EM, the 'habitat' is principally the global capitalist economy and its 
constituents are member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
EM has developed as a theoretical discourse seeking to transcend the polarised debate 
between the 'limits to growth' (often considered a government responsibility) and the 
'business-as-usual' (largely commerce and business) positions regarding 
environmental management. The 'precautionary principle' and advancing 
environmental technologies are central tools of EM for both industry and government, 
in that the former delivers the policy of limiting ecosystem change, and when 
combined with the latter, continued production and economic growth is enabled. 
Indeed, EM theorists see 'environmental protection as a... potential source for future 
growth' Weale (1992:76) and competitive advantage. To assess this potential, it is 
therefore necessary to have a framework of analysis that identifies how core entities 
such as governments and corporations are responding to environmental problems. 
This involves study of political and economic institutions, consumer behaviour, and 
the role and impacts of social movements. 
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EM theory thus presents a framework for analysing the ways in which contemporary 
industrialised societies deal with environmental crises (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000:2). 
It is a discourse analysis of the: 
... dynamics of environmental conflicts in society and how - policy 
making evolves in response [to] recognising... ecological crises as 
evidence of a fundamental omission in the working of the institutions 
of modern society [and] suggesting... that environmental problems 
can be solved in accordance with the workings of the main 
institutional arrangements in society (Hajer 1995:3 emphasis added). 
By implication, EM assumes that governments are capable of learning an 
environmental discourse, the quality of which is dependent on how environmental 
conflicts are recognised, or chosen for recognition. Added to this, EM suggests that 
solutions can be found to environmental degradation in present global capital 
structures. It will be shown, however, that the ability to selectively acknowledge 
environmental problems, combined with the impulse to avoid real change; to stay with 
'business-as-usual', can result in an apparent environmentalism that nevertheless does 
not guarantee environmental or public good stewardship. While EM holds that current 
institutional arrangements can deal with the environmental crisis it may not go so far 
as to acknowledge that in certain situations (such as in core/periphery economic 
relations) larger and stronger pressures may dictate the ecological agenda: 
Though these features certainly shape preparedness for this policy 
program in important ways, they do not provide sufficient insight into 
the ability of individual nations to meet the rigorous requirements of 
ecological modernisation... countries exhibit considerable variation 
in their propensity to align their policies with strict rational reasoning 
(Cohen 2000:1). 
Mol and Sonnenfeld (2000) argue that ecologically modernised behaviour solves 
environmental problems in two key ways, both of which also have associated 
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elements. The first is concerned with social practices (the extent to which the 
ecological agenda is reflected in convention, behaviour, culture and consumer choice) 
and the presence of environmental reforms (particularly through the uptake of science, 
technologies and design which uses ecological criteria). The second considers the 
safeguarding of society's sustainability bases through institutional design and policy 
discourses. Figure 2.1 depicts Mol and Sormenfeld's approach. Each element of 
Figure 2.1 can be studied in isolation as a single aspect of EM - a narrow reference to 
technological uptake and innovation, for example. More broadly, the combination of 
many or all aspects of the diagram is also valid, including reviewing ideological 
commitment to possible future scenarios of sustainable living. 
FIGURE 2.1  
CORE ELEMENTS OF ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION 
Source: adapted from Mol and Sonnenfeld (2000:2-6). 
A central theme of EM is the need to understand and interpret the extent to which the 
key policy actors in contemporary capitalist political economies are responding to 
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environmental change. Rather than dealing with the environment as a discrete aspect 
of the economy which has to be managed, EM acknowledges the necessity to weave 
environmental management through all aspects of the political economy. This 
includes environmental performance as a competitive element in global markets, the 
market promoting positive environmental outcomes, the enthusiastic co-operation of 
industry, and the core maxim that sustained growth is dependent uliimately on 
restructuring along environmentally sound lines (Dryzek 1997:141). 
A premise of EM is the continuing predominance of a global capitalist system in 
which profit, growth and wealth are core political and corporate objectives. EM seeks 
to identify and measure the multiple opportunities for environmental 'best-practice', 
with a view to influencing the accumulation of profit and the cycle of capital. 
It is implicit in EM that, within the parameters set by global capitalism, change can 
occur (the modernisation component), and within the broad ambit of possible change, 
a central EM assumption is that political and economic actors and institutions are 
capable of social learning (Weale 1992). This context provides broad opportunity for 
the application of EM as a theoretical and analytical tool. Christoff (1996:476) argues 
that EM can be used conceptually in policy analysis to 'indicate deeply embedded and 
ecological self conscious forms of cultural transformation' (1996:479). It is important 
to add 'or not' to this statement, because EM allows for analysis of whether change is 
or is not occurring. The approach focuses upon explaining change in environmental 
practice and the development of environmental consciousness within the economy, 
where previous theories have tended to canvass environmental social movements and 
aspects of government performance. These differences in theoretical orientation aside, 
and 'notwithstanding their temporal, national, and theoretical differences, one can 
gather this scholarship together under the aegis of Ecological Modernisation Theory' 
(Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000:2). 
Varied EM approaches reflect the broad opportunity it,offers for analysis. It can be 
interpreted in a restrictive and environmental technology context and more broadly as 
a tool to define changes in environmental policy discourse. It can be a tool for 
retrospective commentary, or, as this thesis will demonstrate, as a context for critical 
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analysis of the extent of environmental change and of the limited opportunities some 
marginal economies may have to implement change. EM is not without its critics and 
these will be discussed in section 2.4. 
2.2 Historical Background to Ecological Modernisation 
Some eco-modernists claim that there has been a shift from the radical grass-roots 
conflict environmentalism of the 1970s and 1980s, to a more professional, reform and 
consensual orientation in the 1990s (Rinkevicius 2000). The latter constitutes the 
institutional environmental learning process noted above. 
It is generally considered that Huber (1982, 1985, 1991) and Janicke (1993) were the 
first authors to use EM as a conceptual approach (Dryzek 1997, Mol and Sonnenfeld 
2000). It can be argued that early contributions to EM tended to focus on the ability 
of economics to deliver environmental consciousness through product choice, 
efficiency in production and with varying degrees of state intervention (Huber in 
particular saw a greater role for the free market than for state intervention), whereas 
later contributions are concerned with more social and cultural aspects of 
environmental change (developed largely in response to the perceived narrowness of 
'first wave', technology-driven EM). 
Some commentators (Dryzek 1997, Hajer 1995 and Weale 1992) describe EM as 
emerging from a process of institutional change that embodies a sustainable 
development ethic of one form or another. This 'ethic' is most evidenced in 
developed countries (typically of OECD membership) with the pioneer country of EM 
usually identified as The Netherlands, and embodied in the National Environmental 
Policy Plan 1989 (NEPP). Hajer's viewpoint: 
The UN report Our Common Future (1987), which became the centre 
piece of the environmental debate in the late 1980s laid the conceptual 
foundations for environmental politics in the1990s ... Western countries 
published comprehensive documents outlining national environmental 
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policy plans ... carefully... reflecting... the perspective of 'sustainable 
developed' as proposed... (1995:9). 
Boland (1994:136) suggests that national or state policy plans such as the NEPP 
emerge to institutionalise policy long-sightedness, environmental protection beyond 
technological treatments of waste at the end of pipes, and the need for a series of 
environmentally relevant policy goals identifying causes of environmental harm 
throughout all aspects of economy and society, as opposed to seeing the environment 
as discrete. EM came into being as a result of theorists observing the emergence of 
such policies. 
2.3 In defence of Ecological Modernisation's claims and ideals 
EM, in all its possible guises, acknowledges the infiltration of ecological ideology 
throughout all aspects of contemporary global capitalist economies. In principle, it 
can be said that there are three main aspects to EM as a policy and analytical 
paradigm: 
(i) moving beyond apocalyptic orientations to see environmental problems as 
challenges for social, technical and economic reform, rather than as 
immutable problems caused by industrialisation; 
(ii) emphasising transformation of core social institutions of modernity - be it not 
beyond recognition - including science and technology, production and 
consumption, politics and governance, and the 'market', on multiple scales 
(local, national, and global); and 
(iii) positioning in the academic field distinct from counter-productivity/ 
deindustrialisation, postmodernist/strong social constructionist, and many 
neo-Marxist analyses (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000: 2). 
In light of (i) in particular, and despite the criticism which will be outlined in the 
following section, EM is the most comprehensive attempt to describe the capability of 
contemporary, western political economies to institutionalise ecological values and 
adopt environmentally benign patterns of behaviour. The common academic critique 
18 
of EM is that while it provides a tool for assessing the extent to which sustainability is 
incorporated into current policy, management and production, it lacks the ability to 
assess the degree to which this translates into actual substantive change in what is 
done and the way it is done. Moreover, it fails to provide an understanding of the 
underlying motives behind the incorporation of sustainability into modern society. 
That is, it cannot answer the question of whether this adoption of su. stainability is 
driven by a fundamental shift in societal values, or whether it represents a more 
simple technological fix that is consistent with, rather than conflicts with, the 
dominant economic paradigm. It is this failure of EM however, that makes it useful at 
the academic level, because it provides a starting point from which to answer that 
precise question - whether this environmental rhetoric translates into a) environmental 
improvements and b) to what extent this is driven by a value shift in the way people 
think about the world as opposed to an adaptation of modern industry and government 
as a means of self-perpetuation - a doctrine of reinforcement. 
EM does however recognise difference in geographies, economies, nation states, and 
industries. It caters for difference by recognising a spectrum of strong and weak 
ecologically modernising aspects in a way that also facilitates comparative analysis. 
EM provides an opportunity to observe that: 
... even if capitalism's ecological crisis is not about limits to growth, 
it is certainly about the limits to growth via ecological plunder. This 
has swiftly brought about new appreciation for the shared conditions 
of life. Awareness of ways that social life is embedded in the wider 
web of ecosystems leads away from the `contractarianism' of classical 
liberalism. (Boland 1994:138). 
The capacity to distinguish between weak and strong versions of EM does allow the 
observer to obtain a picture of whether the adoption of sustainability and related 
concepts is relatively minor, or whether this adoption of sustainability has been more 
thorough and widespread. Hajer (1995) picks up on the strong and weak dimension 
with parallel Techno-Corporatist EM (managerial implementation and technical 
environmental solutions) and Reflexive EM (an approach based on critical self 
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awareness — an environmental ideology). A more reflexive EM society, in Mol and 
Sonnenfeld's (2000) terminology, includes actual and potential capacities for 
preventing and rectifying environmental harm; consensual style governance as 
opposed to top-down national command and control regulation; involving social 
movements in governance as opposed to limiting them to the periphery; and 
acceptance that a compartmentalised understanding of the environment and economy 
is no longer acceptable. Dryzek likens the techno-corpratist approach to sustainable 
development as 'a discourse of reassurance'(1997:146) because it can result in little 
more than a commitment to 'business-as-usual'. His point is that EM tends to become 
merely a tool with which to analyse the rhetoric of political and economic institutions. 
This paper will demonstrate that the ability to do this is informative and not 
necessarily a deficiency. 
Many authors argue that multinational corporations have become increasingly adept at 
pacifying concern over environmental management and performance in business, 
whilst at the same time becoming increasingly capable of avoiding social and 
environmental equity issues in their operations. An example is petroleum giant Shell, 
which, as described by Braithwaite: 
... has become extremely proficient at side-stepping concerns over its 
operations. At the same time the company has attempted to win over the 
public by establishing its own criteria for sound practices (while 
rejecting independent monitoring) and engaging 'stakeholders' on its 
own terms... In an attempt to mollify critics, industry has adopted the 
language of environmentalism, resulting in the flourishing of 
greenwash... (1999:1). 
Welford argues that industrial companies such as Shell respond to the pressures of 
criticism by attempting to ensure that they determine the shape and direction of any 
new agenda. The dominant ideology of corporate environmentalism according to 
Welford is EM, ... and within that is the tool of eco-efficiency' (1997:3). Dryzek 
identifies five main elements to ecologically modernising business and these also 
describe characteristics of eco-efficiency: 
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(I) 'less pollution means more efficient production'; 
(II) future solutions may be more expensive than prevention in the 
first instance; 
(III) an unpolluted and aesthetically pleasing environment means a 
healthier, happier and more productive workforce which may 
even happily sacrifice wages and salaries for these 
environmental awards; 
(IV) 'green goods profit'; and 
(V) 'pollution prevention profits' (1997:142-150). 
Each of these five elements has the potential in an ecologically weak modern society 
to 'defuse the radical potential of environmentalism and deflect the energies of green 
activists without significantly changing the political economic system' (1997:142- 
150). Businesses therefore promote the EM agenda because it requires little real 
change or ensures no change need occur at all. EM does, however, provide a means to 
decipher the meaning and extent of real change, thereby providing opportunity for 
critical debate and reform. It can be simultaneously an excuse for inaction and a 
valuable tool for critical analysis of that inaction. 
EM shows how 'social constructivism and discourse analysis add essential insights to 
the analysis of contemporary politics' (Hajer 1995:3). Critics such as Dryzek assert 
that the conduct of strategic public relations exercises may be cynically aimed at 
capturing community and public support, and likewise, defenders of EM highlight this 
as an attractive stance for politicians. More elaborate environmental management 
strategies include sponsorship of a variety of public relations exercises, award and 
performance functions, NGO groups, and some government initiated programs. The 
most critical scholars of EM describe this process as a discrete form of brainwashing 
so as to quell possible criticism. Arguably this form of sponsorship can help structure 
a basis for growth where monies spent correspond witli return on investment. This 
paper asserts that EM both recognises this process and facilitates analysis of it, by 
providing the means for analysis of specific economies and of the feasibility of the 
'environmental reform trajectory' it hypothesises. To effectively apply EM however, 
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in order to outline feasible opportunities (or not) for environmental reform within the 
context of specific local conditions, EM requires refining to fit specific local 
conditions and institutional developments (Frijns et al 2000). 
Together, such technological/material objectives, mechanisms and 
institutional dimensions of ecological modernisation provide a 
useful starting point for evaluating the applicability of the theory to 
particular cases ... [and] analysis addresses two questions: to what 
extent have [particular activities or behaviours] 'ecologically 
modernised' in recent years? [And] how have these changes taken 
place (Sonnenfeld 2000:237)? 
EM thus provides a basis from which to explore ecological crises at a level beyond the 
constraints of dominant socio-economic institutions, thereby stimulating the 
development of 'deeper' ecological theories. 
2.4 Critics of Ecological Modernisation 
... competing definitions blur [EM's] usefulness as a concept. 
Does ecological modernisation refer to environmentally-
sensitive change? Does it more broadly define a style of policy 
discourse which serves either to foster better environmental 
management or to manage dissent and legitimate ongoing 
environmental destruction? Does it, instead, denote a new 
belief system or systemic change? Indeed, can it encompass all 
of these understandings (Christoff 1996:476)? 
While it can be seen that EM can mean many things, both its advocates (those 
concerned with prescription) and those who adduce evidence of its actually occurring 
(those concerned with description) can be separated into two groups, and within these 
two groupings, three specific contexts can be separated and grouped again. 
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Concerning EM as prescription, first there are those who use EM as a basis for 
analysing social transformation by comparing and contrasting cultural changes with 
regard to the environment. This includes analysis of such indicators as consumer 
preference and the presence and level of activity of non-government environmental 
organisations. As Christoff says, 'EM is used conceptually in policy analysis to 
indicate deeply embedded and ecologically self-conscious forms of cultural 
transformation' (1996:476). Second, while still using EM as an analytical tool, there 
are those who focus on interpreting the social relationships within contemporary 
environmental reform processes. Third, there are authors such as Weale who discuss 
industry and government in their capacity to change the environmental trajectory 
through uptake of green technologies and pressures of the free market (in the case of 
industry), and regulation and policy goals (in the case of government). These 
differences evidence the major strains within EM's application as an academic tool. 
Before turning to EM as descriptive of 'real-world' developments, it is useful to refer 
to Dryzek's summary of EM as a discourse. Dryzek outlines four core assumptions 
that undermine its utility to promote sound environmental outcomes. He summarises 
'discourse analysis of ecological modernisation' and the underlying assumptions of 
each category thus: 
(I) Basic Entities are Recognised or Constructed 
Complex systems 
Nature as waste treatment plant 
Capitalist economy 
The state 
(II) Assumptions about Natural Relationships 
Partnerships encompassing government, business, 
environmentalists, scientists 
Subordination of nature 
Environmental protection and econ,omic prosperity go 
together 
(III) Agents and their Motives 
- 	Partners; motivated by public good 
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(IV) Key Metaphors and Other Rhetorical Devices 
Tidy household 
Connection to progress 
Reassurance 
(Source: Dryzek 1997:146) 
As prescription and description there are multiple types and varying degrees of 
adherence to EM; similarly, there are parallel critical positions ranging from the 
teleological to the rational economic. One can, however, arrange the foci of criticisms 
of EM as description into three broad categories. For simplicity we can amalgamate 
Dryzek's third and fourth categories, as both pertain to learning and knowledge, how 
these are used, and the motives behind decisions and policy. I deal with each in turn 
and will refer to them as: 
Group 1: Holism (EM is seen to lack a holistic view of the world, a 
'depth' perspective, or intrinsic values); 
Group 2: National Reform Agendas (the claim that the existence of 
governmental policies which pertain to sustainable development 
constitutes evidence of EM occurring, is held to be a view which fails to 
recognise implementation deficits); and 
Group 3: Knowledge of the Environmental Reform Trajectory (the 
assumption is that governments and other change agents are capable of 
learning, but the critics maintain that even if they do learn, this does not 
imply positive reform or that knowledge gained will not be used to 
subvert its own intent - a combination of Dryzek's third and fourth points). 
From group one emerges the most forthright criticism of EM - that, fundamentally, 
environmental sensitivity cannot be supplied by capitalism. EM as an analytical tool, 
for interpreting the reform agenda, is held to lack a holistic view of the world (see 
Dryzek 1997, Christoff 1996). In particular, it lacks a capacity to embrace intrinsic, 
non-economic intangible values. EM can also be criticised for not having any real 
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substance, in that it can be used simply to describe the re-tooling of industry in a 
pollution-reducing context, which is certainly good for the environment, but which: 
... can view natural systems in only limited terms, as mere adjuncts 
to the human economy. Nature is treated as a source of resources 
and a recycler of pollutants ... this limited view of nature w- arrants 
green radical suspicion... (Dryzek 1997:144). 
Fuelling this suspicion are the state of the art 'technology fixes' of modern 
production systems, where: 
the stress upon setting emissions standards implies a focus on 
effects rather than causes and hence a focus on end-of-pipe 
solutions. We should not expect a great deal of emphasis, then, in 
policy discourse on the need for structural changes in production 
and consumption to reduce pollution (Weale 1992:84). 
It can also be argued that resource extractive economies such as Australia, dictated to 
as they are by global commodity prices, are unable to achieve the far-sighted holism to 
which strong, reflexive EM aspires. The momentum which drives an integrated 
economy in a given direction cannot so blithely be shifted. In such polities, 
government is essentially constrained to maintaining social and economic progress — 
and EM becomes a discourse of reassurance (Dryzek 1997). 
The second group of criticisms of EM as description highlights problems with the 
deficiencies stemming from its having evolved through the observation of national 
reform agendas, and the assumption that these are evidence of environmental care. 
This is problematic, particularly when reform agendas are not translated into real 
change or result in the transfer of old industrial processes to newly industrialising 
countries (Christoff 1996:487). Hajer (1995), Weale (J992), Dryzek (1997) and 
Boland (1994) each note that evidence for EM occurring can be found in national 
sustainability strategies. However, many strategies fail (often dismally) on the ecology 
front because often they are expressed as instruments of intention rather than 
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regulatory change, and the fact that nothing concrete is required to be done can result 
in ecological reform implementation deficits. Where some converts to EM might 
suggest that the primary function of governments is to set the policy and regulatory 
scene to achieve the internalisation of ecological values, this position suffers the 
contingent risk of 'nothing being done about implementation deficits', and it further 
assumes governmental autonomy over and above processes of globalisation. In the 
case of the Dutch NEPP, heralded as the paragon of successful EM, ... even with the 
full application of existing end-of-pipe technologies it would not be possible to 
prevent a decline in environmental quality in the Netherlands' (Weale 1992:134). 
Turning to the third EM-as-description group, which refers to the learning of 
environmental discourse and the core aspects of EM as presented by Hajer, the 
assumption that governments will recognise elements of environmental crises and 
respond through appropriate discourse is criticised as potentially naive. Even when 
perceptions may seem to change in the most profoundly ecocentric ways, this will not 
necessarily be translated into real action or policy change. Institutional rhetoric and 
ideology has multiple and potentially conflicting functions. Both as theory and 
doctrine, EM can be viewed as ideology or as an analytical tool used for a variety of 
reasons. Without clarification 'there is a danger that the term may serve to legitimise 
the continuing instrumental domination and destruction of the environment' (Christoff 
1996:476). This view is even endorsed by proponents of EM such as Hajer, who 
acknowledges that national and global policy papers such as the World Commission 
on Environment and Development's (WCED) Our Common Future (The Bruntland 
Report) can be seen as a way of pandering to core economic development institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both of which have 
since become 'central agencies for the monitoring of green policies all over the world, 
and rather than this being heralded as a success of environmentalism, it set the death-
knell of collapse' (1995:12). 
Further, Dryzek (1997) suggests that in many instances the extent of ecosystem 
damage in a given country can be shown to be a positive EM force. This is because 
when biophysical decline results in general decline in standards of living, the need for 
environmental reform is more obvious; and change for the better can be lauded as 
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impressive evidence that EM is working, when in fact all that is occurring is that 
recently lost ground is being recovered, and an early, still unsatisfactory equilibrium 
restored. Dryzek also argues that consensual or corporatist political-economic 
interrelationships do not in themselves guarantee a concern for environmental values 
(1997:14), principally because statements of intent and principles of precaution can 
simply be rhetoric. Indeed, consensus can result in greater ecological decline 
especially where the primary motive is that of short-term wealth generation, for which 
issues such as the environment may be commonly agreed to be obstructive. Dryzek 
uses the metaphor of the 'tidy household'. Governments and perhaps societies 
generally seek to maintain a level of affluence that seems to correlate with orderliness: 
For the implicit metaphor in ecological modernisation... is that of a 
tidy household. This household is concerned with maximising its 
wellbeing, but at the same time realises.., surroundings contribute to 
the household's sense of wellbeing... it is not surprising EM has 
prospered most in countries noted for the tidiness, prudence and far-
sightedness of their households... EM is a discourse of reassurance, 
at least for residents of relatively prosperous developed societies... 
(Dryzek 1997:146) 
Though Dryzek quite rightly points out that assumptions about the compatibility of 
modernity and nature, and economic development and public altruism, are combined 
with rhetorical devices to reassure the rightness of business-as-usual, this dissertation 
will nevertheless demonstrate that these elements can be used as a basis for analysis of 
'clean green' economies or political behaviour. EM provides a context for assessing 
the extent of greenness through comparing different behaviours, or providing a 
starting point to assess specific behaviours. Indeed, Dryzek admits that EM has a 
much sharper focus than does sustainable development on exactly what needs to be 
done with the capitalist political economy, especially within the confines of the 
developed nation state, because: 
Unlike sustainable development, economic redirection does not 
necessarily require a de-emphasis of the state and concomitant 
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promotion of international society and the political grass roots 
(1997:144). 
Finally, whilst Christoff suggests that because EM can be used descriptively, 
analytically or normatively this weakens it as a conceptual framework (1996:480), it is 
submitted here that what EM does deliver is a paradigm suitable fOr observing change 
and assessing commitment to an environmental agenda. Other ecological theories 
(particularly those of the deindustrialist persuasion), wherein the possibility of radical 
environmental reform is deemed impossible under capitalism, fail to achieve this. 
2.5 The Utility of Ecological Modernisation to this Thesis 
Reinforcing Dryzek's view that, while problematic, EM does have some discourse 
analysis utility, Hajer (1995:17-20) identifies five core tendencies in the way western 
society relates to its environments: humans will continue to view the environment as a 
source of material wealth and consumption; environmental change is universal but the 
way humans relate to the changing environment is culturally predetermined; in 
western globally oriented economies there is a tendency to conceptualise the 
environment romantically and as the antithesis of industrialisation; observation of 
western economies over the past four decades is characterised by particular iconic 
environmental events; and finally, the politicising of environmental decline comes 
about only as a result of levels of greenness that are learned in the community, 
government and industry, and are thereby questioned or promoted. This thesis will 
primarily focus on the latter by questioning the nature of the greenness promoted by 
government; that is, if a sustainable rhetoric was not available to the Tasmanian 
government, would economic development and its supporting policies be in any way 
modified (the question runs) in an ecologically informed direction. 
Hajer's fifth element of environmental discourse acknowledges that discursive 
strategies have a key role; environmental bad practice and environmental disasters 
only become political if they are conceptualised in environmental discourse. 
Theoretical approaches to EM differ widely, depending on the degrees of greenness 
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held by theorists themselves, which can lead to differing interpretations of elements of 
govenunental discourse. Objectivity eludes. The remainder of this paper will explore 
the ambiguity of 'greenness' and the uptake of paradigms such as sustainable 
development, particularly in a greenhouse sense. 
While Dryzek criticises EM for not guaranteeing the priority of environmental values 
within policy formulation, the utility of EM can be seen by highlighting the real 
environmental policy debt (in other words, the extent of greenness) in institutional 
politics. In Tasmania two core government-based institutions have historically 
dictated economic and political arrangements. These institutions have managed forest 
and hydro-electric power and have, through various restructures, eco-modernised, 
presenting themselves as market-responsive, independent and competitive 'clean 
green' economic units. This is in stark contrast to their behaviour in the 1970s. 
There is decreasing scientific contention over the threat of global warming and the 
greenhouse effect. Greenhouse has become common language, much like sustainable 
development has become a core policy focus within any ecologically modernising 
bureaucracy. In Tasmania, industrial growth and energy/GNP relationships as a policy 
focus left over from the old ideology of hydro-industrialisation have been ecologically 
modernised to remain key policy foci, repositioned and regaining strength through 
appeal to a clean and green marketing advantage. Is this form of EM strong/reflexive, 
or weak/rhetorical? If greenhouse was to be fully embraced and the utility of hydro-
electricity used to its greatest potential in Tasmania, a number of outdated energy 
intensive industrial processes might be replaced by smaller, more efficient and 'better 
job' businesses. Exploring greenhouse capability and the opportunity to exploit 
hydro-power generation and forestry potential within strong and weak ecologically 
modernising processes, will be undertaken to demonstrate the utility of EM as a 
conceptual framework. 
The fact that the idea of reflexive modernisation was developed by sociologists such 
as Beck and Giddens in order to analyse individual and institutional strategic action, 
provides insight into an EM problematic, that of governments sometimes confusing 
the roles of institution and of corporate citizen. Particularly where government 
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agencies are privatised they often play the role of consumer, developer and 
environmental regulator. Campbell (1999) argues that in a competing free market 
system, where determination is through consumer choice rather than scientific truths, 
government can in different instances be consumer and corporation. Being both can 
confuse goals and strategies. This confusion can surface when investigating 
governmental rhetoric and advertising campaigns, which do not necessarily represent 
scientific 'wisdom' but instead play on cultural preference. The authenticity of the 
EM process can be challenged because consumer preference can be manipulated by 
new labelling of old goods. Thus contemporary environmental reform needs to be 
considered in light of perceptions of management strategies and information 
presentation by governments and business. 
When government and/or its agencies are competing in the free market as semi-
privatised entities, the key overarching role of 'government' as the 'body politick' 
arises from the need to continually re-evaluate and reinvent strategies to achieve 
ideological, often axiomatic, goals. This becomes a balancing act between competitive 
economic development and social and environmental obligation, the ultimate balance 
being that to which reflexive EM refers. Some would argue, for example, that 
privatisation is the purest and most straightforward means of achieving efficiency in 
the economy by leaving the cut-and-thrust decisions to private motives. While it may 
or may not result in more efficient economic growth, what it fails to consider are the 
social and environmental impacts. This is because not all environmental and social 
solutions can supplement overarching goals of profit. As a result, a 'not necessarily 
for profit' obligation is essential in government. Hence another dimension of 
perception/information management exists alongside the corporate, and this additional 
layer of complexity can defuse or deflect environmentally inspired citizen action: 
The apocalyptic overtones in the presentation of global environmental 
problems seriously confines the political debate on what needs to be 
done, by whom, and under what conditions. Hence there is ample reason 
to examine in detail how the priority issues in environmental politics are 
defined, as well as trying to understand the implicit political decisions 
that are being made through environmental discourse (Hajer 1995:11). 
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Using greenhouse as an environmental policy context, this paper will demonstrate the 
validity of this position. It will include understanding the development opportunities 
stemming from regulations that create a carbon constrained future and it will assess 
the political/policy decisions that are being made in this context — weak, in a top 
down, reactive and rhetorical sense, or strong and proactive, in a reflexive sense. The 
remaining chapters will thus explore elements of why, where, and how the Tasmanian 
government is attempting to exploit development opportunities with a renewable-
industrialisation and greenhouse rhetoric as a core management strategy. The 
potential of Tasmanian public, private and natural goods to provide competitive 
advantages will be discussed, with particular emphasis on the pros and cons of various 
issues confronting consumers. Dilemmas such as greenhouse sinks in the form of 
plantations on cleared agricultural land versus maintenance of rural lifestyle values, 
consumer perceptions of solar power versus large and 'dirty old' hydro schemes, and 
marketing strategies such as GreenPower, will be used to support a core argument: 
that, while greenhouse provides an opportunity for businesses and government to 
appear to be ecologically modernising, in reality environmental intentions need to be 
questioned. 
The remainder of the thesis will describe potentially conflicting goals and obligations 
and the policy opportunities the greenhouse model presents as a demonstration of the 
ecological modernisation of two key public utilities attempting to reinvent and 
legitimise themselves whilst aligning to economic policy assumptions which have 
remained constant for over half a century. 
2.6 The Extent to which this Study Makes Sense of Ecological Modernisation as 
an Analytical Tool. 
It has been shown that EM provides a basis from which to observe the industrial 
transformation of different economic sectors and the extent of state intervention in 
ecological reform. Observation of environmental management on the part of industry, 
consequences for employees, and changes in technological trajectories, enable 
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analysis of development opportunities and likely benefits to society. EM offers a 
means of analysing the discourse and thereby gauging the degree to which there is 
dissonance or concurrence between environmental policy-speak on the one hand and 
the actual drivers of policy on the other and whether this relationship is strong or 
weak. 
This thesis makes sense of EM as a guide to identifying the extent of top-down policy 
pressure and resulting local policy debt/lag/awareness often communicated in a 
rhetoric which purports to be otherwise. This will be achieved by assessing the 
potential for extensive competitive advantage through Tasmania's contingent 
greenhouse position (significant carbon sinks, extensive use of renewable electricity 
and a clean green image) without major structural change. The case studies will 
explore how this contingency may or may not accord with reality. The likelihood of a 
match between what is likely to be real and what is conveyed will be shown to be 
excessively optimistic. Combined with this over-optimism, the paper will evidence 
both historical and contemporary policy strategies to identify the extent of strong 
reflexive or weak EM as they are demonstrated through changing discursive practices 
and emerging new ideologies couched in greenhouse discourse. It is likely that 
Tasmania's greenhouse policy position will reflect that found in one aspect of Finnish 
policy: 
The findings on Finnish agri-environmental policy are somewhat 
contradictory. On one hand, especially in the policy discourses, there 
are signs of transition consistent with the ecological modernisation 
theory. On the other, from the institutional and practice-oriented 
perspective, the evidence suggests only some minor changes, even 
stability in agri-environmental regulation... (Jokinen 2000:1) 
As a case study greenhouse and the extent to which the Tasmanian government has 
accommodated a greenhouse rhetoric through two core environmental businesses arms 
that have been at the centre of environmental conflict will be explored. It does this in 
anticipation of Hajer's question, is EM essentially rhetorical purporting to reconcile 
the irreconcilable (environment v development) - 
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... only to take the wind out of the sails of 'real environmentalists' 
... or a much more profound meaning [that] could be seen as the 
first step on the bridge towards a new sort of sustainable modern 
society?... this openness makes EM the intriguing subject that it is 
(1995:34). 
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3. Interpreting Greenhouse Credentials: a clean, green and 
ecologically modernised industry 
This chapter explores what the environment industry is, more specifically examining 
the types of activities that can be considered to be 'greenhouse' oriented. It will 
include an exploration of the core elements of the Kyoto Protocol and greenhouse 
policy approaches in the United States and Australia. Critical to these policies are the 
industries that would be developed, and processes that would be changed, in order to 
put greenhouse strategies into practice. By identifying those activities that might 
comprise the 'greenhouse industry' this chapter will provide a foundation from which 
later chapters will interpret business capability and opportunity, as well as the 
competitive advantage and investment attractiveness Tasmania has to offer in a 
greenhouse context, and how this is becoming part of the government's environmental 
discourse. 
3.1 Toward Defining the Environment Industry 
The range of definitions of the 'environment industry' or 'environmental industries' is 
vast, and there is herein no attempt to be comprehensive. It is, however, useful to 
consider examples of how the environment industry has been defined in the context of 
our assessment of the greenhouse industry. This section draws upon the approach 
taken in the Tasmanian Department of State Development's (DSD) audit of 
environmental industries (Becicitt, Davies and Smith 1999). 
There is no universally accepted definition of the environment industry. One view is 
that, technically speaking, the 'environment industry' does not exist (Statistics Canada 
1996) - primarily because no formal statistical codes have been developed within 
environmental jurisdictions. Another view restricts the definition of the environment 
industry to limited and measurable activities that largely focus on waste, such as 
pollution control and resource management (Australian Bureau of Statistics). Yet 
other approaches define it more broadly. For example, the environment industry can 
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comprise 'industries whose activities make a positive contribution to ecologically 
sustainable development' (Crowley 1999). Definitions more narrowly confined to the 
management of waste, pollution, energy, environmental monitoring and other services 
also exist. 
The utility of exploring definitional issues resides in the need to establish a basis from 
which to benchmark and compare environmental performance (or green credentials) 
based on relevant business activity. An aim of the thesis is to interpret 'credible' 
greenhouse based business activity, within the context of the observation that, if no (or 
even few) high-profile environmental businesses already exist within a regional 
economy, establishing green credentials can be difficult. 
3.1.1 Statistical Constraints 
It is very difficult to assess environmental performance; to benchmark (for example) 
levels of acceptable environment deterioration. In the first instance there are the 
inherent difficulties involved in measuring compliance and non-compliance with 
environmental legislation. Added to this, a myriad of environmental management 
tools have evolved, and their application and use frequency could potentially be 
measured. Environmental management tools, however, span local, state, national and 
international jurisdictions, and include such devices as: formalised International 
Organisation for Standardisation's (ISO) environmental management system ISO 
14001 (an environmental management system designed for businesses to develop a 
systematic management approach to the environmental concerns/obligations of their 
organisation, which can then 'credibly' demonstrate to clients how the business is 
striving to effect positive environmental transformation in management); new 
Commonwealth corporations law (S 299(1) (f), which requires businesses operating 
under certain environmental permits and licenses to produce public environmental 
reports); and guidelines for the production of various State of the Environment and 
Impact Assessment Reports. 
Because of this plethora of approaches to environmental management, setting in place 
a conceptual framework with adequate rigour for benchmarlcing performance poses 
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significant problems. Adding further complexity is the evolving nature of 
management tools and a characteristic lack of clarity on the precise nature and detail 
of performance requirements. Nevertheless, specific statistical approaches have been 
developed. 
The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) codes 
industry by variously determined categories. ANZSIC was developed (in part by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS]) for the production and analysis of industry 
statistics in Australia and New Zealand (1993:1). Measuring business activity in those 
categories considered to be environmental activity provides an indication of the green 
credentials of businesses, regions or localities. Existing codes which are likely to 
cover the environment industry are: 
3702 Sewerage and Drainage Systems Services 
7821 Technical Services: Architectural Services (including landscape architecture 
and town planning) 
7823 Engineering Consulting (including product design) 
7829 Technical Services not elsewhere classified: including Pollution Monitoring 
and Scientific not elsewhere classified 
7855 Business Management Services: including Environmental Consultancy 
(excluding laboratory services) 
8113 Local Government Administration: Environmental Standards Control 
The above categories can be inclusive of various environmental activities, while 
excluding others. Statistics Canada comments that: 
This is not surprising because the environment industry 
consists of business involved in activities that span a 
number of different industries in the Standard Statistical 
Classification (Statistics Canada 1996). 
The ABS also has two broad environmental industry descriptors: environmental 
protection, and natural resource use and management. Environmental protection is 
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defined as 'that expenditure aimed at preventing, reducing or eliminating 
environmental pollution or any other degradation of the environment'. Natural 
resource use and management is defined as 'expenditure relating to the use and/or 
management for economic or social purposes of natural resources, including land, 
water, flora and fauna, sub-soil assets and energy' (Dyass, pers comm, 1999; see also 
ABS 1998b). 
The ABS publication Environment Protection Expenditure Australia 1995-96 and 
1996-97 notes definitional difficulties in this area and in an attempt to strengthen the 
possibilities for international comparison has applied the key environmental domains 
provided within the European System for Economic Information on the Environment 
(SERIEE): 
- waste management; 
- waste water and water protection; 
- ambient air and climate protection; 
protection of biodiversity and landscape; 
protection of soil and groundwater; and 
other environment protection activities. 
The last of these domains, the 'other' category, constitutes an implicit difficulty with 
environmental activity. The ABS describes other environmental protection activities 
as 'those activities that are either not covered by the other domains, or those 
expenditures that cross over two or more domains and cannot be split' (1998b:58). 
The categories developed by the International Business Information Service (IBIS) 
also present difficulties when it comes to narrowing down environmental activity to 
specific statistical classifications. IBIS business reports canvass the environmental 
industries in a roundabout way, via the following categories that may include 
components of the 'environmental industries': 
- Technical Services; 
- Business Management Services; 
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- Architectural Services; 
- Sewage and Drainage Services; and 
Consulting Engineering Services. 
3.1.2 A Broader Approach 
The DSD (1999) audit of environmental industries notes that the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has attempted to establish a 
working definition of the global environmental goods and services industry, whilst 
also noting that 'the boundaries of the industry are blurred and not easily defined' 
(1993:3). Central to the debate is the differentiation between activities that clean up 
existing processes and production (end of pipe devices, for example, smoke stack 
filters), activities that 'reduce the need for clean up and end of pipe treatment', and 
activities which focus on 'clean technologies and products' (such as renewable 
energies) (OECD 1996a:4). The differences between these activity types underpin the 
'greenness' and, therefore, the green credentials of business. In an EM sense, an 
observation of weak greenness may be evidenced by technology add-ons to business-
as-usual which simply suffice environmental obligations, as opposed to more strong 
or reflexive approaches such as redesigning an entire business process from the 
bottom up to systemically engender environmental responsibility. 
After extensive consultation the OECD produced an indicative list of activities which 
are likely to comprise the environment industry (Appendix 1). At the broadest level 
of definition core and non-core activities are as set out in Table 3.1. 
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TABLE 3.1  
OECD BROAD LEVEL CORE AND NONE-CORE ACTIVITIES 
CORE activities NON CORE activities 
A. Environmental Goods 
Production of equipment, technology and 
specific materials for: 
A. Environmental Goods 
Production of equipment, technology 
for: 
1. Air pollution control 1. Potable water treatment 
2. Waste water management 2. Other recycling systems 
3. Solid waste management 3. Renewable energy plant 
4. Remediation/cleanup of soil and water 4. Heat/energy management 
5. Noise/vibration control 5. Cleaner/efficient processes 
6. Environmental monitoring, analysis and 6. Cleaner/efficient products 
assessment 7. Alternative agriculture/fisheries 
8. Sustainable forestry 
9. Others 
B. Environment Services B. Environmental Services 
Provision of services for: Provision of services and construction 
7. Air pollution control for: 
8. Waste water management 10. Other recycling/recovery plant 
9. Solid waste management 11. Renewable energy plant 
10. Remediation/cleanup of soil and water 12. Amenity/conservation 
11. Noise/vibration control 13. Alternative agriculture/fisheries 
12.Environmental contracting/engineering 14. Sustainable forestry 
13. 	Environmental 	research 	and 15. Eco-tourism 
development 16. Other services (e.g. industry 
14. Analytical services, data collection and 
analysis 
associations) 
15. Environmental education and training, 
information 
In its interpretation and application of the OECD definitions DSD used the framework 
outlined in Table 3.2. Tasmanian environmental businesses consulted by DSD during 
the audit process tended to support the above framework. Very few of these 
businesses required placement within the 'other' categories (A 9. and B 16. in Table 
3.1), and those that did suggested very specialised activity. What is interesting for this 
thesis is that production of equipment and technology for renewable energy plant and 
sustainable forestry are' considered non-core under the' OECD definition. 
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TABLE 3.2 
DSD ENVIRONMENTAL INDUSTRIES 
1. Engineering Based Technologies to Aid Environmental Management 
- Pollution control/equipment manufacture 
- Process 	simulation, 	modelling, 	design 	and 	optimisation, 
e.g. buildings energy performance modelling, industrial heat flow 
modelling 
- Process monitoring and control 
- Logistical analysis and control systems 
- Information technologies 
- Biotechnology, e.g. for waste treatment and pollution control 
— Materials science 
2. Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy 
- Energy efficiency in buildings: insulation, high-efficiency boilers, low-
energy lighting 
- Energy efficiency in equipment, e.g. variable motors and drives 
- Carbon sinks and emission trading (forest related) 
- Public transport 
- Infrastructure for cycling, walking 
- Landfill gas recovery 
- Renewable energy (1): wind, hydro, solar, possible tidal and wave 
- Renewable energy (2): biomass, including energy, forestry, waste 
incineration and digestion. 
3. Management Tools/Consultancy Services 
- Environmental impact assessment 
- Environmental auditing and management systems 
- Environmental accounting 
- Life cycle analysis 
— Environmental Planning,/Policy/Legislation 
— Environmental Risk Assessment 
4. Waste Management Related 
- Repairing and reconditioning 
- Dismantling, reclamation and parts exchange 
- Collection, transport and sorting infrastructure for re-use, refilling and 
recycling 
- Reprocessing and recycling of waste materials 
- Waste heat recovery and re-use, both within processes and, for example, 
horticulture and district heating 
- Renewable materials, e.g. natural fibres and timber substitutes for plastic, 
e.g. hemp 
5. Other Environment Protection Activities 
— Research and Development 
Source: Department of State Development (1999:21-22) 
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These categorisations illustrate the interconnected nature of the environment 
industries. They are also applicable to the search for a definition of the greenhouse 
industry, and for a framework which gauges green credibility. 
3.2 Green Development: Green Jobs, Work and Opportunity 
Because of the difficulties in establishing the boundaries of what constitutes the 
environment/green industries, there is a variety of characteristics adduced to influence 
policy and planning in government. One of the key drivers for development in our 
economy is the creation of jobs. This thesis seeks to explore development 
opportunities arising from greenhouse. Contemporary thought on green jobs can 
further help establish what development opportunities greenhouse presents, and the 
green credentials of a 'greenhouse industry'. The argument is that if a valid 
conceptual framework can be extracted from something as abstract as 'green work', a 
valid descriptor of what constitutes a 'greenhouse industry' can be far more easily 
actualised. This is because science and policy establish quantitative boundaries which 
delineate the 'greenhouse effect' and corresponding policies to mitigate it. In contrast, 
describing green work leads one into more qualitative/perceptual theoretical realms. 
Discussion of the latter also contributes to this dissertation in that evaluating 
ecological modernisation and assessing 'good' environmental stewardship often 
resides in perception management and attitudes concerning what constitutes real 
ecological reform. 
In discussion of 'green jobs' programs from Australia and Denmark, Penny (pers 
comm, 1999) suggests five key areas of hindrance within general economic 
development in advancing the green jobs model: 
an increasing class of people who are excluded from paid work because the 
nature of available jobs is unhealthy, environmentally destructive, or otherwise 
unsatisfying (for example, an individual committed to furthering 
environmental stewardship within their local community may be marginalised 
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because the only work opportunities exist in environmentally unsustainable 
businesses); 
a need to restructure human economies and communities to stop damage to 
ecosystems; 
(I) and (II) often impact negatively upon one another (a satisfying job may not 
be eco-friendly and visa versa); 
IV. 'good' jobs and environmental protection are often seen as antagonistic, 
historically evident in environmentalist/union conflict; and 
V. lack of integration between policy areas and of organisational collaboration. It 
is evident that many organisations and government agencies are working on 
finding solutions to employment problems which move towards sustainability 
but are not in touch with one another. 
Further, Penny notes that employees generally do not evaluate the characteristics 
which are relevant to defining a 'green or brown job', but confine their interest to 
criteria accepted as defining a 'good job', such as an attractive salary. But elements 
that comprise a 'good' job are often not confined to financial return and working 
conditions. Penny's research highlights the solidarity and comradeship attached to 
mining jobs even though many mines may be operating with outdated technologies 
and production processes, be dirty, dangerous, and even be inappropriate in light of 
new technologies, resource depletion and climate change. The 'good job' perception 
must be addressed in attempting to restructure working populations and work 
practices. A greenhouse friendly job may not necessarily be a 'good job'. 
These issues suggest a further obstacle to defining precisely what green jobs are: there 
is a considerable difference between using the 'process' whereby products are made as 
the determinant of a green job, and using the environmental soundness of the 'end-
product' as the assessing criterion. From each perspective wildly conflicting results 
emerge. It is entirely possible to maintain that scrubbing dirty emissions is not a green 
job. An 'end product' approach will suggest that a photovoltaic cell is a green 
product, though the manufacture of the steel frame which holds the cell is not. 
Similarly, such an approach suggests that cleaner production implemented in a factory 
whose end product is a styrofoam cup is not necessarily green work (Penny, pers 
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comm, 1999). People in a production line involved in cleaner production processes, 
on the other hand, would be classified as being involved in green jobs if the criterion 
is not the environmental worth of the end product but the environmental quality of the 
production process, and this would be so regardless of the environmental value of the 
end product. 
Penny suggests a further example: public transport and associated infrastructure which 
are not included in a definition of green jobs. The end product of public transport is 
moving people from one place to another and is not, on the face of it, discretely 
environmental, yet most people do adjudge public transport as 'environmental'. This 
problem becomes more complex when extended down to the micro-level of transport. 
For example, how are we to categorise these cases? 
A train driver may bum massive amounts of fossil fuel to transport goods and 
people from A to B, but arguably reduces the number of smaller vehicles being 
used. 
A road construction worker may burn massive amounts of fossil fuel to construct, 
prepare and enable the greater utilisation of more smaller vehicles, but potentially 
with greater efficiency and lower congestion than previously. 
Each of these examples has to be viewed in terms of what the alternatives would be in 
the context of the local environment, of available capital/technology and of the 
ultimate choices made relative to business-as-usual (this will be evidenced in the 
Tasmanian case study of 'renewable industrialisation opportunities' in Chapter 5). 
(Interestingly enough, the definition framework adopted from the OECD in section 
1.2 includes public transport and infrastructure such as walking and cycling tracks as 
environmental.) 
The crucial issues presented by the green jobs debate that can add value to this paper 
rest in how governments and society perceive and value production. The pursuit of 
greenhouse related jobs will not add value to the Tasmanian economy if value is not 
placed on the importance of the work. Employment opportunities need to be 
understood in parallel with Tasmania's natural competitive advantages so as to 
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develop systems of production which maximise potential for growth in social, 
environmental and economic terms. 
3.3 Defining the Greenhouse Industry 
Discussion so far has outlined the difficulties in conceptualising and defining the 
environment industry and green jobs. This discussion is directly transferable to the 
notion of a 'greenhouse industry', which is a subset of the environment industry. It is, 
however, necessary to outline the characteristics which differentiate greenhouse 
activities from other environmental industries more generally. Once these 
characteristics have been established an exploration of greenhouse opportunities in 
Tasmania can be undertaken. Also needed is an analysis of concepts relevant to the 
uptake of environmental responsibility, environmental marketing and environmental 
competitive advantage. This will include debate on external and internal drivers 
within the greenhouse industry. 
The central driving force for the greenhouse industry is the Kyoto Protocol, adopted 
by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The Protocol established several differentiated levels of commitment to 
emissions reduction in highly developed (Annex B countries) countries (it should be 
noted that Annex B and Annex 1 tend to be used interchangeably, though, the list of 
countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol differs from the list of countries in Annex 
1 of the UNFCCC by the addition to the latter of Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and 
Slovenia and the removal of Belarus and Turkey). At the general level parties agreed 
to greenhouse gas abatement to at least five percent below 1990 levels for the first 
commitment period of 2008-12, though Australia managed to negotiate an eight 
percent increase, and Iceland and Norway also negotiated increases (see Figure 1). 
The Kyoto targets and flexibility mechanisms designed to achieve these targets have 
become key commercial and policy drivers for greenhouse industry development: 
From an economic perspective the setting of greenhouse gas 
emissions targets in the Protocol was the key decision taken at 
Kyoto because of the significant potential economic and trade 
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competitiveness implications they hold. Now that individual 
country targets have been set, the international policy debate has 
shifled toward the question of effective and environmentally 
credible implementation of the protocol... The Kyoto mechanisms 
are a number of important flexibility provisions contained in the 
protocol — emissions trading, joint implementation and the- clean 
development mechanism — that, if implemented, could reduce the 
cost of meeting abatement targets (ABARE 1999:2). 
The flexibility mechanisms are intended to allow countries to develop customised 
methods for investing in emissions reduction, and to manage emissions accounts: 
The Protocol sets up a checking account for each industrialised 
("Annex B") nation, and deposits in that account five years of 
allowable greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions (for the 2008-2012 
period). The amount of allowances for each nation is set as a 
percentage of the nation's 1990 emissions levels. Each nation 
commits to limit its emissions to the amount in its account. A 
nation emitting fewer GhGs than allowed will have surplus 
allowances; a nation exceeding allowed levels will have a deficit 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 1998:1). 
In order to explore greenhouse development opportunities recognition of these 
international mechanisms is essential. Nations will adopt technologies and develop 
economic and environmental instruments to comply with international incentives. In 
order to ensure that these opportunities can be captured in a technical definition, the 
thesis adopts a definition of the greenhouse industry that encompasses those activities 
which focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and on sequestering carbon 
through carbon sink development, by means of the activities/specialisations outlined 
in section 1.2: 
engineering based technologies to aid emission reduction and sink development; 
45 
- energy conservation and renewable energy to aid emission reduction and sink 
development; 
- management tools/consultancy services to aid emission reduction and sink 
development; 
waste management to aid emission reduction and sink development; and 
other environment protection activities to aid emission reducti6n and sink 
development (including greenhouse gas measurement, Clean Development 
Mechanism and joint implementation initiatives). 
Application of these criteria would likely see almost any activity included as a 
participant in the greenhouse industry. An exploration of greenhouse industry 
development opportunities therefore needs to take account of local physical and 
economic geography, as well as local energy and emissions profiles, science, law and 
geopolitics. The application of EM theory to analyse specific greenhouse discourse 
requires an understanding of the quality and/or extent of various activities within its 
geographic and regulatory environment in order that a judgement of sink or abatement 
capacity can be compared with alternatives, and quality of life indicators such as 
'good' employment placed on the importance of the work. 
Because the Kyoto Protocol has set individual targets for countries to meet, the policy 
impetus revolves around cost effective and environmentally credible implementation 
of the protocol (ABARE 1992:2) which should require economic and scientific rigour. 
The following section therefore examines aspects of policy approaches in the United 
States and Australia that aim at greenhouse abatement. This will demonstrate the 
economic and development focus of the Protocol as the core influence on policy 
design, a fundamental characteristic that evidences EM in process. The policy 
approaches (and in particular the Australian approach) clearly illustrate that the 
guiding principles and courses of action reflect an accumulation of policy debt, 
particularly when considering their implementation and corresponding strategies. 
Turning to the smallest Australian state, Tasmania, the trickle-down policy philosophy 
and its translation into on-the-ground development opportunities will be shown to be 
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little more than green rhetoric for governmental self-promotion, and evidence of weak 
EM. Where the Commonwealth is signatory to international treaties, ill-considered 
implementation methodologies can potentially undermine the original policy 
objectives. Policy decisions higher up the governance chain can promote 
implementation difficulties and prolong the accumulation of policy debt at the bio-
regional level. 
FIGURE 3.2 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
THE AVEkAGE COMMITMENT FOR ALL ANNEX 1 COUNTRIES IS AN EMISSION REDUCTION OF• 
1 5.2  PERCENT BY 2008 TO 2012 BASED ON 1990 LEVELS. Source: Kay (1998:2)  
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3.4 The US and Australian Approaches 
A detailed outline of greenhouse reducing approaches taken in other Annex B 
countries is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is useful however to note some 
similarities between the Australian and US approaches. The US has adopted a mix of 
policy initiatives and measures, as analysed by Bernow et al (1999a) and summarised 
in Table 3.3. The US approach comprises: 
... a robust mix of complementary approaches, including 
incentives, market creation and transformation, regulatory 
modernisation, technical assistance, efficiency and performance 
standards, research and development, and tax reform (Bernow et 
al 1999b:10). 
TABLE 3.3 
AMERICA'S GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS 
TRANSPORTATION 
* A vehicle efficiency initiative. 
including: progressively stronger fuel 
economy standards for cars and utility 
vehicles; an efficiency and emissions 
based rebate system for vehicle 
purchases: 1.2.8,-,D for improved design, 
materials and technologies; public 
sector market creation program.s for 
cleaner and more efficient vehicles; 
and standards and incentives for 
freight trucks and other commercial 
modes. 
• Urban/regional transportation demand 
management and related incentives: 
pricing retbrms, including congestion 
and emissions-based pricing; land-use 
and infrastructure planning for 
improved access to alternative and 
complementary travel modes, 
including transit, walking and biking: 
facilitation of high speed intercity rail 
development: pricing, planning and 
informational initiatives to promote 
intermodal freight movement. 
INDUSTRY 
* Tax incentives to stimulate greater 
levels of investment in new more 
efficient energy-using manufacturing 
equipment, and R.D&D to bring down. 
the costs and speed the availability of 
more efficient equipment; 
• Regulatory refinement and technical 
assistance to remove disincentives -for 
industrial combined heat and power 
(CUP), whereby electricity is 
generated on-site, rather than imported 
from the grid. by using the same fuels 
that produce heat for manufacturing, 
processes. 
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• .A progressively stronger cap on the 
carbon intensity of motor fuels, 
reaching a 10 percent reduction by 
2010: R&D for cellulosic ethanol, 
other renewable fuels and associated 
vehicle technologies; renewable fuels 
commercialisation programs in various 
market segments, including public 
sector procurement programs. 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
• .A progressively increased, renewable 
portfolio standard, that would require 
suppliers to collectively provide 10 
percent of generation. by 2010 with 
renewable resources, with a credit 
trade system to ensure that the national 
target is met with a regional 
distribution that results in lowest cost. 
O A tightening of the 1.990 Clean Air 
Act Amendment sulphur dioxide cap, 
which now halves the sector's 
emissions from 1.990 levels to 9 
million tons by 2000, to reduce them 
further to about 3.5 million ton.s by 
2010. Also, a cap and trade systems 
for nitrogen oxides and fine 
particulates; to bring their levels down. 
These pollution restrictions would 
reduce coal use and, thereby, carbon 
emissions. 
• A. requirement for co-firing of biomass 
in coal plants, with credit trading, 
which. is progressively increased to 10 
percent by 2010, providing near-term 
carbon reductions and stimulating 
development of that resource. 
O A cap and trade (or tax) for carbon 
emissions to reduce the carbon. 
intensity of the sector between 1990 
and 201.0 by about 40 percent. 
COMMERCIAL and RESIDENTIAL 
BUILDINGS 
• Appliance and building standards that 
would establish norms for equipment, 
design and performance which, 
through, purchases and practices, 
would reduce energy used to provide 
services in homes and offices. 
• Market transformation incentives 
including technology demonstrations, 
manuthcturer incentives, and 
consumer education to reduce barriers 
to energy savings and ren.ewables. 
O Initiatives to expand the use of 
combined heat and power for district 
energy systems. 
Source: Bernow et al (1999b:12-17) 
Australia became a party to the UNFCCC in 1992. The Convention aims to stabilise 
emissions of greenhouse gases at a level that would prevent dangerous, human-
induced interference with the climate system. It was further strengthened when the 
Kyoto Protocol, was accepted in principle (but not ratified) in December 1997. 
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The National Greenhouse Strategy (NGS) is the primary mechanism through which 
Australia's international commitments will be met: 
It aims to limit Australia's net greenhouse gas emissions, whilst 
developing knowledge about greenhouse issues and laying the 
foundations for adaptation to climate change (Department of 
Primary Industries, Water and Environment 1999:8). 
The NGS is an extension of programs launched by all Australian Governments in 
1992, the National Greenhouse Response Strategy. The NGS provides for monitoring 
of progress, especially in relation to the Kyoto emission target, and for ongoing review 
of monitoring regimes in light of changes in circumstances. The first review will be 
conducted during 2002, or earlier if necessitated by developments relating to the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Implementation of the NGS involves major 
reductions in Australia's projected emissions growth, as consistent with meeting 
international commitments. 
The Commonwealth, states and territories, in cooperation with local government and 
industry, worked collaboratively to develop the NGS, which was finally launched in 
1998. It has three main fronts: 
1. improving awareness and understanding of greenhouse issues; 
2. limiting growth of greenhouse emissions and enhancing sink capacity; and 
3. developing adaptation responses. 
These core objectives and related industry development opportunities can be 
summarised by subject headings within five of the key NGS modules : 
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Module 1 PROFILING AUSTRALIA 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
• Preparing and improving greenhouse 
inventories 
• Projecting future emissions 
Module 4 EFFICIENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY USE AND 
SUPPLY 
• Harnessing renewable energy 
• Improving end-use energy efficiency 
Module 5 .EFFICIENT TRANSPORT AND 
SUSTAINABLE URBAN PI_ANNING 
O Integrating landuse and transport 
planning 
O Travel demand and traffic management 
* Encouraging greater use of public 
transport, walking and cycling 
O Improving vehicle efficiency and fuel 
technologies 
o Freight and logistics systems 
Module 6 GREENHOUSE SINKS AND 
SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT 
• Enhancing greenhouse sinks 
• Enhancing sustainable forestry and 
vegetation management 
• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from agricultural production 
Module 7 GREENHOUSE BEST 
PRACTICE IN INDUSTRIAL 
PROCESSES AND WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
o Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from ind.ustry 
• Reducing methane emissions from waste 
treatment disposal  
Source: National Greenhouse Strategy 
(1998:3) 
TABLE 3.4 
KEY NGS MODULES 
From this brief overview of elements of the US and Australian policy approaches to 
greenhouse, consistent themes can be seen to emerge. These themes also blend very 
well with the definitional trends described above for the greenhouse industry. For 
example: 
Bases for Defming the Greenhouse 
Industry 
Greenhouse Policy Approaches 
- Engineering and technology approaches 
- Energy Conservation 
- Management Tools 
- encouraging greenhouse best practice 
incentives to stimulate greater levels of 
investment in new more efficient 
energy-using manufacturing equipment, 
and :RD&D 
- introduction of renewable energy 
percentiles for generators and retailers.  , - profiling and benchmarking, emissions 
internationally and nationally and 
introducing environmental and market 
acceptable limits 
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These three examples clearly evidence the US and Australian governments' policy 
approaches which are becoming increasingly market oriented and consumer/developer 
sensitive, 'encouraging and stimulating' rather than being 'regulatory and enforcing'. 
This is reflected on a global level in the Kyoto Protocol, with its flexible mechanisms 
and opportunities for national approaches to implementation. 
The Kyoto Protocol can be likened to Our Common Future and the corresponding 
national adoption strategies analysed by EM theorists and canvassed in Chapter 2. 
Earlier it was argued that evidence of weak EM includes tendencies for top-down 
policy generation, and the existence of a rhetorical environmental discourse at the 
expense of concrete environmental best practice and a genuine commitment to 
ecological outcomes. The brief outline offered in this chapter demonstrates 
greenhouse as a prominent element in international ecological modernisation. Global 
warming has become such a major issue that the majority of OECD countries now 
attempt to demonstrate their commitment and effort towards greenhouse abatement by 
way of national policies and statements of intention to reduce pollution levels. This 
process simultaneously allows a polity to develop a policy rhetoric and claim political 
credits from green credentials when the 'greenness' from many perspectives is 
extremely dubious (for example, by claiming that their nuclear power generation 
capacity is greenhouse friendly). 
3.5 Prologue: Setting the Greenhouse Scene for Tasmania as an EM Case Study 
Greenhouse development is the example par excellence of EM (and neo-liberalist 
policy approaches for environmentalism generally), and provides a framework for 
interrogating policy rhetoric and the institutional uptake of environmental values. 
The remaining chapters combine this and the greenhouse definition to analyse 
Tasmanian policy trends and political events in forest and renewable energy 
management. Accessing and processing Tasmania's forest resources and the building 
of hydro-electricity schemes have been at the frontier of economic development in 
Tasmania. These _resources have not been developed with an environmental 
consciousness, but within a mode of thinking dominated by development imperatives 
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based upon a strategy of resource extraction and energy expansion. It will be 
demonstrated that while these industries are presently being marketed as greenhouse 
friendly ('clean and green'), these values are superficial only and have not been 
instilled into the mainstream development ethic. The actual opportunity to market and 
develop the Tasmanian economy in terms of greenhouse credibility will be shown to 
be far more limited than this rhetoric suggests. It is constrained by environmental 
capability, historically accumulated policy debt, and an inability of governments and 
established institutions to embrace a reflexive approach to EM (largely due to 
historical constraints). 
Tasmania acts as an overall greenhouse sink. In a greenhouse conscious global 
economy, this should provide a potential economic advantage to the state. The thesis 
of this study is that the Tasmanian government will not be able to take advantage of 
this position though it suggests that it can. 
Economic processes in the global economy give rise to competitive pressures for 
traditional commodity-based industries and regional and resource dependent 
economies to 'manufacture' expressions of competitiveness in order to attract global 
investment in forms that differentiate them from their competitors. Traditionally, 
exploitable characteristics have included labour costs, proximity to markets and 
concessions or incentives provided by governments (such as the provision of cheap 
electricity). More recently, environmental credentials and a marketable 'green' image 
have been added to this box of tools. These are partly the result of the globalisation of 
the economy, and partly the result of a growing international environmental 
consciousness. 
Tasmania is one such small, remote, resource-based economy. Intensive competition 
for international capital has forced continual repackaging of its economy and its 
resource profile to fit global markets. Historically, this has resulted in a constant 
accumulation of 'policy debt' - political institutions that operate constantly in a 
reactive top-down mode as opposed to being proactive and 'reflexive'. Opposition to 
this trend is most evidenced by the emergence of green politics, which matured from a 
conservation movement more commonly associated with the 'alternative' social fringe 
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of the 1960s, into an organised political movement participating successfully in the 
formal electoral system. Hay notes, in opposition to the political stability that 
characterised the decades prior to the 1970s: 
With the mobilisation of vigorous opposition to hydro-industrial 
hegemony in the form of the abortive campaign to save from hydro-
inundation the jewel in the wilderness crown', Lake Pedder, 
Tasmanians were suddenly faced with disputations about first 
principle and alternative visions (1991: 63). 
The flooding of Lake Pedder in the early 1970s to produce cheap electricity for 
industrial development marked the first major event in Australian conservation 
politics: 
In Tasmania, the dominant values find expression in a deep-rooted 
ideology of hydro-industrialisation... the supply of cheap hydro- 
electric power became an article of faith for several generations — the 
central unquestionable plank in what passed in Tasmania for political 
thought (Hay 1987:4). 
In the decades following, further development of hydro-electric schemes provided a 
point of coalescence for groups and individuals of the green persuasion. Tasmania's 
Hydro-Electric Corporation strongly influenced the management of the economy and 
politics, but so strong was the unity among conservationists and so potent their 
political response that the traditional two party system could no longer command the 
allegiance of almost all Tasmanian voters. From its fledgling days as the United 
Tasmania Group, the movement evolved into the Tasmanian Greens, and at their peak 
(in the 'Labor/Green Accord' from 1989 to 1991 [Hay 1998:103]) they held the 
balance of power in government. 
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Beginning in the early 1970s with the Lake Pedder Action Group and 
the world's first 'greens 'party, the United Tasmania Group, 
adherents of ecological values have long been effectively organised in 
Tasmania. With land-use issues almost continuously 'on the boil' 
since 1970 the environment movement has become increasingly strong 
and skilled, and the resultant clash between the fundamentally 
opposed values of ecology and what Morrison termed growthism' has 
thrown these irreconcilable differences  into sharp relief (Hay 
1987:4). 
Pinnacle events in the history of the Tasmanian green movement are characterised by 
the development of hydro schemes and forest clear-felling for the woodchip industry, 
core historical activities traditionally managed and promoted by government. 
It can be argued that Tasmania's geography and environmental assets combine to 
make it a world class environmental icon. In recent years this has been marketed by 
almost every tradable entity in the state's economy (through environmental labelling 
and a 'clean green image') — a far cry from the dispute over the flooding of Lake 
Pedder, a hydro-electricity scheme that is now claimed as clean, green renewable 
power. This image, and the consequent dependence on it by some industry sectors, is 
a direct reflection of economic drivers, market demands and consumer preference in 
the global economy. 
Specifically, the threat of climate change has spurred the international community to 
implement agreements, protocols and commitments to reducing those elements that 
contribute to the warming of the Earth's surface - the greenhouse effect. In Tasmania, 
in a normal year, of all the electricity generated (including self-generators at 
Australian Paper and waste flue gas generation at TEMCO) approximately 98 percent 
is generated from renewable hydro-power. According to the Tasmanian Greenhouse 
Statement (TGS), nearly half the island is covered by carbon trapped or carbon 
reducing forest (3.3 million ha), helping make the state an overall net carbon sink 
(Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment 1999). By contrast, all 
other Australian states and territories are net greenhouse contributors. Tasmania, 
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therefore, has a number of natural and historical advantages, which suggests, on the 
surface, that it should be well placed to capitalise on these global market trends in a 
greenhouse reducing context. 
The remainder of this paper will therefore explore the characteristics that comprise 
elements of a 'greenhouse industry' in Tasmania. The framework detailed in Chapters 
1 and 2 will be presented as a basis for observing development opportunities in two 
Tasmanian government-owned and managed business sectors (forestry and renewable 
energy) that have a significant greenhouse role in the Tasmanian economy, applying 
EM and greenhouse industry definitions to examine clean and green greenhouse 
credentials. The use of EM will provide the opportunity to critically assess the real 
extent of the state's ecological reform, or the extent to which greenhouse provides a 
basis for official recourse to an empty clean and green rhetoric. 
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4. Carbon Sequestration and Forestry 
This chapter uses forest policy, to assess the way contemporary policy in Tasmania 
has been adapted in light of greenhouse issues, to assess the degree - to which EM has 
occurred in the Tasmanian context, as well as how 'real' this EM is, and to assess the 
degree to which perceived greenhouse opportunities are real. In order to do so, it is 
useful to provide a historical context to forest management in Tasmania. This is 
necessary in order to demonstrate the way in which environmental issues in general 
have been dealt with, evidencing the evolution of a forest management policy culture 
in the state. A historical context will also help to assess the persistence of a particular 
policy culture regarding the relationship of forest policy management to 
environmental issues. The policy emphasis on greenhouse sinks and the discourse 
provided for community consumption can then be compared with the actual 
opportunities for greenhouse sink development. This will provide evidence of the 
extent to which, EM, if it is occurring at all, is weak or strong. 
The incorporation of concepts such as ecological sustainability into forest 
management principles is now commonplace, evidence that EM is in fact occurring in 
the area of forest management policy. The case study outlined in this chapter includes 
a summary of the emergence of a sustainable ethic within Tasmanian government 
forest policy. To trace the way in which the concept of sustainable development has 
been adopted, evidence such as the establishment of conservation reserves, key policy 
agreements and aspects of the economics of forestry and cycles of capital particular to 
forestry production will be identified. This will background our assessment of the 
degree to which EM is occurring, and how greenhouse opportunities may or may not 
be contributing to this. The framework developed in Chapter 3 will then provide a 
means of assessing green credentials and opportunities in terms of greenhouse related 
forest policy. 
Thus the chapter will reflect this approach by considering: 
- the historical background to the policy management of public forests in Tasmania; 
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sink development/flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and development 
opportunities; and 
ownership of carbon credits in partially public owned business deals and the 
potential greenhouse benefit and real investment opportunities in Tasmania. 
4.1 Historical background to the policy management of public forests in 
Tasmania 
Forestry operations can be strategically organised in order to maximise profitable 
production as well as maintaining ecological and cultural values. Some outputs are 
constrained, however, by the requirements for long rotations (up to 80 years in the 
case of sawlogs) and the inability to realise quick capital returns. Historically, the 
pursuit of economic outputs has therefore required intervention on the part of the 
state. Such intervention has traditionally been justified by the need to invest for future 
generations and to ensure industry longevity. It was on these grounds that the 
Tasmanian Forestry Department emerged in 1921 with a forest policy context drawing 
upon German scientific influences and principally aimed at production for 
'sustainable yield': 
In Germany during the early and middle 19 th  century when the concept of 
sustainable yield was being formalised and incorporated into forestry 
textbooks, the forests had long been managed purposefully. When stands of 
trees had reached a desired degree of maturity ... were 'ripe'.., there were 
cut; the land was restored to forest; the trees grew for a new cycle, leading 
to another forest ready for harvest at some future date... (Clawson and 
Sedjo 1983:3). 
Faced with a risk of further depletion of timber resources, the government was driven 
to protect forests from uncontrolled clearing for agriculture and decreasing access to 
timber resources combined with wasteful logging practices. The 'clearing' mode of 
thinking was reflected in late nineteenth century parliamentary Acts that relegated 
large tracts of unallocated resource the status of wastelands (Hall 1992). The Forestry 
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Act 1920 (and subsequent establishment of the Forestry Department 1921 that, 
through later amendment of the Act, became the Forestry Commission in 1947) 
created the basis upon which rights of access could be determined and managed. The 
development of these access regimes over time and the core government organising 
strategies deployed by the state have been summarised by Dargavel (1991:134). Table 
4.5 below combines Dargavel's categories with more recent changes to Tasmanian 
forestry organisational strategies and demonstrates the transition and emphasis of 
forest policy from sawmilling to woodchipping as primary strategy, the shift from 
state to non-state management responsibility, and the shift from long term lease to 
short term contracts for timber products: 
TABLE 4.5 
POLICY DRIVERS AND ACCESS REGIMES 1895 TO PRESENT 
Period Dominant Policy 
Driver 
Resource 
Regime 
Access Rights Locus of 
Responsibility ' 
for the Forests 
1895- Small sawmills Exclusive Sawlog: lease for up to Nil 
1920 Patch 21 years 
1920- Small sawmills Exclusive Sawlog: permit for up Nil 
1980 Patch to 15 years 
1901- Large sawmills Exclusive Sawlog: special Act for State 
1943 Patch 21+ years 
1930s Pulp and paper Exclusive 
Concession 
Pulpwood special Act 
for 80+ years 
Company 
1959, Pulp and paper Integrated Pulpwood special Act State 
1961 (integrated multi- 
product) 
Concession for 80+ years 
1968 Pulp and paper, 
Woodchip 
Integrated 
Concession 
Pulpwood and 
Woodchip special Act 
for 15 years 
State 
1980 Pulp and paper, 
Woodchip 
Integrated 
Concession 
Sawlog: quota 
allocation for 2 years 
State 
1995 Pulp and paper, 
woodchip 
Wood Supply 
agreement 
Woodchips: negotiated 
contract of sale for 
Forestry 
Tasmania 
100,000+ tonnes of 
wood for 10 years 
Corporation 
and some 
(some companies 
residual concession) 
Company 
1995 Woodchip Gazetted Sawlogs: 10 year Forestry 
Rights negotiated contracts Tasmania 
(guaranteed quantity 
for 5 years) 
Corporation 
1995 Sawmills Competitive Sawlogs: tendered in Forestry 
Bidding parcels for up to 5 
years 
Tasmania 
Corporation 
Source: Beckitt (1995:9) based on Dargavel (1991:134) 
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These historical access regimes were determined by balancing the need to attract 
investment capital and to maximize the value of production. Based on Le Heron's 
(1990) terminology, forest policy in Tasmania up to the introduction of competitive 
bidding sawmill supply can be described in terms of varying degrees of welfare 
capitalism, which has persisted throughout the various phases described in Table 4.5. 
In fact, current policy retains quite a deal of this characteristic: 
Wood-wise, waste-wise... the value-adding wood centre planned to 
process wood from the Southern forests. Today, the forest is harvested 
for sawlogs, veneer logs, woodchips and firewood. All the short and 
smaller pieces of logs and residue are burnt in the forest. In this new 
project, the harvested logs will be carted on forestry roads to the one 
central site in State forest. Every piece of wood will be productively 
used, even the ash and the mud. The plan is to make the project site 
investment-ready... [which means]... that the site will be prepared with 
all planning and zoning approvals finalised with the local council, 
including planning for roads, site power and waste management, so 
that the site will be ready for businesses to invest in the new value-
adding processes (Forestry Tasmania 2001:1) 
Governments normally respond to the potential shortfall of timber supply by investing 
in long rotation crops not usually attractive to private investment. In fact Tasmania 
responded by providing third world style concessions to attract large companies and 
foreign capital. After concessions had been granted to sawmilling companies and 
these subsequently collapsed, the government turned to the pulp industry. It traded 
industry security for value adding by providing monopoly access to what could have 
been valuable sawn timber. In the early 1970s the benefits afforded to pulp 
companies were extended to woodchipping businesses through further concessions. 
While it was couched in terms of these concessions being granted for access to the 
residue created from sawlog harvesting, this has been widely contested and seen as a 
further reduction in value adding (Harries 1985). 
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Objectives of corporation 
7. As a manager offorest land with a commitment to multiple 
use, the ob'ectives o the co 'oration are to o timise - 
(a) the economic returns om its wood ,roduction activities; and 
(b) the benefits to the public and the state of the non-wood values 
o orests. 
It became clear in the 1990s that the Forestry Commission was playing the role of 
both regulator and developer. This was to be overcome through the corporatisation of 
the Commission to create the current Forestry Tasmania Corporation. The objectives 
of the Forestry Tasmania Corporation (Government Business Enterprise) are listed in 
schedule 1 of the Government Business Enterprise Act 1995: 
The second, and perhaps secondary objective, 7(b), is of particular relevance to a 
discussion on greenhouse sink development opportunities and other contemporary 
policy initiatives that reflect characteristics of EM. 
Elements of welfare capitalism have not been, and cannot be, fully erased from public 
or semi-privatised forest management. This is because quality sawlog and veneer 
rotations require up to 100 years (3 generations) of capital immobility in eucalypt 
species, and, up to 600 years in the case of some special species. Attempting to attract 
private capital to back this sort of investment is very difficult due to the uncertainties 
associated with realising adequate return. The state therefore continues the welfare 
capitalist mode of management in which it attempts to develop elaborate mechanisms 
for attracting capital through a range of instruments, including guaranteed supply 
agreements, renewal of rights, supply of low-cost energy, provision of transport 
infrastructure and alternative mechanisms for transfer of profit (such as share or joint 
venturing). In order to achieve this there needs to be in-built flexibility; yield and 
product mix need to be sufficiently varied to keep pace with market demands. Both 
the state and federal Governments have developed policies to attract investment and 
make forestry a more 'standard' industry to invest in by way of taxation schemes and 
various other market tools. 
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4.2 Contemporary Forest Policy 
Currently, both state and federal Governments are pushing the growth of 
plantation/regrowth forests to reduce national dependence on timber imports and to 
make up the shortfall in resource supply created by increased efforts to conserve areas 
of remaining native forests. Greenhouse has added a second justification for this 
plantation strategy because it theoretically provides sink enhancement opportunities. 
In this way, carbon sink development has provided an opportunity to ecologically 
modernise production forestry as a legitimate environmental activity. It has done so in 
two ways. First, plantations result in a reduced concentration of harvesting effort in 
native forests, second they can assist in ameliorating the effects of dry-land salinity, 
and third, they can assist in the control of climate change. The Tasmanian 
Government's current Forestry Growth Plan (FGP) illustrates the emphasis on 
plantation development. Outlined below, the FGP illustrates contemporary 
management thinking on how this can be achieved in the immediate future in the 
context of Commonwealth and state initiatives: 
Forestry Growth Plan 
Released in November, 1998, the Program is a blue-print for 
investment and development .fOr 10 years and beyond. If a post-REA 
expansion policy is f011owed, an intensification total of 100,000 ha over 
10 years would be targeted. This would include: 
- 40,000 ha eucalypt plantation conversion: 
- 16,000 ha eucalypt plantation purchase/lease: 
- 20,000 ha softwood plantation conversion; 
- 8,000 ha softwood plantation purchase/lease: 
- 10.000 ha early age spacing: 
6,000 ha commercial thinning; and 
- Plantation expansion would slow in the period 11-20 .rears, 
thereafter based on replanting following harvest. 
lhe vision of State Forests in 10 years time is 0 . 7.8 percent new and 
existing plantations (120,000 ha), and 43.4 percent native,fOrestry 
(660,000 ha). 
Targets for plantation establishment outside of State Forest are likely 
to be severely alic.,cted bv the ability to access land. 
(Source: Forestry Tasmania, 2000) 
62 
In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the Tasmanian government has seized all 
strategies available to it, including the potential to attract investment in plantations by 
offering rights to carbon credits from those trees. A later section of this thesis will 
argue that this strategy is high risk, because of uncertainty surrounding the rules and 
definitions associated with an international emissions trading system- . 
4.2.1 Privatisation in Government Forestry production 
Superimposed on this, contemporary micro-economic reform of various aspects of 
government has brought about the corporatisation of the management structure of 
Tasmania's public forests. The corporatisation of Forestry Tasmania marked the start 
of what was intended to be a move from an '...era of state-managed welfare 
capitalism ... to a more open and less interventionist economy' (Le Heron 1990:195) 
in Tasmania. This has seriously limited for the capacity of government to build 
environmental considerations into contemporary forestry management regimes. 
Greenhouse is one such consideration. Le Heron has comprehensively described the 
New Zealand experience of the 1980s-1990s, and his critique applies equally well to 
Tasmania. 
While changes have been made to the legislative environment in which FT operates, a 
number of structural impediments remain intact as non-variable attributes of forestry 
development. According to Le Heron, industrial forestry involves the circulation of 
capital through the stages of tree planting, processing and reafforestation (to preserve 
utilisation investments), and is dependent on science and technology to decrease the 
turnover time of capital and reduce biophysical risks (1990:196). This evidences 
some of the non-changeable aspects of industrial forestry with which any form of 
management structure has to contend: 
The focus to date has been on native forest management. Nevertheless, 
initiatives such as the Wood and Paper Industry Strategy (WAPIS), the 
Farm Forestry Program (FFP) and Plantations for Australia: the 2020 
Vision (Vision 2020) have been directed to addressing at least some of the 
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issues arising along the whole of chain production (ie. from growing to 
processing (ForWood Australia 2000:2). 
The most recent state-based initiative addressing sustainable forestry growth and 
future prospects for Tasmania has been the Forestry, Timber and Paper Audit, which 
reflects transitional trends, commodity vulnerability and the import/export timber 
products deficit in Australia. Both ForWood Australia and the industry audit echo the 
New Zealand experience of mass afforestation and industrial initiative by both private 
and public sectors in the 1960s. New Zealand forest development policy during this 
period, according to Le Heron (1988), was aimed at encouraging expansion of forest 
product exports. To achieve desired export levels by the 1980s this policy needed to 
consider land resource limitations, product diversification, and value adding to 
processed forest products (in comparison with agricultural products). FT's current 
attempts to embark on a new direction emphasising intensive forest management and 
expanded plantation development mirror these elements of New Zealand forest 
strategy. 
From a government perspective forestry management needs to be multifaceted, 
concerning itself with industry development, social welfare and environmental 
responsibility. This requires, however, the less-than-compatible roles of mediator and 
investor, and in order to maintain profitability the state is often involved in sharing the 
cost of production in an environment where risks are often socialised while profits are 
not. Such observations square with Le Heron's view that' ... every phase of industrial 
forestry is amenable to degrees of co-ordination by the state or private sector with 
varying degrees of success' (1988:4). 
New Zealand created a commercial forestry corporation in 1986, almost 10 years prior 
to Tasmania. In designing this change it was originally intended that the corporation 
would comprise separate processing and wood resource companies. Industry, 
however, protested such differentiation, arguing that the corporation should be 
concerned only with growing trees and selling logs. Industry argued further that full 
or partial privatisation would benefit the nation as it would create threats of possible 
takeover that would force efficiency. Commercialisation, however, requires that the 
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company or corporation at least breaks even; that is, the value of output must at least 
equal the value of resources used. The need for realistic pricing is therefore 
axiomatic. The question that this raises, however, is how then do concessionary 
timber prices, particularly for the sawn timber markets, be maintained in such an 
environment? Can it be guaranteed that realistic log prices mean that processors with 
the best technology and value added products are the only ones who stay in business? 
Synthesising the conflicting philosophies of welfare capitalism and 
privatisation/corporatisation creates problems and challenges for the state, particularly 
when combined with the simultaneous need to assimilate ecological management 
objectives. Changing societal and government perceptions and preferences for certain 
economic futures has significant implications both for subsidising particular 
categories of investment (and maintaining established production processes) and for 
defending a fully commercial state forest enterprise, particularly, in an environment 
with a changing resource base. Strategic restructuring can in itself bring on particular 
outcomes (for example, by choosing to emphasise either socio-economic or ecological 
values). In the forest industry sector full privatisation can dictate a radical shift in 
forest management regimes together with major ramifications for the management of 
ecological values. For example, past monopoly regimes have been required to reduce 
risk by ensuring resource security and by differentiated forest rotations that establish 
cyclical (as opposed to boom—bust) capital returns. These pressures are reflected in 
New Zealand's long term plantation strategy which: 
From the outset, distinctive state-economy relations made possible the 
planting of exotic forests that 30 years later gave modest increments to 
sawmills and rapid growth of a pulp and paper industry, to the full extent of 
the exotic forest resource. The links between afforestation and utilisation 
have never been automatic despite attempts ... to treat forestry and 
processing, conceptually and in practice as a single production line 
(1998:27-260). 
These changes in forestry management need to be considered in light of changing 
societal perceptions and growth in environmental due diligence. More so than private 
65 
enterprise, government business enterprises are constrained by the complexity of 
competitive markets and community service obligations that include conservation. 
Tasmania has experienced a series of production forestry v conservation conflicts, 
over a long period. Notwithstanding a change in the language used and altered 
production regimes, conflict has not declined. Conservation v resource security 
tension has created a dilemma for governments throughout Australia. The 
Commonwealth government's response was the Regional Forest Agreement (RFAs) 
initiative — which now forms the foundation of contemporary forest policy in 
Tasmania. 
4.2.2 The Contemporary Policy Environment: EM and The RFA 
The RFA process was an attempt to establish, on the basis of scientific rigour, the 
details of forest communities, forest production and all relevant socio-economic 
values. This, it was hoped, would provide a basis, acknowledged as legitimate by all 
parties, for compromise between production forestry and conservation, and thereby 
deliver security of access to forest resources while conserving representative 
biological communities. If a compromise was to be ultimately resolved through this 
process it had to be able to deliver a vision of the future for government and 
specifically for the policy role of government as a production forester. To some extent 
the RFA satisfied those taking a middle ground, which is to say those reflecting the 
characteristics of an 'ecologically modern' position. Under the RFA, forested land 
was assigned either a production or non-production status. The future potential for 
expansion or maintenance of specific levels of industrial forestry was in this way 
prescribed. The RFA enabled future forestry development in those areas assigned 
production forest status by providing resource security, while constraining future 
development by demarking where forestry could and could not occur. 
The precise nature and biogeographic distribution of forestry operations was to be 
determined in this context and have the support of policy documentation, embodying a 
commitment to an ecologically modernised sustainable future. However, this process 
was, according to conservationists, seriously flawed: 
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. .. the RFA and TASVEG 2000 mapping are inconsistent. It is 
therefore not possible to use these data sets to verify claims with any 
degree of certainty once the land has been planted... once an area is 
cleared of native forest, and the data sets show conflicting vegetation 
types, how can it be proved what forest was originally there (Cadman 
2000:8)? 
Aspects of Tasmania's RFA are still being developed and it has been within this 
context that the opportunity has emerged for potential carbon trading and investment 
attraction through sink development. The RFA has meant that the corporatised 
Forestry Tasmania now operates with a 'restricted' but defined resource. With 
decreasing supplies of old-growth timbers there is a corresponding development of 
plantation and regrowth strategies as outlined in the Forestry Growth Plan. These 
changes became necessary to ensure sustained production and economic growth in the 
forestry sector. Furthermore, to achieve appropriate economies of scale for new 
business opportunities and to maintain existing market access (including existing 
supply agreements) partnership with private enterprise has increased, as well as the 
purchase of private land for further plantation establishment. Greenhouse is one of 
many components of managing these processes. Companies likely to incur greenhouse 
penalties under a carbon credit trading mechanism have moved quickly to take 
advantage of any potential opportunities and have approached the Tasmanian 
government with expressions of interest in plantation development, carbon rights 
being an important component of the proposals (as in the case, for example, of the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company/Mitsubishi plantation project). 
The sudden growth in plantation forestry is thus in part being made possible by global 
greenhouse policy. But a dilemma exists which EM can help to explain. It has been 
estimated that seventy percent of Forestry Tasmania's plantation timber will come 
from native forest conversion and that, because only eighty percent of Tasmania's 
native forest estate has to be maintained under current,, conservation measures, the 
remaining twenty percent, which includes areas of high conservation value is under 
threat (Cadman 2000:4). Surely if eighty percent of Tasmania's native forest estate is 
to be maintained and only twenty percent available for production, the policy 
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environment has permitted quite a deal of compromise. In Dryzek's words, the RFA 
has been developed through a partnership in which the government, businesses, 
moderate environmentalists, and scientists cooperated to restructure the Tasmanian 
forest economy along more environmentally defensible lines, a classic case, in other 
words, of EM (1997:144). 
Because a number of concerns remain, however, and because (at least according to 
Cadman) the ground facts are unclear, the `sustainability' of the current policy can be 
called into question. Firstly, twenty percent can be converted to plantations, and 
secondly this twenty percent may include areas of high conservation value. Thirdly, 
the scientific basis for defining land tenure can be questioned, and finally, carbon 
rights and associated greenhouse policies are unclear and at best tenuous business 
imperatives. 
Thus the ground between a sustainability rhetoric and a sustainable clean and green 
reality can be challenged. While it can be observed that EM is occurring by recourse 
to the contemporary environment discourse characterising forestry management, its 
extent can still be questioned. In reference to the RFA, for example, many of the 
scientific measures used for mapping and identifying communities, rare and 
threatened species have not been fully resourced, verified or in some cases even 
finalised. This ambiguity is reflected in carbon sink science and economics. Any 
investment in carbon based sinks pre-empts the development of rules of trade and 
raises questions about verification and the presence of expertise (one element of the 
greenhouse industry defined in Chapter 2). This will become more evident in section 
4.3.1. 
While Government forestry management has learned the language of sustainable 
development, traditional sawlog resources have steadily declined, while wood 
residues for pulp and fibre markets have increased and become increasingly 
competitive on a global scale. The societal concern for, deforestation has not 
diminished alongside these changes. This has been evidenced under a recent 
Tasmanian government consultation strategy, Tasmania Together, which purports to 
examine future options for economy and society. One of the core findings of this 
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project is that there is an overwhelming belief in the state's clean green image, as well 
as a desire to discontinue native forest logging and woodchip exports. EM theorists, 
such as Hajer, acknowledge that such discrepancy between popular opinion and 
rational policy is likely to be commonplace. The implications of this discrepancy 
relate to the problem of legitimising policy in the face of a lack of popular support: 
There are at least two features of environmental politics that 
could indeed be causes of concern —first the changing basis for 
legitimate decision making, and second, the hidden link between 
science and politics (Hajer 1995:10). 
The RFA and post-RFA policies are scientifically authoritative bases for legitimising 
forestry and other industry activities on forest lands as an aid to political decision 
making, thus evidencing Hajer's observations. The RFA `sustainability' compromise, 
is itself evidence of EM occurring, is also intended to alter the politics of forest 
debate, and not necessarily for ecologically holistic reasons. Highlighting this tension 
and identifying the dangers of removing qualitative aspects of politics demonstrates 
the strategic utility of EM theory. Sustainability policies can indeed undermine 
progress towards more environmentally benign futures. 
In order to achieve post-RFA expansion, the circulation of capital through planting, 
processing and reafforestation needs significant re-strategising, especially because of 
the declining availability of larger diameter logs. Greenhouse as a legitimate 
environmental concern recognises that trees store carbon and that younger, faster 
growing plants sequester carbon more rapidly. Chip and pulp rotations are suitably 
matched with this naturally occurring characteristic because they are relatively short, 
removing trees at an age when optimum growth rates have been reached. Recognition 
of the need to reduce turnover time in the forest harvest and post harvest production 
capability cycles alongside the added bonus of carbon sequestering potential, provides 
some incentive to induce the transition from older to younger aged production. 
Further, fibre markets are globally orienting preference to younger monoculture 
clearwood over traditional mixed species 'inconsistent' old growth ('residue') fibres. 
Arguably there is an impetus to sell off older fibres while markets remain, in 
69 
preparation for competitive positioning. This assumes in the first instance that the 
same markets and the same products should be pursued. 
4.3 Sink development flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and 
development opportunities 
4.3.1 Definition of Carbon Sinks 
Chapter 3 provided a definition of the greenhouse industry. In developing this 
definition the significance of the Kyoto Protocol and the targets set for individual 
countries were described. Flexible mechanisms under the Protocol have been 
designed to maximise the opportunities for individual countries to reduce global 
warming impacts cost effectively and measurably. Carbon sinks are one such 
mechanism defined under Articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7 of the Protocol. 
Braswell et al. describe global carbon cycles in terms of a natural 'conundrum'. 
Increased global temperature can both increase and decrease atmospheric carbon 
dioxide (the key greenhouse gas) at the same time: 
...increased temperatures facilitate the release of carbon from soil; carbon 
released from organic matter such as soil is oxidized to carbon dioxide. 
However, increased temperature also leads to increased growth in plants, 
which absorb carbon dioxide. Thus, ecosystem processes moderate between 
global warming and plant growth (1987:870). 
The carbon sink mechanism is intended to provide cost-effective opportunities to 
reduce overall greenhouse emissions by afforestation and reforestation to increase 
carbon absorbing plant matter. It was envisaged that it would encourage the 
reforestation of previously cleared lands — this being generally 'environmentally 
desirable'. Because of the above ecosystem balance or 'conundrum' highlighted by 
Braswell et al, rules applying to sink development under the Kyoto Protocol have yet 
to be fully defined. The aim of the sixth Conference of the Parties (CoP 6) in 
November 2000 was to reach agreement on the nature of these rules — indeed, it was 
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to reach decisions on whether sinks as a flexible mechanism are appropriate. The 
ensuing debate suggests that on an international scale a resolution is unlikely: 
US turns down meeting on climate change... The 6th Conference of Parties 
(COP 6) to the UNFCCC ended in failure largely because of European 
Union countries and a US. led group of nations' inability to agree on 
critical issues... In particular, the question of whether forest sinks should be 
allowed to generate emission reduction credits under the clean development 
mechanism remains a major hurdle. The idea of planting forests to 
sequester carbon dioxide (CO2) was one of the more controversial 
proposals designed to help countries meet greenhouse gas emissions 
targets ...Greenpeace International accused the US. and the Umbrella 
Group of confirming its judgement on COP 6, which was that it 'would be 
remembered as the moment when governments abandoned the promise of 
global co-operation to protect planet earth' (ENS 21 Dec 2000). 
The development of rules under which growth of vegetation constitutes an 
internationally credible carbon sink that can contribute to legally binding greenhouse 
gas (GhG) emission targets under the Protocol is critical. Broadly speaking, the Kyoto 
Protocol definition of a carbon sink is a planted forest established after 1 January 1990 
on land that was previously cleared, such as agricultural pasture. By measuring the 
sequestered carbon in such sinks, credits can be awarded, and these can then be 
traded-in to counter for emissions or on-sold to other net emitters. A simplistic and 
relatively inexpensive approach to abatement was intended. 
Specifically, the Kyoto Protocol provides for the inclusion of sinks through Articles 
3.3, 3.4 and 3.7. The Australian Greenhouse Office, in a discussion paper produced in 
early 2000, notes: 
- under Article 3.3, currently allowable sink activities are confined to 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990; 
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Article 3.4 sets up a process for negotiating additional sinks activities that 
developed country Parties may apply in the first commitment period and must 
apply in the second and subsequent commitment periods; and 
Article 3.7 allows Australia to include emissions from land clearing in 1990 in 
the baseline for the calculation of its assigned amount. Key - issues in the Kyoto 
Protocol's treatment of sinks must be resolved through international 
negotiations. 
At this point in time a number of definitions exist. Definitions and operational and 
measurement issues that await decisions from further Conference Of the Parties 
(COPs) are: 
precise definitions of afforestation, deforestation and reforestation; 
the meaning of a forest; 
how and which additional sinks activities in the agricultural soils and land- 
use change and forestry categories are to be included under Article 3.4; 
the meaning of 'human-induced'; and 
how changes in carbon stock and greenhouse gas emissions and sequestration 
as a result of Articles 3.3 and 3.4 activities are to be measured (AGO 2000:2). 
4.3.2 Development Opportunities and Economic Return 
The development opportunity and economic benefit to be gained from sink 
enhancement emerge from reducing a country's overall emission profile and therefore 
avoiding punitive measures from the international community, or by providing a 
surplus (ie. more carbon sequestered than overall emissions) which can be sold. With 
respect to the latter, it is up for debate as to ownership of credits given to 'sinks' 
developed, and whether it is in the interests of individual countries to maintain the 
credits for national benefit, or provide rights to private individuals for trade and 
benefit. 
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The Kyoto Protocol thus set in place a system for emissions trading, but did not 
entirely define the rules. Sink development is, in any case, generally regarded as 
having a relatively small potential to contribute towards global emissions reductions 
(for example Barbour 1999). Importantly, Article 3.4 of the Protocol refers to 
'Additional Sink Activities' as distinct from existing sink capacity pre-1990. In 
principle this is intended to preserve existing sink capacities and to avoid the Protocol 
being used as a perverse incentive to clear existing sinks and replace them with Kyoto 
accredited sinks. There is much contention around what 'previously cleared' should 
mean and, consequently, what sink activities should or should not be accredited, as the 
physical land capacity for sink establishment is limited globally by both the 
availability of space, and the economic costs of establishment. Furthermore, even 
where sink establishment is possible, the outcomes in terms of the amount of carbon 
sequestered may be lower than anticipated: 
... the average biomass of a plantation is considerably lower than 
the maximum attainable biomass, due to the harvesting process... the 
average exists at approximately half of the maximum tree biomass... 
of the whole tree, only the main stem or trunk is removed for 
industry. The remaining plant material decays rapidly and the 
carbon returns to the atmosphere (Barbour 1999:3). 
Finally, the potential to offset emissions by sequestering carbon in forests is limited 
under the Kyoto process. The accrual of credits is achieved by establishing 
commitment periods in the future, within which an individual country (and 
consequently individual business) has its emissions measured at the beginning and 
end, to account for greenhouse contributions and reduction requirements. The first 
commitment period under the Protocol is 2008 to 2012 and the only credits which can 
be sold in order to meet Kyoto targets are those sequestered during the commitment 
period. Carbon sequestered after 1990 but before 2008 will not be a saleable asset to 
achieve Kyoto targets. This is a critical factor when considering development 
opportunities and needs to be considered when analysing the tone of government and 
business oratory on greenhouse sink opportunities. 
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In order to clarify sink business opportunities there are in principle three core 
possibilities: to lease or sell space to a sink developer; to establish a vegetative 
capacity on land previously cleared with the intent to gain multiple economic benefits 
(such as timber production); and to establish vegetative capacity in terms of 
environmental plantings unlikely to be harvested or cleared. Each of these 
opportunities will be considered with respect to FT's responsibilities for the 
management and operation of government owned production forests, against an 
historical background of industry support and welfare capitalism. 
The related issues that are not clear or resolved include: 
ownership of carbon rights (public goods held by the state or semi-private 
goods held by a GBE); 
what the actual opportunities are (post 1990 afforestation and reforestation on 
previously cleared land, and the availability of this); 
Tasmania's potential carbon rights competitive advantage (to boost FT revenue by 
selling available or potential credits to international businesses polluting 
elsewhere; to attract further plantation development; or for the state to pass on the 
credits available to it to existing manufacturers who need to reduce their emissions 
profile or potentially decommission plant, or for the state to provide the credits 
available to it to attract new industry much in the same manner as providing cheap 
electricity); or 
what possible mix of these might be put in place. 
4.4 The Question of Ownership of Carbon Credits: The Potential Benefit and 
Real Investment Opportunities 
FT manages a significant proportion of Tasmania's forest reserves, production forests 
and post-1990 (Kyoto) regimes. Eligible credits can potentially be sold and enhance 
FT's business position. Because the operating imperatives laid out under the Forestry 
Act specify a commercial focus for FT and require it to provide financial returns to the 
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state, FT's business activities do not necessarily contribute to a strategic re-
positioning of the economy, and hence to the state's long term vision. 
Until international definitions of 'Kyoto Forests' and 'Kyoto Lands' are clarified, a 
number of significant dilemmas will remain. For example, lands which have 
previously been used as managed forests or native forests cleared for the sake of sink 
development will not be eligible. Debate on eligibility is intended to rest on 
rehabilitation principles so that reafforestation of previously forested areas such as 
farmlands are eligible. Eligibility is critical for determining potential credits and 
therefore investment and ownership of carbon rights. 
How questions of definition, ownership and access are resolved will determine the 
parameters of investment opportunity. 
However, the fundamental aim of the 
Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse 
emissions through a number of 
methodologies by creating liabilities on 
greenhouse intensive countries, which, in 
turn, seek to restructure their national 
emitters through regulation. In most 
cases, translation of Kyoto measures into 
national policies constitutes in effect, a 
carbon tax. Carbon credits and emissions 
trading are in essence mechanisms which 
make use of capital markets and 
competition in order to reward good 
corporate citizenship and penalise those behaving poorly — a tax which appears not to 
be a tax. Tasmania is potentially in a position to take advantage of those likely to be 
penalised, because it can offer them sink capacity and ownership of carbon credits. 
However, Tasmania also has its own share of industries that are likely to face 
significant liabilities. 
Carbon Markets 'Worth 
Billions' 
Australian investors are set to 
capitalise on a S5 billion domestic 
market in carbon credits tbllowing this 
fortnight's announcement the Sydney 
Futures Exchange (SEE) will unveil 
the world's first trading market in the 
field by the middle of next year.... By 
establishing an exchange-traded 
market for carbon credits 'before the 
K.yoto Protocol comes into three, SFE 
can provide organisations with an 
early opportunity to lock in a financial 
position and secure a competitive 
advantage... (Australian Financial 
Review 1999) 
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The Tasmanian Government has been keen to seize the opportunity to sell carbon 
rights despite uncertainties surrounding ownership, or, it would appear, without 
considering the maximum potential benefit from any carbon credits available to it. On 
a 1999 overseas trade mission Premier Jim Bacon promoted Tasmania as an 
appropriate destination for investing in sink development and carbon credits. It has 
been apparent, however, that a strategy of selling carbon credits ahead of certainty 
over ownership or knowledge of how many credits will be available is risky. 
Companies will invest only where there is clear and contracted benefit from emission 
reduction activity. Plantations can be established on lands previously not 
economically viable and 'environmental' planting can be undertaken where previously 
there has been practically no economic incentive to do so. Potentially opportunities 
for Tasmania exist to attract general business development because of the greenhouse 
advantages and/or carbon offsets that could be offered. The social and economic 
benefits however, need to exceed that of merely increased plant biomass. For 
example, if sinks are to be planted and the government is to retain carbon rights, the 
government could determine that a certain level of infrastructure would be built and a 
certain level of employment guaranteed and then pass the emission benefit to the 
investing business. Without exploring these considerations Tasmania may be 
underselling a capacity and a resource without maximising opportunities for growth. 
4.5 Assessing the Sink Opportunity 
The ability of FT to develop carbon sinks is severely constrained by the limited 
availability of cleared land. Of Tasmania's landmass (6,833,100ha), approximately 
one quarter is dedicated to agriculture (1,708,200ha) (State of the Environment Report 
1996 and Department of State Development 2000). To date, plantations (177,258ha) 
occupy only 2.6 percent and this figure includes plantations on State Forest land. 
Added to this, although the hardwood plantation estate has been substantially 
expanded in recent times, and is -thus difficult to authoritatively quantify, the National 
Plantation Inventory (2000) puts the hardwood plantation estate at 101,844 hectares, 
of which 82 percent (83,500ha) is privately owned. 
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FT's opportunites to acquire credits are therefore severely limited. Barbour notes that: 
Beadle (1989) estimates that in Tasmania alone, 888 km 2 of 
forest would have to be planted to cope with its transport 
emissions over the next 100 years. This estimation is based on 
the use of prime agricultural land, which is not available to such 
an extent. Therefore less productive regions would have to be 
used, which in turn would result in a greater area of land being 
required to compensate for the lower site quality... 
Consequently the value of plantation forestry as a net carbon 
sink is limited in the long term (Barbour 1999:16). 
Leasing private lands and recruiting investment from external partners through joint 
venture could increase the area reafforested. More often than not, however, the 
attractiveness for external joint venture monies rests in the opportunity to own the 
carbon pool. It is this that can then be traded or used for industry benefit somewhere 
else. The benefit for FT is that establishment capital need not be sourced locally and 
the management cost of the resource can be shared. 
There may also be the potential for establishing Kyoto eligible forests on existing FT 
lands or lands purchased by FT. This strategy could prove contentious, and may be 
seen as potentially conflicting with National Competition Policy or even the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (if government could be seen as unfairly participating in the 
market). In doing so, Kyoto forests owned by FT will need to be accounted for under 
some form of verification system, and then traded in an emissions market (either 
national or international). Currently there is a proposed national carbon accounting 
standard, the evolution of which is uncertain. Added to this, the Kyoto Protocol has 
not yet been ratified and there are substantial costs in establishing, maintaining and 
enhancing carbon stocks over and above other wood products. And, an emissions 
market may in fact never eventuate. There are potential problems with joint 
investment where, of two companies investing in a plantation, the forest owner may 
seek to distinguish between, for example, pulp production on cleared native forest, 
and that on previously cleared land so as to give those in the joint venture the benefits 
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of sinks, even though the carbon plantation investment is inseparable from overall 
environmental practices: 
...post-hoc attempts to pick and chose previously cleared land... and 
delineate them as sinks is both unethical and a potentially un-
auditable approach (Cadman 2000:3). 
The problems with disaggregating land ownership and therefore accreditation on a 
single property may even be problematic. On a single property it is possible to have 
native forestry and plantation established on cleared land for sinks. Cadman argues 
that a corporate structure makes it difficult to trace ownership and in the case study 
that he provides, the possibility exists where on one piece of land the existing native 
forest can be cleared, this space planted as well as the previously cleared space, then, 
after the fact, it may become possible to pick and choose the 'previously cleared land 
to designate the sink bits' (2000:11). 
Another option the government could implement would be the establishment of 
plantings aimed at rehabilitation of degraded land by such measures as biodiversity 
enhancement or salinity reversal. This has the benefit that the planting would not be 
harvested and corresponding emission pentiles charged. Whilst the real economic 
value of the planting may be dramatically lower that a plantation aimed at wood 
products, the sale of the carbon credits being the only likely immediate economic 
return, multiple non-wood product values exist such as tourism and community well 
being. Considering the issues outlined above, however, along with trends in current 
forest management and preference for certain forms of capital, this option is not likely 
to become a policy reality. 
Multiple difficulties arise with each option, particularly when attempting to deliver a 
viable resource to both sawlog users and other fibre markets. Drawing upon a range of 
evidence, Barbour notes that decay rates relating to plantation based wood products 
can be seen as oxidising rapidly (1-5 years for example in paper products), medium 
fast (5-10 years for example in ephemeral wood products such as pallets and posts), 
and slowly (10-100 years for example in treated, structural and furniture timber), and 
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that 'consequently the maximisation of carbon removal from the atmosphere through 
sequestration is controlled by the level of biomass attained by the community at a 
particular site, and the rate of decay of the plant material after harvesting' (1999:6). 
Whilst value added wood products are likely to store carbon for longer than fibre 
products because they have longer life cycles, cost of production and carbon 
accounting, impediments are great. 
In its advice to private individuals, State Forests New South Wales also points out that 
practical application of current Kyoto rules means that: 
... the . carbon sequestered in a planted forest is deemed to be emitted 
when the forest is harvested. This means fyou sell carbon credits, you 
will have to either re-purchase carbon credits at the time of harvest, or 
replant the planted forest to ensure that the level of carbon that has 
been sold as a carbon credit remains sequestered in perpetuity (State 
Forests NSW). 
If carbon credits eventuate under a single international, or various national trading 
system systems they would need to be qualified in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol. A hectare of land can sustain a plantation of 250 — 400 trees depending on 
many factors including the rainfall, terrain, type of tree and plantation practices. An 
average plantation of 300 trees per hectare in Tasmania is assumed to be a reasonable 
estimate by FT (Eastment, pers comm, 1999). 
According to 1999 estimates, it was believed that approximately 30 percent of FT's 
plantation forest could qualify for Kyoto forest. Effectively this means that 3,000 
hectares of Kyoto forest could be established annually and be traded for carbon 
credits. FT also indicates that since 1990 40,000 hectares of hardwood and softwood 
trees have been established and that approximately 10 percent of this is on land 
previously cleared which could hence qualify for Kyoto forest. It needs to be 
considered, however, that of this (4,000 hectares of Kyoto forest), approximately 
1,000 hectares of softwood plantation are under joint venture. This effectively means 
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that carbon credits are not available to Forestry Tasmania alone for trading. The 
remaining 3,000 hectares are hardwood plantation, and are available. 
As part of the Forestry Growth Plan, Forestry Tasmania intends to establish 8,000 
hectares new plantation per year, of which approximately 30 percent will be on land 
cleared prior to 1990. Based on past experience FT suggests that a -plantation of 5,000 
hectares each year is practicable and that this level of plantation should be 
permanently sustainable (Sharama, pers comm, 2000). 
The average practical growth life of a hardwood tree is estimated at 60 years and that 
of a softwood tree at 27 years. On maturity, a harvested hardwood tree holds 
approximately 1 tonne and a softwood tree 0.5 tonnes of carbon. Thus, the carbon 
dioxide absorbed by 300 hardwood trees over 60 years is 300 tonnes, which equates to 
an average of 18.33 tonnes per hectare, per year. The softwood equivalent over 27 
years for an average 300 tree plantation would be 150 tonnes - an average 20.37 
tonnes per hectare, per year. The total likely quantity of tradeable credits from 
Tasmania's plantation estate can be extrapolated on the basis of these figures, and is 
analysed below. 
Noting that between 40 and 73 percent of net primary production of biomass occurs 
within soil, Barbour suggests that: 
... these substantial differences in primary production between native 
forest and plantation monocultures, have huge implications for the use 
of carbon sequestration, as well as on other issues concerning the 
environment and society.., it is the average biomass that is attained by 
a forest that dictates its effectiveness as a carbon reservoir, and not 
the growth rate of the species being grown... a short rotation time 
does not increase average biomass (Barbour 1999:11-14). 
Bearing this in mind, a Greenhouse Sink Analysis for Tasmania has these 
characteristics: 
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- the average annual plantation in Tasmania is estimated at 10,000 hectares and 
includes both public and private forests. An estimated 30 percent of the plantation 
forest will qualify for Kyoto forest; that is, 3000 hectares will become Kyoto 
forest each year; 
Forestry Tasmania estimates that in the Kyoto forests, 80 percent will be 
hardwood plantation and the remaining will be softwood. This meansthat 2400 
hectares of hardwood and 600 hectares of softwood Kyoto forest plantations will 
be established each year. Forestry Tasmania's softwood plantation is under joint 
venture and hence its share of softwood is not available for trading; and 
the estimated greenhouse sink potential in the annual 2,400 hectares of hardwood 
plantation is 44,000 tonnes whilst in the annual 300 hectares of private forest 
softwood plantation it is 6,100 tonnes. In total, therefore, the annual addition of 
sink capacity would be approximately 50,100 tonnes of CO2. While estimates 
range of the value per tonne of carbon, at an estimated price of $US10 per tonne of 
CO2, the value of annual sink capacity addition is worth $US715,000 — 
approximately $1.4 million Australian (assuming USD = 1.96990 AUD). 
To sum up: Kyoto rules would limit allowable sinks to forests established since 1990 
on land that has never been forested (ie afforestation) and forests established since 
1990 on land that had been historically cleared (ie reforestation). However, 
sequestration through replanting areas that were forested in 1990 would clearly not 
qualify and sequestration by other trees, including naturally occurring native forests, 
would not qualify (Sharma, pers comm, 2000). It must also be remembered that: 
- only changes in eligible carbon stock that occurred during the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period, 2008 to 2012, can be counted in that period; 
eligible sequestration in any subsequent commitment periods can be counted in 
those periods; and 
- sequestration of emissions that occurred prior to 2008 cannot be counted, even if 
they occur in Kyoto forests (AGO (c) 1999:27). 
And also: 
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The cost of purchasing a carbon credit at harvest time will depend 
entirely on developments in technology. Revenue from the sale of 
timber products would be available to offset the purchase of carbon 
credits. So the decision on whether or not to harvest will depend on 
the relative value of timber and carbon at the time... (State Forests 
NSW). 
Clearly the value of carbon credits will be a critical determining factor for harvesting 
and plantation investment. In a background of global pressure and possible corporate 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, decisions will be based on the value of carbon 
sequestration. Estimates have ranged anywhere from $10 per tonne (CO2 equivalent) 
to $60 per tonne. Whilst trading has not commenced and the Protocol not yet ratified, 
sink investment will remain high risk until trading commences in some form or other. 
Whilst the Sydney Futures Exchange has been established for carbon trading, the 
system will take some time to gain momentum and maturity. 
4.6 Conclusion and EM discussion 
In summary, the potential greenhouse and biodiversity conservation benefits resulting 
from carbon sink investment are likely to be limited and therefore a potentially 
unsound driver of policy objectives. This chapter has shown that management of state 
forest lands has been controversial from a conservation perspective and constrained by 
resource access and fibre markets for decades. Whilst these trends have become 
incrementally significant over time, so too has been the adoption of an environmental 
discourse and sustainable policy rhetoric which supports the continuation of 
traditional economic regimes with little or no change. The residue markets 
dominating concession regimes of the 1930s to 1990s gave way to supply agreements 
committing supply of fibre for up to ten years. As the nature of the resource changed, 
new lifeblood has been sought. Value-adding opportunities include pulp mills, 
fibreboard manufacture and more recently 'renewable' energy power generation. 
These changes have meant significant investment in a discourse that promotes the 
benefits of rapid growing short rotation monoculture forests, and the picking up of all 
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opportunities which provide an appearance of environmental benefit. Greenhouse 
policy and carbon sink potential provide an ecological spin and investment attraction 
which may be little more than elaborate discourse in nature. Carbon sink policies can 
be seen as an instance of EM in practice wherein regional economies such as 
Tasmania embrace the opportunity of a new official policy rhetoric at the behest of 
international regimes and national negotiations. This is done in the hope of 
technological innovation and greener end-of-pipe technologies to provide solutions to 
regrowth veneering, pulp and paper production and biomass power production which 
will maintain current levels of market activity. The hallmarks of EM have been 
shown to be present; indeed, greenhouse provides a good instance of EM uptake 
within business and government. Evidence presented also highlights how policy 
intention expressed in ecological terms may not necessary translate into real 
environmental benefit. Again, forest related greenhouse policies are shown to be 
characteristic of this problem. 
If and when an international emissions trading system is developed, the likely 
opportunities for Tasmania to benefit from its existing forest estate, or new forest 
estates, will be very limited. Added to this, establishing scientific and verifiable 
carbon sequestration in order for carbon accounting to occur is extremely technical (as 
we have seen). On the basis of the evidence presented here, there seems every 
likelihood that the cost of employing this expertise is likely to be greater than the 
value of a tonne of carbon stored. 
This case study illustrates the likelihood that carbon sink potential in Tasmania, and 
those seeking to exploit it, are on a demonstrably weak tangent of ecologically 
modernising business. This is because of the substantive lack of real greenhouse 
driven investment opportunities that deliver genuine environmental benefits. This 
demonstrates evidence of weak EM as opposed to strong and reflexive EM, with 
commitment largely at the level of rhetoric, where its deployment is essentially 
manipulative. In closing this chapter it is well, too, to point to the wider context in 
which this Tasmanian case study ramifies. As Cadman notes: 
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The question must be asked: if carbon credits are enhancing 
investments that may encourage native forest destruction in 
industrialised first world countries, then surely there is an even 
greater risk that in poorer countries.., the potential for perverse 
outcomes is even higher? ... not only are sinks a questionable 
method of addressing climate change, but they may also lead - to 
negative environmental outcomes... ( 2000:4). 
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5. Renewable Industrialisation? 
This chapter provides a second case study to assess the currency of EM, and the nature 
and extent of the uptake of EM principles such as a sustainable development ethic and 
an advanced environmental consciousness, through the exploitation of greenhouse 
opportunities in Tasmania. In this instance the focus is on the state-owned electricity 
businesses and the emerging renewable energy opportunities being created by 
international and national greenhouse policies and programs. 
In examining the way that these businesses are currently positioning themselves to 
take advantage of 'greenhouse' business opportunities, it is necessary first to outline 
their environmental record in terms of the traditional roles that they have played in 
balancing energy demand and supply within the state. As with the previous case study, 
this background will put in context the degree to which EM is occurring in the area of 
Tasmania's energy policy. Consistent with the approach taken in the previous chapter, 
this section of the thesis will proceed with a brief outline of the historical experiences 
and contemporary trends in energy policy in Tasmania. This is followed by an 
explanation of the potential competitive advantage Tasmania might have by virtue of 
its substantial past investment in renewable hydro-electricity assets. 
The second part of this chapter will explore business development incentives for 
renewable energy development contained in the Kyoto Protocol and contemporary 
Australian greenhouse policies. With this international and national policy 
background, the extent to which the potential greenhouse competitive edge is being 
exploited by the Tasmanian government or its energy businesses is explored. Finally, 
this chapter will examine whether these instances evidence EM occurring, and the 
degree to which any such occurrence of EM represents a genuine transition toward 
more ecologically sustainable policies and values, as opposed to a mere rhetorical 
exercise geared to maximising potential advantages from unintended and incidental 
environmental benefits of previous energy planning decisions. This will enable 
interpretation of associated environmental discourse and policy rhetoric, and 
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exploration of whether a strong or weak ecologically modern ethic is present in 
Tasmania's current energy policy. 
5.1 Historical Development and Management of Public Hydro-Electicity Assets 
in Tasmania 
Approximately 60 percent of Tasmania's stationary (non-transport) energy 
requirements are supplied from hydro-electricity. The energy supplied from these 
hydro-electricity assets is portrayed by the Tasmanian government and government-
owned business as a 'renewable', 'clean and green' electricity source. Much is made 
of this in marketing Tasmania and its tourism (Department of State Development(b) 
1998:31). Behind this official view, however, lies a rich history which is important to 
any understanding of the capacity of the state's electricity business to 'sell' its product 
and its image as renewable, clean and green. A snapshot history of Tasmania's hydro-
electricity assets and the associated role of government energy policy (in its various 
forms) will establish a context in which to discuss the extent of environmental 
learning in the contemporary government business enterprise of Hydro Tasmania ('the 
Hydro' or HEC). The history of the Hydro is replete with both pride and conflict and 
as a result there now exists a substantial body of historical literature now exists 
providing accounts of its history (Knight, Benjamin and Colebach [1962]; Australian 
Conservation Foundation [1972]; Kirkpatrick [1979]; Thompson [1981]; Gillies 
[1984]; and Read [1986]). This section draws heavily, but not exclusively, on the most 
recent and perhaps most comprehensive addition to this corpus of literature, Lupton's 
Lifeblood: Tasmania's Hydro Power (2000). 
Dominant themes in these historical accounts of the Hydro are the degree to which the 
production of hydro-electricity was primarily a tool for industrial development and the 
close relationship between industry and the Hydro. Thompson, for example, noted 
that: 
The key to understanding the HEC's power in Tasmania is to examine it's 
relationships with industry. Tasmania is effectively a hydro-industrial 
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complex. Since the establishment of the HED in 1914 the aggressive 
marketing of electricity to large industrial consumers has been the 
lynchpin of Tasmania's economic progress. Cheap and abundant 
electricity brought industry.... These became the heavyweights of the 
Tasmanian economy... handicapped by the difficulties of a small home 
market and a 240km stretch of water separating it from the Mainland... 
(Thompson 1981:23). 
The Tasmanian Government became actively involved in developing the island's 
hydro-electric resources in 1914 when it stepped in to take over a failed private 
enterprise project aimed at harnessing the water resources of the Central Plateau to 
generate electricity (the Great Lake scheme). The Hydro Electric Department (HED) 
was created to ensure that the project started by the failed company was completed 
(Gillies 1984). This 'nationalisation' occurred within an economic climate where it 
was envisaged that the provision of cheap electricity could attract energy-intensive 
mining, metals, mineral processing and chemical companies to Tasmania. The 
presence of these companies, it was envisaged, would establish a firm economic basis 
with employment and growth in the state. The HED was seen as, and saw itself as, 
both a saviour and magnet for manufacturing business that would provide 
employment and revenue for the state. In return, those companies would be supplied 
by the HED with cheap, reliable sources of power. The 'hydro-industrialisation 
vision' was that these large energy intensive manufacturing businesses would create a 
development environment conducive to smaller manufacturers for whom energy was 
not a major cost item. Embedded in this strategy was a presumption of a rolling 
program of hydro-electric development. As one enterprise was established or 
expanded in the state and took up the surplus capacity of electricity, more electricity 
would be required to provide for potential new industries, so a new hydro-electric 
project would be needed to ensure that there was sufficient surplus of cheap electricity 
to attract new industry, and so on ad infinitum. 
The HED's vision, however, proved elusive, and industries were slow to arrive. In 
1930 the HED was restructured to become the Hydro Electric Commission (HEC), 
and the Hydro Electric Commission Act 1930 effectively provided the Commission 
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with legitimate independence from the persuasive influences common to politics, as 
well as the ability to control and use water resources to maintain the development 
paradigm the RED had so firmly established. A subsequent parliamentary Act 
consolidated the HEC, as well as making provision for state control over all waters, 
including lakes, falls, rivers and streams (Thompson 1981:16). This involved an 
enhanced charter to coordinate the activities relating to generation, transmission, 
distribution, retailing and marketing of electricity within the state. In the early 1950s, 
the HEC was handed absolute monopoly on-all aspects of electricity from the planning 
stage right through to the retail stage. This allowed the HEC a greater capacity to 
coordinate its core activity of organising for the production of large amounts of cheap 
electricity in order to attract potential industry. Lupton notes that the intent of the 
1930 Act was to organise relationships of responsibility to Parliament so that its 
business could not be hindered by governments of the day seeking short term political 
gain 'to the determent of the state's long term interests' (2000:296). This security was 
mirrored in some of the HEC's major supply contracts, which contained sovereign 
risk clauses to insure the supply and price that won the business development in the 
first place, against changing governments or political whim. 
The HEC's dream of hydro-industrialisation was eventually realised by attracting, not 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries, but footloose energy-intensive industries. 
These industries sourced their primary inputs from outside the state and relied, in 
producing exportable outputs, not on labour but on large quantities of cheap 
electricity. Subsequent expansion by these industries put in train a series of electricity 
demand forecasts which committed the HEC to a continuous rolling construction 
program which inevitably became institutionalised as the Commission's modus 
operandi. By the 1950s the HEC accounted for nearly three-quarters of the state's 
debts and loans. It could generate water-based power for the manufacturing sector at 
the expense of water supply for rural industry irrigation. It had the power to alter river 
flows and catchments. As these activities expanded they increasingly encroached 
upon pristine natural ecosystems. This led to increasing conflict, which reached a new 
height when it was discovered that one hydro-electric scheme (the Middle Gordon 
Scheme) would inundate an entire National Park (Lake Pedder National Park). The 
power held by the HEC was unprecedented. As Lupton notes: 
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The HEC became the pivot of the public sector in Tasmania... it became 
more powerful perhaps than any other government instrumentality that 
Australia had known in times of peace (Lupton 2000:8). 
A consequence of this was social upheaval, including two well-documented and 
iconic environment/development conflicts. The first of these began in the late 1960s 
when the HEC commenced work on the Middle Gordon Power Scheme which 
involved, among other things, the inundation of Lake Pedder in 1972. While the HEC 
viewed this as 'collateral damage', the controversy over the issue gained such 
momentum as to call into question both the powers of the HEC and the key political 
assumptions of the day. A dedicated environmentally conscious segment of the 
community was politicised and a potent conservation movement evolved. The 
flooding of Lake Pedder became a critical historical point in mobilising the 
contemporary environment/green movement. It stimulated previously disparate 
interest groups such as the South West Action Group and the Lake Pedder Action 
Committee, to consolidate and emerge as the United Tasmania Group in 1972 - the 
first green party in the world (Walker 1989). From the United Tasmania Group 
emerged the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (1975), which became a formidable 
opponent of hydro-industrialisation: 
So it was that the Australian stronghold of hydro-electricity became the 
political stronghold of one of the most influential green movements in 
the world... The plan to flood Lake Pedder became a political storm. 
Later, the proposal to flood the Lower Franklin River produced not just 
a storm but a tempest that spanned the continent (Lupton 2000:9). 
In trying to save the wilderness, proposals for alternatives to large hydro-electric 
schemes were advanced by sections of the environment movement. These included 
not only energy conservation and wind, but also a coal, fired power plant. This 
provided the HEC with an opportunity to sell its favoured option in terms of 
environmental benefits and the Commission seized the opportunity by adopting the 
slogan `HEC: Power without Pollution' and 'Hydro is Solar' (Harries, pers comm, 
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2001), whilst side-stepping the charge of environmental vandalism associated with the 
destruction of wilderness areas. We have here an early example of EM behaviour on 
the part of the HEC. 
Lupton also provides an account of the 'Fight for the Franklin', the second pinnacle 
historical event, which followed the announcement of the second stage of the Gordon 
River Power Development - specifically, the proposed construction of the Gordon-
Below-Franklin Dam, in 1979. The scheme, if it had been constructed, would have 
increased the state's hydro-generation capacity by 22 percent, at an inflation-adjusted 
cost of $1.4 billion (2000:303). Instead, the proposal to flood the lower Gordon and 
Franklin Rivers re-ignited the controversy of hydro-electric development. The scale 
of protest was unprecedented and blockades occurred at the proposed dam site. The 
accounts of this controversy are numerous and stand testament to the significance of 
the events. The 'green movement' successfully campaigned on both emotional and 
hard economic grounds and engaged in a battle that would see the wilderness 
eventually recognised as a World Heritage Area and the declaration of the Wild 
Rivers National Park. The result, according to Lupton, was that 'all told, a potential 
annual energy output of 3,161 gigawatt hours had been locked up in World Heritage 
Area' (2000:328). 
With a change from Liberal to Labor government in Canberra, the latter having 
campaigned on a promise to save the Franklin, the Dam was stopped. The 
controversy was ultimately decided in 1983 by a 4:3 decision of the High Court of 
Australia, in which the Commonwealth's constitutional power to halt construction of 
the dam, under its international treaty obligations arising from its signature to the 
World Heritage Convention, was upheld. It was the world's first internationally-scaled 
wilderness preservation controversy, whilst in Tasmania itself the battle led to the 
establishment of the Tasmanian Greens, a political party which went on to hold the 
balance of power in the Tasmania Parliament from 1989 to 1991 (Hay 1998:103). 
The HEC and its business activities had inadvertently created a world renowned 
environment movement that was committed to principles well beyond those of 
ecologically modernising institutions. 
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5.1.1 Restructures and Privatisation of the Hydro Electric Commission 
The creation of a potent environmental movement was an unintended consequence of 
hydro-industrialisation. Behind the environmental debate were also economic 
critiques of energy planning and nascent moves to restructure the industry along the 
lines of an economically efficient model. The environmental movement itself mooted 
some of the initial moves towards restructuring and reform. 
In the decades following these key environmental disputes, the HEC underwent 
significant organisational change, including numerous business restructures. It will be 
shown that these changes have been constrained by accumulated policy debt and 
reform, ultimately restricting the ability of the Hydro to be a genuine example of 
reflexive EM. The dominance of the Hydro in Tasmania's economy was earned 
through the historical ability to attract large energy intensive industry through the 
competitive price advantages it once had to offer. Challenged by the environment 
movement, in little over a decade commentaries evince the Hydro's learning of an 
environmental discourse. 
Care for the environment had been accorded an increasingly high profile 
in the Hydro 's pronouncements ever since the Pedder and Franklin 
debates made it a powerful and political issue. Now the seriousness of 
their commitment, made explicit in the 1987 Corporate Charter, was 
matched by changes in which Hydro went about business (Lupton 
2000:357). 
The Hydro Charter 1987 included goals such as provision of electricity to the 
community at the lowest practical cost, encouraging the development and efficient use 
of energy resources (including wind, wave and solar power), and advising on policies 
that, through efficient resource use, promote commercial and industrial development. 
With the Charter in mind we can consider what EM has to offer in terms of 
distinguishing rhetoric from reality in assessing corporate behaviour. 
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13 January 1997 
Christine Milne 
Leader of the Tasmanian Greens 
DISAGGREGATION VITAL TO ECO- 
LVDISTRIALISATION 
The Tasmanian Greens today said that the 
recommendations of the National 
Competition Policy Review of the Structure 
of the Hydro-Electric Corporation's 
Distribution and Retail Businesses, 
provided sound reasons why the HEC 
should be disaggregated 
Greens Leader Christine Milne, said that 
fin decades the HEC ran rough shod over 
Tasmania but through disaggregation 
would finally he brought to heel. 
"The break up of the Hvefro is the final 
phase in the Greens campaign to bring it to 
heel." said Greens Leader Christine Milne. 
"Tasmania can move into a new era 01 
energy efficiency. energy conservation, co-
generation, and genuine innovation." 
.The Tasmanian Green recognised their 
debt to the 'TEC stating there may not 
have been a United Tasmania Group or 
Tasmanian Greens lvithout the . past 
exceskVS of the old monolith. but felt it was 
high time ,lam - Tasmania to move .finward to 
a new era ofeco-industrialisation. 
"As we move into the next century and nevi 
millennium it is time • to leave the 
(10177 thal 1Ce of the Hydro behind as we 
nzoi ,e into a new era of eco-
industrialisation." 
"It would be easy jOr the Government to 
structure the break-up to favour a sale. or 
Bass/ink. Our job will be to ensure the 
break-up is the best for :Tasnzanians, 
whatever the jiatere may hold." 
The Greens moved amenchnents to the 
Government's recently passed 
disaggregation legislation to ensure that the 
na 1 breakup would conic before 
Parliament for scrutiny, thus giving the 
Parliament the benefit of the Natibnal 
Competition Policy review released today. 
Source: The Greens 2000 
A mandate such as the Charter, combined 
with an historical approach described by 
Lupton as the Hydro's 'Wild West frontier' 
(2000:363), means that the comparative 
importance given to promoting development 
over encouraging efficiency needs to be 
carefully considered. The legacy of the 
'Wild West' development paradigm matched 
by the political desirability of winning large 
energy-intensive projects, is arguably still 
considered the pinnacle of political 
achievement and such industries as the 
mainstay of the Tasmanian economy. 
Thompson, in his account during the 
Franklin debate, suggested that the HEC was 
one of the most powerful and controversial 
institutions in Australia. Its policies had led 
to the destruction of Lake Pedder and were 
responsible for Tasmanians being the largest 
consumers of electricity in the world. 
According to Thompson:' ... the 
Commission should either be disbanded or 
split into two separate authorities' and that 
failure to do so 'would ensure the 
construction arm of the HEC continues to 
dictate Tasmania's energy policy' 
(1981:162). 
Calls for restructuring were therefore first 
mooted by the HEC's environmental 
opponents, who believed that the 
restructuring of their arch-rival would result in an emasculation in terms of its 
• 
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political power. And, restructuring did occur - Lupton notes that in the early months of 
1988 the Hydro's old and established engineering-based management structure was 
'obliterated altogether' in a new wave of commercialisation. 
Ironically, this restructure was driven by Premier Robin Gray's refusal to be dictated 
to by a government instrumentality, even though this same instrument largely secured 
his gaining of the Premiership in the first place. The changes were also driven by the 
state of the HEC's coffers and the cost of its loans after the Australian dollar was 
floated in 1983. The common perception is that the restructure, along with the 
winding down of construction, meant that the culture of hydro-industrialisation of the 
previous decades was all but over. 
But the demise of the power-engineering branch within the Hydro did not, contrary to 
the view of many contemporary writers, constitute an end to hydro-industrialisation. 
Evidence of the hydro-industrialisation ethos continued to surface throughout the 
1980s. It was a decade of drought, which cost the Hydro $3.6 million in fuel oil to fire 
the backup Bell Bay power station. In pushing for restructuring the Greens failed to 
see that the economists waiting in the wings would seize upon the opportunity to 
create an electricity market and to drive reform to a point where electricity businesses 
were reduced to commercial activities competing aggressively for profit and market 
share. Energy efficiency and demand management did not fit into this commercial 
ethos. This was, more generally, a decade that saw a shift towards commercialisation, 
a phase which also saw the undoing of campaigns such as 'Switch Off and Save' 
which amounted to what was considered a decade of inactivity (by encouraging people 
to use less electricity in their homes) in the domestic market (2000:363-73), and its 
replacement by what might be seen as a 'switch on' campaign characterised by 
attaining comforts 'for only 5c a day'. This commercialisation process accelerated 
toward the end of the decade and in 1990 Tasmania, in line with moves being made in 
other Australian states, introduced an Authorities Financial Management Act 
(SAFMA 1990) which effectively served notice on goyernment authorities, such as 
the Hydro, that they had to behave as a profitable arm of government yielding their 
owner a dividend (2000:372). Furthermore, under the Labor minority government, the 
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Department of Resources and Energy had been set up and for the first time the Hydro 
had to work with government in assessing energy options. 
The balance of power gained by the Tasmanian Greens and Labor in 1989 ended 
acrimoniously in 1992. An election saw the reins of power passed to the Liberal Party. 
Robin Gray, who came to power as Premier of Tasmanian as a pro-dam politician 
during the Franklin dispute and was renown for his pro-development stance and 
uncompromising support for the dam, became the Minister responsible for the energy 
portfolio. During his Premiership in the 1980s, further dam options had been 
explored and developed (including the King and Anthony Scheme, the building of 
which started in 1984) and are said to have provided enough surplus power to 'turn 
around' the business. 
... additional revenue lay not in raising prices and driving customers 
away but in lowering them and increasing consumption. Thanks to the 
Anthony Power Development, the Hydro now [by the early to mid 1990s] 
had the largest reserves of energy in History.... (Lupton 2000:398). 
By the time the King and Anthony Scheme came on line (in the early 1990s), it had 
become patently obvious that construction of hydro-electricity schemes was not a 
cost-effective option for the future. Further hydro development was prohibitive and 
during this phase the Tasmanian government and the Hydro explored such future 
energy possibilities as natural gas and an undersea electricity cable link to Victoria, an 
idea which had first emerged in the 1950s (2000: 373-385). 
Although the omission of further hydro-electric schemes from the list of options was 
explained on the grounds that the cost-effective options had been locked up in World 
Heritage Areas, the reality was that the cost of electricity from the last scheme, the 
King and Anthony-Henty schemes was Ile/KWh, approximately 21/2 to 3 times the 
cost of electricity produced from new coal and gas fire,d power stations on mainland 
Australia (Harries, pers comm, 2001). While there was a shift from hydro to other 
energy options, the steadfast commitment to an ideology of growth, and the political 
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validity of big projects, remained as strong as the 'Utopian Dream' development ethic 
of the late nineteenth century (Lupton 2001:385). 
At the same time as the 'big energy project' ideology appeared to be regaining 
strength, the Hydro was attempting to ecologically modernise itself. Initially driven by 
public relations, it was quick to recognise that environmental credentials had the 
potential to translate into not just good public relations or compliance with law, but 
new business opportunities. While the Hydro of the 1970s and 1980s paid more than 
lip service to environmental concerns (Lupton 2000:390), it was not much more than 
lip service. Lupton himself points out that the Hydro lacked at the time any formal 
environmental policy (2000:390). However, the HEC cobbled together a formal 
environmental policy, padded with conciliatory rhetoric to the tune of'... the days of 
confrontation are over...' (2000:392). This new voluntary environment policy put in 
place a number of follow-up procedures and assessments that served, ironically, to 
highlight several shortfalls in the new eco-focussed business. A series of audits 
carried out under this policy revealed that the HEC owned a host of contaminated 
sites, pointed to a series of failed rehabilitation attempts, and revealed numerous other 
general operational inefficiencies. The Hydro was forced to respond by adopting an 
environmental management system consistent with the international standard ISO 
14001. Implementation of this standard involved significant costs for consultancies 
and rectification programs. 
Further restructuring, downsizing and outsourcing of the Hydro occurred in the mid to 
late 1990s. In 1997, the Liberal government announced the split up of the Hydro into 
three separate business units: the Hydro (generation); Aurora (distribution and retail) 
and Transend (transmission). Arguably, the real driver of this change was Treasury's 
plan to sell the Government's electricity assets and to maximise the sale price by 
selling these as three separate businesses. This was well suited to the Liberal 
Government's philosophy of getting government out of running business. 
Whilst the government saw the opportunity to divest itself of ownership of businesses, 
Treasury saw the opportunity to reduce state debt. But the government did not 
anticipate massive public opposition to the sale of the Hydro. The Greens and the 
95 
Hydro combined to oppose the sale (and indeed, Robin Gray, the Minister for Energy, 
publically supported the Hydro against the Premier). The Government responded by 
watering the proposal down to a strategy of partial sale. This was sold to the public as 
necessary to reduce state debt. The voting public, however, rejected even the partial 
sale option. In 1998, a Labor government was sworn in with a landslide victory, its 
primary campaign platform, the retention of the Hydro in public hands, winning the 
overwhelming support of a majority of Tasmanians. 
Considering the Hydro in the context of environmental consciousness and politics in 
Tasmania raises a myriad of possibilities in relation to EM: the uptake of EM as a 
doctrine; the recognition of EM characteristics; and the question of 'genuineness' in 
environmental reform. The common view is that hydro-industrialisation died in 1983 
and that the HEC subsequently underwent a conversion on the road to Damascus, a 
major change in its culture, injecting environmental concerns into its day-to-day 
activities and management. The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s evince a number of 
core characteristics: 
1. the public clearly wants to retain the Hydro in public ownership; 
2. the Hydro has undergone major restructures and now operates as a commercial 
business; 
3. government wrested energy planning away from the Hydro then sought to hand it 
over to 'the market'; 
4. the popular view is that hydro-industrialisation is dead and buried; and 
5. the Hydro has ecologically modernised itself. 
The validity of these views will be tested in the following section by questioning, in 
particular, the fourth and fifth of these - analysing the way in which the HEC has 
pursued its new corporate goals with a new environmental ethic based on a 
greenhouse sensitive future, and the parallel advantages and constraints available in 
greenhouse policy frameworks. With this established, the core drivers of policy 
development and the extent of change can be assessed. 
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5.1.2 Competitive Advantage — Historical Accident or Growth from Green 
Credentials? 
Ecopolitical commentary in Tasmania over the past three decades has 
characteristically echoed three themes: 
the uniqueness and emergence of the first green party in the world, the United 
Tasmania Group, and further green political development; 
the uniqueness and magnitude of the state's natural environment; and 
political, social and economic agendas that have undermined the dominant 
economic development paradigm driving the state's economy - hydro-
industrialisation. 
Crowley for example, suggests that 'hydro-industrialisation functioned as a policy 
framework, shaping not only Tasmania's industrial profile, but also the nature of its 
industrialised communities' (1989:48). While commentators such as Crowley describe 
hydro-industrialisation as a 'development relic of the past', this view is based on a 
narrow interpretation of hydro-industrialisation. A broader interpretation would allow 
a different thesis to be put forward, namely that the underlying ideology and dominant 
development paradigm did not in fact die or even atrophy following the Franldin Dam 
episode, but survived by adopting a specialised environmental position sympathetic to 
development. This thesis accords with the central thesis of EM — that capitalism, as 
the dominant economic paradigm, can pursue environmental stewardship. 
The brief historical overview of the Hydro provided above highlights the major 
schism between the environment movement and hydro-industrialisation as observed 
by several ecopolitical commentators during recent decades. The following sections 
will discuss how, in the current economic, social and political environment, the 
transcendence of hydro-industrialisation from its traditional character to one of 
environmental consciousness expressed through a greenhouse sensitive discourse has 
arisen. It will explain how elements of greenhouse deVelopment provide a new 
discourse, and how, because of this, the common tendency to refer to hydro-
industrialisation in the past tense is in fact inaccurate. It will be shown that 
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greenhouse has provided what appears to be a turnaround in the environmental 
discourse of the once core enemy of environmentalism in Tasmania. 
The extent to which this institutional learning reflects more than rhetoric can be 
assessed within an EM framework, by asking three key questions: 
I. 	will/has the consciousness of the environment movement become benign to 
past hydro-industrialisation, so that environmental damage done in the 
process of constructing past schemes is accepted or forgiven, thus that these 
schemes are now seen as 'good' on the basis of being renewable?; or 
is it that what has been perceived as the real task of the green movement has 
been won, on the energy front at least, and that its once true enemy will, in a 
benign capacity, adopt a real and measurable environmental paradigm?; or 
does the new, renewable industrialisation of Tasmania constitute an example 
of Welford's (1997) hijacking of environmentalism — as discussed in Chapter 
2. 
In his Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), Porter argues that stringent 
environmental regulation can lead to the export of those products which are thereby 
promoted. Those countries that have most rigorously attempted to curtail air pollution, 
for example, have become global leaders in the export of pollution control 
technologies. Porter further notes that: 
The strongest proof that environmental protection does not hamper 
competitiveness is in the economic performance of nations with the 
strictest [environmental] laws... Turning environmental concern into 
competitive advantage demands that we establish the right kinds of 
regulations... They must stress pollution prevention rather than merely 
abatement or clean-up. They must not constrain the technology used to 
achieve them, or innovation will be stifled. Awl standards must be 
sensitive to the costs involved and use market incentives to contain them 
(Porter 1996:34). 
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Reflecting an ecological modernisation framework, Porter's competitive advantage 
thesis interprets the relative positioning of units (such as nations, industries or 
businesses) to their environment and the outside forces (threat of new entrants; 
intensity of rivalry; pressure from substitutes; and the bargaining power of buyers and 
suppliers) that act upon it. Competitive advantage can be captured either by using the 
environment or by using merely environmental concerns held by consumers as the 
basis for acquiring comparative strength. Relative strength is a critical dimension to 
successful exploitation of environmental assets or acumen, and as competitors become 
increasingly ecologically conscious, credibility becomes a core business element. The 
relativity concept parallels expressions of weak and strong versions of EM - weak 
business-as-usual involves environmental retro-fitting (which most competitors can 
do); whilst strong environmental performance is based on verifiable procedures and 
demonstrative systemic ecological commitment (which many competitors will not 
manage). 
There is a dilemma, however, with which EM is not easily reconcilable. EM theory 
(in a prescriptive sense) does not readily recognise that the weakest expressions of EM 
(in a descriptive sense) can provide greater relative competitive strength than is 
recognised. This can undermine EM prescription as a force for positive 
environmental reform. For example, it is in peripheral economies where the most 
intact ecosystems are likely to be present (because of a lack of development), and 
correspondingly, it is in these places that environmental decline is likely to be greatest 
when economic development occurs. As a case in point, Tasmania boasts some of 
the most unique wilderness assets in the world, and these attributes are exploited 
throughout the economy to gain strategic competitive environment. The presence of 
the 'best' wilderness is no guarantee that Tasmanian businesses are examples of 
genuine environmental stewardship, but it still provides competitive edge. The need to 
espouse a stronger form of EM is particularly acute in the presence of scarce 
environmental assets, but it is likely to be passed over in favour of weak EM when 
business are already hampered by pressures such as global commodity prices, and this 
is typically the case in countries with peripheral economies and comparatively intact 
ecosystems. In peripheral economies, because of external economic pressures, the 
most efficient business tactic is to environmentally 'badge' goods and services, 
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continuing environmental destruction while still promoting an environmentally 
sustainable rhetoric for competitive advantage. This characterises an almost systemic 
inability to ever develop strong EM within economies where the most critical 
ecological resources are likely to reside. More developed economies with more 
compromised ecosystems, on the other hand, have an incentive to espouse stronger 
forms of EM, to make up for the absent resources and to seek competitive strength. 
Thurow (1999) explores the way that knowledge can be used to build wealth as 
opposed to more traditional capital, 
including industrial processes and land. 
The first industrial revolution saw 
structured technological advances 
combined with the 'birth of the corporate 
research laboratory' (1999:1), the second 
saw electrification and the third 
revolution is based on cultural 
capital/knowledge. Competitive 
advantages gained through the previous 
industrial revolutions harnessed radical 
methodological change and innovation, 
and the third is not dissimilar. Thurow 
argues that in each revolution success has 
emerged through disequilibrium 
conditions which emerge and collapse as technologies and ideas mature (1999). Like 
Porter, 'Thurow sees disequilibrium as a potential threat as well as a potential 
opportunity or competitive advantage. 
Competitive advantage in the second industrial revolution in Tasmania was obtained 
through the provision of hydro-electricity. Contemporary competitive advantage is 
being sought through knowledge of environmental dispourse and couching the Hydro 
in a new light. Indeed, Tasmanian GBE examples explored in this paper have shown 
that the ability to adopt environmental rhetoric has emerged out of historical accident, 
or disequilibria of development and environment. Because of the tenuous nature of 
Thurow's 5 Rules: 
I. No-orie ever becomes very rich by 
saving money 
Sometimes successful businesses have 
to cannibalise themselves to save 
theniselves 
3 .1Wo routes other than radical 
technological change can lead to high. 
g r o wth. high rate-of-return 
opportunities: sociological 
disequilibriums (aid developmental 
egg 40T/wits 
4. Making capitalism work in a 
deflationary environment is much 
harder than in an inflatiottary 
environment 
5. There are no institutional substitutes 
/or indivichad entrepreneurial change 
agents. 	 (lituow 1999) 
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this management change, the environmental stewardship rationality may prove to be 
as much a threat as an opportunity. 
Porter and Thurow provide a context that encapsulates the greenhouse dilemma for 
Tasmania. The historical disequilibrium of an industrial base that was once 
competitive, attracting major electricity consumers based on reliable, low price, bulk 
supply, is no longer. The Tasmanian government, having invested heavily in 
infrastructure (for which it is still paying), established itself with a monopoly resource 
for which the fuel was free (as long as it rained), and could be stored for long periods 
of time, thus providing a reliable capacity. It saw hydro-electricity as strategic, with 
the capacity to underpin growth. The same situation can be seen to be at work, now - 
however, the state's energy system is now capacity-constrained and suffering price 
competition within the national energy market. In this situation, the Hydro is 
attempting to use a reworked development discourse to portray itself as a green 
industry with a huge potential marketing advantage. Greenhouse allows for 
optimisation of this contingent disequilibrium, as the value of renewable energy is 
being recognised and massive investment is being made in these technologies 
worldwide: 
Even today, renewable energy is Europe's fastest-growing source, 
and California gets 9 percent of its electricity from renewable 
sources other than hydroelectricity. The world's fastest-growing 
energy technologies, outpacing even energy savings, are wind power, 
increasing about 26 percent a year, and photovoltaics... (Hawken et 
al 2000:247). 
5.2 Renewable Energy Development Opportunities: Emssions Trading, 
Renewable Energy Certificates and Flexible Mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
We now turn to how the Hydro implements its newfound environmental concerns 
within a greenhouse context. To do so, we must identify the greenhouse opportunities 
that exist for the organisation. The difficulties associated with identifying greenhouse 
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opportunities with any precision, and the need for social values to be considered to 
establish the validity of 'the greenhouse industry(ies)', were discussed in Chapter 3. 
Global, national and state-based responses to the 'greenhouse' phenomena have also 
created too many associated business opportunities for a fully comprehensive account 
to be possible. However, at a more general level, much useful observation can still be 
made. 
The Kyoto Protocol has itself in part given rise to this plethora of responses, by its 
extremely general nature, and through the flexibility of the mechanisms it proposes to 
reduce the costs of achieving national targets. This has stimulated considerable 
speculation over the opportunities for profit and capital growth from GhG abatement, 
all qualified by further speculation over whether the Protocol will be ratified or not. 
One important area of speculation has been the possible creation of a market for 
emissions or carbon credits. A difficulty is how carbon (and indeed other GhG) 
abatement would be treated ahead of the actualisation of such a market, and whether 
early abatement action would be accredited. This question is relevant because trading 
in carbon emissions is evolving in the absence of government decisions and ahead of 
any decisions about how such early responses will be treated or, indeed, in the absence 
of any certainty that the Kyoto Protocol will even be ratified. 
There are a number of potential risks involved in early action. It is risky because not 
only do companies not know if they will be accredited for such action, but also the 
cost-benefits are unknown. Despite these risks, both governments and businesses are 
engaging in early action and the sale of potential carbon credits that might be earned 
from such action. This contains a potential risk because, if credit is given for early 
action in a fictitious market, the real dollar value will be unknown. Carbon values are 
likely to be either under or over priced in the first instance, and until an emissions 
market matures (and opportunities for credit become either ubiquitous or rare), the 
real economic value of emission credits cannot be realised. This raises questions as to 
why both governments and businesses are already selling potential assets. 
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The complexity of the artificial markets evolving from a greenhouse context can be 
further evidenced by the fact that economic benefits from emission reductions 
(through avoiding potential emission penalties or carbon sequestration) are also 
possible. Thus, potential tradable credits might be gleaned from technologies which 
can capture and store, or sequester, carbon or, where a business is allowed to emit a 
certain amount and actually emits far less 
Carbon Credits Are The Newest 
	
Market 
	 (thus creating an emissions surplus), such a 
business may be able to transfer its pollution ... There even may be speculators 
trading on the -carbon market'• right to another party. A third opportunity is 
within a decade, a market some 
the development of renewable energy and analysts believe could be worth 
S700 billion by 2010... many over- 	other technologies which displace the use of the-counter deals are being struck 
belvveen l'Orestry bodies and GhG intensive fuels. These technologies 
business.. Many industries realise 
include co-generation, shifting from carbon they may be economically exposed 
in a carbon constrained ,litture and 	intensive fossil fuels to less carbon intensive 
are getting their credits he/ore the 
fossil fuels (such as from coal-fired ,first round of Kyoto-committnent 
analysis 	between 	'00S-12... 	electricity to gas-fired electricity), and bio- 
, (Australian 1999). 
energy. Mechanisms such as the Kyoto 
Protocol have attempted to present to business as many wins as possible, such as the 
potential 'double dividend' of realising credits from creating carbon pools, as well as 
savings in energy efficiency, or investing in fossil fuel displacing technologies such as 
renewable electricity. 
The Commonwealth has recently created an incentive for the second strategy (that of 
shifting to less carbon intensive fuels) in the form of renewable electricity legislation. 
The legislation (Renewable Energy Act 2000) creates an obligation on electricity 
retailers to purchase 'new' renewable energy and, therefore, it also creates a market 
value for the renewable energy above the normal price for the physical electricity. 
The difficulty however, has been how to define 'new renewables'. A similar problem 
occurs in relation to another renewable energy program, the GreenPower program. 
The attempt to reach agreement on what is and what is not GreenPower has been 
dogged by problems. Considerable controversy, for example, exists as to the efficacy 
of labelling steam-generated power from the burning of harvested forest residues as 
'green'. The argument is that in order to be classified as green or renewable, the 
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forests from which the residues are sourced would need to be sustainable managed. 
This in turn creates a need for agreement on what does and what does not validly 
constitute sustainable forest management. On this question there is no consensus. A 
second debate revolves around whether the negative environmental impacts of a 
renewable energy project, such as large hydro-electricity projects, outweigh the 
positive greenhouse benefits of such projects. Large hydro projects havebeen 
excluded from the GreenPower renewable energy program as a result. The Renewable 
Energy Act, however, contains the potential to provide bonuses to 'existing 
renewables' (accrediting large hydro-power schemes which have drowned wilderness 
areas, though not for the purpose of greenhouse reduction). A third and final example 
of these definitional and environmental problems can be seen in the benefit of 
providing credits to large-scale photovoltaic installations (which require GhG-
intensive input to produce the product initially). At the international level there is also 
debate over the use of nuclear power to reduce GhG emissions. 
Similar problems arise in providing credits for carbon sinks which may be present 
purely in terms of historical accident (much like hydro-dams in Tasmania), through 
isolation and rough terrain, or poverty (a failure to clear native forests for pasture at 
the same rate or to the same extent as other states or countries because the technical 
wherewithal was not present), as opposed to conservation for genuine abatement and 
sequestration. 
The questions of how quickly GhG emissions need to be reduced, and by how much, 
still remain contentious. Globally, and in the majority of countries, use of fossil fuels 
and emissions of GhGs have grown since 1990. A number of jurisdictions have 
argued for baseline years other than 1990, as proposed under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
reason for this is that a baseline year later than 1990 would be easier to achieve. A 
1998 baseline, for example, would make the 2008-2012 commitment period more 
attainable than would a 1990 baseline, as emissions from 1998 were higher than they 
were in 1990. In deciding baselines it is also necessary to take account of any 
efficiency measures that are already in place, otherwise early or current emission 
reductions result in negative economic impact on businesses. 
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While setting a baseline provides certainty for business, in agreeing to what it should 
be governments need to minimise the impacts on industries within their jurisdictions. 
The certainty provided by baseline protection for individual companies is important to 
drive developments and progress in the industry. The dilemma with setting a baseline, 
however, is that for it to be seen as an attainable goal by business and governments it 
needs to be high (particularly given the fact that there is still scepticism over 
greenhouse science itself). On the other hand, baselines need to be set sufficiently low 
to have a meaningful effect in terms of controlling climate change. This dilemma has 
become the crux of a cautionary and conservative approach which may ultimately 
undermine the Kyoto Protocol entirely, especially as America's President, George W. 
Bush (representing 300 million people, or 4 percent of the world's population, and 25 
percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions) has announced that his country will 
not ratify the Protocol. The likelihood that the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified has been 
seriously weakened by the act, as: 
... the Protocol will not take effect until it has been ratified by 55 
percent of the nations emitting at least 55 percent of the greenhouse 
gases... this has yet to happen... [and]... Bush, a former oilman, has 
questioned the science behind climate change forecasts and hinted 
recently that the US no longer supports the Kyoto Protocol (ENS 
March 28 2001:1). 
And further, 
President George W Bush has no intention of supporting any 
environmental initiatives that could harm the American economy, he 
said today. ..."We're now in an energy crisis," said Bush. "And that's 
why I decided to not have mandatory caps on CO2, because in order 
to meet those caps, our nation would have had to have had a lot of 
natural gas immediately flow into the system, which is impossible... 
Bush said he would work with American allies to reduce greenhouse 
gases. 'But I will not accept a plan that will harm our economy and 
hurt American workers', Bush added (ENS March 29 2001:1). 
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In Tasmania's case, the choice of baseline by the international community has major 
ramifications for its ageing industrial base and its future industrial outlook. The 
Tasmanian government may obtain benefits from either an emissions trading system 
or from a tradeable market in renewable energy certificates. It will be faced with a 
decision over whether to use any benefits it acquires to support the retentionof those 
industries in the state. In the current institutional arrangements, benefits accrued by 
Tasmania would be earned by GBEs. Depending on the rules put in place for these 
markets, the number of credits or certificates earned by these GBEs may be 
significantly less than the carbon credits or certificates that industries or state-owned 
businesses would have to purchase. These may be significant, as attested by the 
Tasmanian government's Greenhouse Statement. The capacity for the state 
government to use any certificates or credits for the purpose of retaining industries (or, 
indeed, attracting new businesses) in the state may therefore be limited. GBEs are also 
likely to sell credits into forward markets in order to realise economic benefit as soon 
as possible (we have already seen in the previous chapter that FT is selling carbon 
rights ahead of any certainty and ahead of the number or value of those rights being 
actualised). 
The result of these decisions will determine how many credits Tasmanian businesses 
require, and whether or not the Tasmanian government can support acquisition of 
credits (or prefer to see GhG-intensive businesses cease to exist or substantially 
change their ways). 
On a per capita basis, Tasmania's industrial processes (excluding energy 
and transport emissions) contributed the highest proportion of state 
greenhouse gas emissions by this sector in Australia. This is mainly due 
to greenhouse gas intensive industries such as aluminium smelting and 
cement production (Tasmania Greenhouse Statement 1999:17). 
There is also a risk for the government that these industries may seek to pass on the 
costs of any carbon credits that they are required to purchase. As Rolfe points out, 
industries everywhere will be seeking indemnification: 
106 
Where long-term fixed price contracts commit an emitter to production of 
greenhouse gas intensive products, the emitter should consider trying to 
control its potential liability. A producer of greenhouse gas intensive 
products (e.g. pulp, aluminium or cement) may want the purchaser of 
their products to indemnifi, them for possible future costs associated with 
greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements and incurred as a result 
of supplying the buyer with the emitter's product (Rolfe 1999:18). 
In Tasmania's case, the capacity of industries to pass on these costs to government is 
likely to be strengthened by the nature of their existing long term contracts, residual 
from the days of hydro-industrialisation, with the state-owned electricity supplier 
(Aurora). These contracts are believed to contain sovereign risk clauses which could 
protect the companies from liability for increased electricity prices incurred as a result 
of changes in government policies. That is, the electricity retailer would need to 
purchase renewable energy certificates (RECs) or carbon credits, but in these 
instances would be prevented from passing the costs on to its industrial customers. 
This would adversely impact on the bottom line and its dividends to government. 
Hence Aurora's operation would continue to be subsidised. The end result of this 
would be that government would have to pay twice to retain these industries: once to 
provide them with low cost electricity, and then again by indemnifying them from the 
costs of any carbon credits or RECs that the state-owned electricity retailer would 
have to purchase. This situation is likely to be exacerbated as the Tasmanian 
government continues to pursue a strategy of attracting energy-intensive industries 
such as magnesite mining and processing, the introduction of natural gas, and the 
importation of coal-fired electricity from mainland Australia via the Basslink 
interconnector. As Rolfe points out, investment attraction and new developments 
involving high emissions will have to recognise the consequences of emitting and 
possibly pay dearly. 
The Tasmanian Government will also have to juggle this strategy with that of 
maintaining a clean green image by pursuing other developments such as wind farms, 
eco-tourism, organic farm produce, or expansion of its existing renewable energy 
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base. There are therefore two potential benefits for the Tasmanian Government in 
promoting its renewable energy base. One is the need to earn RECs to offset the costs 
to government of the Renewable Energy act 2000. The other is to Promote the state's 
clean green image. The ability of the state to pursue this strategy has been seriously 
eroded by the way in which these greenhouse reduction programs have been 
implemented. In the case of the Commonwealth's new Renewable Energy
(Electricity) Act 2000, because existing renewables are not recognised, and will not be 
eligible for RECs, the state owned electricity retailer will have a liability under the 
Act. This will require the'purchase of RECs equivalent in 2010 to approximately 4-5 
percent of its total electricity sales. The anticipated price of those certificates in 2010 
is $40 per megawatt hour (MW/h). At current levels of generation of 95000 gigawatt 
hours (GW/h), this would include a cost of approximately $10 million per annum 
(Harries, pers comm, 2001). The Tasmanian Government will therefore be unable to 
earn certificates for existing renewables, while its retailer will have to buy certificates 
even though it supplies 100 percent renewable energy. The `renewableness' of this 
energy therefore provides no monetary advantage for the government. 
What this means is that if the largest of Tasmania's industries exited the state, thereby 
freeing up 60 percent of the state's electricity generation capacity, it would not 
translate into a windfall marketing benefit of clean/green renewable investment 
attraction. There is an irony here which challenges EM assumptions that capitalism as 
it currently functions in Tasmania is necessarily the 'best' mechanism for achieving 
environmental outcomes. At very least, the signals for moving to clean green modes 
of production are weakened, and therefore challenge some of the concepts in EM 
theory. 
Greenhouse business opportunities available to the Hydro are not restricted to the 
development of new renewable electricity infrastructure in Tasmania. Further 
emission reduction opportunities exist in the form of flexible Kyoto arrangements 
such as the Clean Development and Joint Implementation mechanisms (primarily 
targeting greenhouse reducing developments in non Annex 1 countries). Both of these 
provide opportunities to gain credits prior to the 2008-2012 measurement period. 
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In summary, under the proposed emissions trading system businesses in Annex 1 
countries could accrue credits both locally or externally in non Annex 1 countries. 
They could generate credits for early action; they could generate credits for alternative 
energy creation displacing carbon-intensive energies; and they could generate credits 
for fossil fuel displacement. 
With these somewhat uncertain business opportunities, the Hydro, which has 
historically attracted energy-intensive and greenhouse-intensive industries in its first 
phase of industrialisation, is entering a new phase of renewable industrialisation 
intended to capture opportunities and exploit existing competitive advantage in this 
area. The chairman of Hydro Tasmania (as it now is), in announcing his 
organisation's intentions to the public, linked this new investment strategy to the old 
hydro-industrialisation policy: 
One billion dollars will be invested in Tasmanian wind farms over the 
next 10 years, increasing Hydro Tasmania's generating capacity by 
almost 50%. The massive increase will revolutionise power generation 
in the state and Hydro Tasmania chairman Peter Rae says wind power 
development will be as significant as hydro industrialisation... 
Renewable energy is big business with big opportunities for those who 
position themselves appropriately... We have now confirmed that wind 
power in Tasmania in the period ahead will be what hydro 
industrialisation was in the 20th century (The Mercury 2000:1-2). 
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The question this statement raises is how the management of Tasmania's hydro assets 
(be they owned by government or government business enterprise) made the quantum 
transition from hydro-industrialisation to a 'new clean and green renewable generator' 
with premium price market advantages. And, indeed, the extent to which it has been a 
transition or something more 
superficial involving the rhetoric of 
major transition but minimal 
substantive change. The purported 
change to what might be labelled 
'ecologically modern', has emerged 
from am energy provider based on 
'pioneer'-phase landscape alteration 
and masterful feats of environmental 
engineering where the key driver was 
plentiful water and a landscape 
deemed to be of little value. The 
following section will describe the 
historical background and recent 
changes to the management structure 
of Tasmania's publicly-owned hydro-
electricity assets to assess the extent to 
which the uptake of EM precepts has 
in fact taken place. 
The Hydro's Environmental Policy: Clean 
Renewable Energy 
•wantjidure generations to enjoy the benefits 
of . a clean and healthy envinmment and we 
operate our business with that obiective in MIMI 
We are leadees in environmental management 
in the electrkitv industry. 
We are conunitted to: 
o continuous improvement in envinnunental 
management in-tic:tic:es 
inlegration qf environmental 
con:siderations into planning and 
operations 
o care/al management of our land and water 
'sources 
O wise and efficient use of energy 
O prvvention t .):1. pollution and minnm,ation of 
waste. 
As a minimum standard, we ensure Our 
activities comply with relevant environmental 
We wort,- closets; with the lasmanian community 
on matters of environmental interest and 
concern. 
We ensure that our stttif have the necessary 
expertise to JUIN their environmental 
responsibilities. 
We conduct regular hnieWS of our 
environmental postOrmanc:e throutrn processes 
such as environmental auditing. An annual 
environmental purfOrmance report is made 
available to members of the public. 
5.2.1 Implications for Tasmania of 
National Policies and Consequential 
Development Opportunities 
in 1997, the Commonwealth 
governinent announced its greenhouse 
package, Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change. As part 
of this policy commitment, a legal requirement for electricity retailers and large buyers 
of electricity from a pool (or directly from a generator) to source an additional two 
Hydro Tasmania (2001) 
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percent of their electricity purchase from renewable sources, was mandated by the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000. The Commonwealth Government under the 
Act has set penalties for non-compliance initially at $40/MWh (AGO 2000:1). To 
meet the liability, liable parties will have to purchase renewable energy certificates. 
Thus, market mechanisms are intended to stimulate an artificial renewable energy 
trading market, similar to the concept of creating a market for trading carbon rights. 
For a renewable energy generator to be eligible for the awarding of certificates, it must 
have commenced operation after January 1997 or above pre-1997 levels of output. 
This requires the measurement of existing levels of renewable generation prior to 
1997 in order to establish a baseline so as to calculate any increases in generation 
above historic levels for that generator. The Renewable Energy Regulator has the 
discretion to set an appropriate baseline for an existing renewable generator. 
Those eligible renewable energy generation assets commencing 
commercial operation on or after 1 January 1997 will be able to 
earn certificates for all electricity provided to the appropriate 
measurement point, following accreditation by the legislation. 
Other (pre-existing) renewable generation assets (defined as in 
commercial operation prior to 1 January 1997) will only be 
eligible to earn certificates from existing generation assets 
where they can demonstrate an increase in output from those 
assets above a relevant historical baseline (Office of the 
Renewable Energy Regulator [ORER] 2001) 
Consequently, the bulk of the electricity generated from Hydro Tasmania's system 
will not be eligible to receive certificates. The electricity that is hydro-generated and 
sold to Aurora will create a liability of 2 per cent. Aurora will therefore need to 
purchase certificates to cover this. The opportunity to benefit from retro-fitting 
existing hydro-generation to produce additional electricity will need to be considered 
carefully. If a baseline for a hydro station in Tasmania was based on a year, or years, 
that happened to represent low rainfall years, that station could produce well above its 
baseline in a normal rainfall year, and Hydro Tasmania would receive windfall RECs. 
If, on the other hand, every power station was upgraded with more efficient turbines 
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or runners, for example, their baselines could be set at levels whereby RECs gained 
could never meet the cost of upgrading, let alone the liability (it might simply be 
easier to instigate a program of cloud seeding to increase regional rainfall). Because 
Tasmania's system is currently running at full capacity, baselines for Tasmanian 
hydro-generators are likely to be set close to actual average long-term capacity levels. 
Thus, the Hydro (and indeed, other existing renewable generators in Australia) is 
forced in an economic sense to 'test' the ORER, to discover the baseline that will 
ultimately be chosen. It might be that this case is reflected in a recent report 
suggesting that bonuses available under the Renewable Electricity Act have stimulated 
hydro-generators to seek benefits from retro-fitting existing renewables: 
Early indications suggest that, during the next few years at least, 
RECs are going to be created largely from landfill gas, wind 
generation and solar hot water. Significant contributions to the 
market may also come from additional generation by existing 
hydro plant that can lift output through improved turbine 
operation or capturing increased run-off Relatively small 
amounts may be provided from other photovoltaics, and mini-
hydro... there were 106 applications under consideration of 
which more than half were from existing hydro plant... [and 
Tasmania actually submitted the most of those applications]... 
(Australian Energy News 2001:14). 
The report also highlights the likelihood of existing generators submitting applications 
in order to test the ORER and 'discover' what baselines will be applied to ascertain 
whether there are in fact opportunities to receive RECs from those generators. More 
than half of the applications received were from existing hydro plant, with Tasmanian 
and New South Wales making the most applications. 
A National GreenPower Scheme has also been created. The GreenPower scheme is a 
consumer choice mechanism whereby retailers offer GreenPower products to 
customers as a proportion of their energy needs. This proportion is guaranteed by the 
retailer to have been sourced from a 'green' accredited generator. By nominating 
preferred 'green' energy sources, and offering to pay a premium, energy suppliers 
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agree to buy the equivalent amount of energy nominated from renewable sources. It is 
a voluntary scheme and customers can opt to pay a premium in return for the 
assurance that the retailer will nominally source that part of the electricity from a 
'green power generator'. The government accredits generators as green to ensure 
consumer confidence. 
Eligible GreenPower renewable energy resources include: 
solar power (photovoltaic and thermal); 
wind; 
biomass (landfill gas, municipal solid waste, agricultural wastes, energy crops, 
wood wastes). It should be noted that only wood sources from existing sustainably 
managed forestry plantations and clearing of specified noxious weeds are 
accepted. Use of any materials from high conservation-value forests is not 
acceptable; 
hydro-electric power (small-scale or on existing dams) 
Projects must have adequate environmental flows. Projects that involve 
construction of new dams or diversion of rivers are generally not acceptable 
under GreenPower; 
geothermal; and 
wave and tidal power (SEDA 2001). 
Neither existing nor new large-scale hydro generation is considered 'green power'. In 
the case of both GreenPower and the Renewable Energy Act's two percent measure, 
the Hydro is therefore not placed well for environmental/greenhouse competitive 
advantage. This has significant implications for the state and how the environmental 
discourse of the Hydro parallels other greenhouse initiatives. The Porter/Thurow 
disequilibrium of Tasmania's 'overall carbon sink' status, its forests and electricity 
systems that one would presume are greenhouse favourable, is problematic. Against 
this background, however, the Hydro is developing new renewable wind generation 
resources and has announced plans for a major new investment initiative: 
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Further, announcements such as Hydro 's $100million wind power 
project are attracting companies seeking the purchase of green 
credits (The Mercury 1999:8). 
This new renewable initiative, however, is not without its own environmental impacts, 
and has attracted protest on both ecological and other environmental grounds. New 
renewable energy projects are not always non-contentious. In Western Australia for 
example: 
In the midst of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
Federal Government efforts to increase renewable power 
generation, objectors have appealed against Glenelg Shire's decision 
to grant Energy Equity Corporation permission to build what would 
be Australia's largest renewable energy project near Portland... 
Objectors, including the National Trust, a local Aboriginal group 
and residents, have appealed on the grounds of noise vibration and 
the impact the turbines will have on coastal views. The land is said 
to be of cultural significance to local Aborigines. The appeal will be 
heard at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in June (Watkins 
1998). 
Proposed wind farm projects are commonly the source of public concern. Wind 
farms are located on the basis of the available wind resource and as a result tend to be 
in exposed, undeveloped regions. They can also have significant environmental 
impacts ranging from bird collisions, altered micro-climatic conditions, visual 
amenity and local habitat destruction. The greenhouse benefits of wind farms, 
however, are widely accepted, and hence there has been a staggering growth in the 
industry globally. 
5.2.2 The Contemporary Policy Environment and the Consequent Attraction of an 
EM Rhetoric 
Both forests and renewable electricity are, in a greenhouse context, central policy and 
development foci for the Tasmanian government. Both are also very significant to the 
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Tasmanian economy, and therefore at first glance it would be reasonable to assume 
that in both cases there is potential competitive advantage to be exploited. It would 
also be reasonable to expect that forestry companies and the owners of significant 
renewable-energy resources are making the most of this competitive advantage by 
embarking on an appropriate discourse. In the case of forestry, Chapter 4 
demonstrated this is in fact occurring. Similarly, the Hydro has been shown in 
previous sections to be evidencing some EM characteristics. Indeed, the Hydro's 
contemporary motto is 'Hydro Tasmania — the renewable energy business'. It's core 
environmental policy can be encapsulated under the headings sustainability, 
responsible environmental management, compliance with environmental legislation, 
open and effective communication, environmental expertise, and reviews of 
environmental performance (Hydro Tasmania 2001). 
To interpret some of the meaning behind the eloquent discourse of sustainability that 
the Hydro now conveys, it is interesting to apply EM's tools in the broader context of 
energy policy in Tasmania — particularly greenhouse. One can thereby question how 
significant the transition really is, and the degree to which it is, in fact, a sensible 
strategy. 
In the same manner that carbon sink development is constrained by the policy 
restriction of accrediting forests established on previously cleared land after 1990, 
only 'new renewables' are likely to gain renewable certificates (or the equivalent 
credits). As we have seen, 'existing renewables' such as large hydro-electricity 
schemes are largely seen as 'brown' as opposed to 'green' in greenhouse schemes or 
the national renewable energy target. The 'greenness' debate becomes very difficult in 
a policy sense. For example, the Amazon forests may well comprise the largest 
carbon sink on the planet, but should governments connected to them be provided 
with a windfall of carbon credits when some of them are actively reducing their sink 
capacity, as opposed to proactively enhancing them for greenhouse abatement? 
Member countries of the European Union (who may npt have such forest assets) 
certainly argued early in the development of the Kyoto Protocol that such a situation 
would be inequitable. Similarly, if greenhouse policies provide existing renewables 
with a windfall situation, it may undermine adequate stimuli for new generation to 
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displace greenhouse-intensive energy sources. Essentially, the greenhouse policy 
stance necessarily becomes one where the overall greenhouse profile must be reduced 
(taking account of the contributions of existing pre 1990 forests and renewable energy 
generation), therefore, globally, it is critical to promote additional renewable sources. 
As a technological 'add-on' to business-as-usual, retro-fitting existing renewables, and 
in particular the Hydro's wind farm project, clearly evince EM behaviour. Also of 
interest is the relationship of this development to other energy policies and strategies 
in the Tasmania. A large wind farm in Tasmania comes tied with another 
infrastructure project. Peter Rae, chairman of Hydro Tasmania, has announced that the 
development of further wind gereation in Tasmania is dependent on Basslink (ABC 
2000). The Basslink inter-connector originally touted in the 1960s has been described 
by Lupton as: 
Another outward-looking initiative the Hydro was involved in was 
the long-talked-about submarine cable connecting with the National 
electricity grid; Tasmania's hydro-electric system would supply the 
mainland with peak load power and the mainland's coal-fired 
stations would repay the state with base load (Lupton 2000:383). 
A British company, National Grid, has been selected to develop Basslink. It is not a 
'Hydro-owned' project. The greenhouse problem is that the wind farm project is 
(purportedly) dependent on Basslink, which is in turn, dependent on the importation of 
coal-fired electricity. Hydro's Basslink Project Manager in a recent radio discussion 
(Halliday 2001) stated that Basslink would allow Tasmania's 'beautiful' renewable 
energy to be exported to the mainland, thereby helping Australia meet its greenhouse 
reduction commitments. It was added that it is for this reason that the Federal 
government was in support of the project. The problem with these notions is that 
without building more renewable energy schemes in Tasmania, Basslink would have 
no significant effect on the total GhG emissions. It misses the point that if wind farms 
or other new renewables were not built in Tasmania, they would be built on the 
mainland, and thus the suggestion that Basslink has any greenhouse benefits is 
problematic. Interestingly, local reports have been made that: 
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Australia would almost certainly fail to meet its mandated renewable 
energy obligations fBasslink did not go ahead... Tasmania expects 
to supply between 40 and 50 per cent - valued at $1.4 billion - of 
renewable energy over the next 10 years. Nationally, 1000 
megawatts is required to be generated... without Basslink 
Tasmanian renewable energy could not be sold into the national 
energy market... [and in context]... Hydro Tasmania has 
calculated that local wind power generation could 
commercially provide the 500 megawatts to the national energy 
market... [and]... has the capacity to generate about 2200 
megawatts through hydro generation... [which would not be 
counted because it is existing renewable energy] ... (Haley 
2001:9). 
This claim that Basslink would have a positive greenhouse impact by virtue of the fact 
that it would facilitate wind farm development in Tasmanian, was made in the recently 
released Draft Integrated Impact Assessment Statement (NSR Environmental 
Consultants 2001). 
The Facilitation by Basslink of this scale of wind power development 
in Tasmanian corresponds to 16% of the Commonwealth-mandated 
renewables target of 9,500 GWh. (2001:8-2). 
Claims such as this overlook the very nature of the Commonwealth's mandated target. 
It is the 9,5000 GWh per year of new renewable energy that is mandated. If 16% of 
this is not produced in Tasmania, it will have to be produced elsewhere in Australia. 
Basslink, therefore, would on its own have zero impact in terms of achieving the 
mandated target. These observations would be more plausible if there was a threat to 
- 
shut down all existing hydro-generation, replacing it with fossil fuel-based generation. 
Such reports also gloss over the possibility of new renewable generation being built on 
the mainland, which would obviously not be dependent on Basslink. It must be 
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remembered however, that Tasmania is also a victim, because it is hampered by the 
rules contained in national policy. 
Basslink, then, is a two-pronged fork: it would allow for the development of 
renewable energy in Tasmania, but it would be based on the importation of electricity 
produced from coal-fired generators on the mainland of Australia. -Added to this is the 
complication that RECs will operate in a paper-based trading process (certificates) and 
thus the use of actual electrons generated is not important. If it is the Hydro's intention 
to export 'green' electrons via Basslink from its wind resources, by the time these 
have travelled from the far North West of Tasmania to George Town in the central 
north of the state, and across 280 kilometres of Bass Strait to mainland Australia, the 
efficiency losses may render it uneconomic, or at least wasteful. The strategic 
greenhouse benefit of a wind farm/Basslink relation thus remains unclear. The 
Hydro's strategy can, therefore, be questioned on a number of fronts. These include 
the dependency on Basslink; an inability for the state to control liabilities that fall on 
its own GBEs or old but significant manufacturing businesses; an inability for the state 
to maximise benefits from credits that may be generated; and finally, with Basslink in 
place and the export of hydro-electricity there is the dual contingency of drought and 
no wind (and therefore a greater reliance on imported electricity). 
If the government was to pursue the sale or partial sale of the Hydro, its value would 
increase with Basslink in place, simply because electricity could be sold for much 
more than before. It appears that there are two fundamental justifications for 
Basslink: to attain participation in the National Electricity Market (NEM) Which 
should therefore ensure competitive electricity prices in Tasmania; and in preparation 
of the sale or partial sale of the Hydro. The justification used for community 
consumption would be that the state is short of electricity and there are only two 
options available, Basslink or natural gas. Other options such as wind and coal have 
been shown to be too costly (in the vicinity of 4c to 10c Kw/H, Office of Energy 
Planning and Conservation 1997) and there are a number of insurance risks to the 
economy that can be politicised. These include the insurance against the risk that one 
of Tasmania's major industrials leaves the state, and the insurance costs for drought 
risk management (including the maintenance and running of the Bell Bay oil fired 
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power station — soon to be converted to gas). Finally, Basslink allows a small increase 
in load to be managed without the creation of another major dam that would bring 
with it oversupply. At a time when government has been, perhaps, over-pessimistic 
about natural gas options, the role of Basslink was summarised as: 
Tasmania has now fully exploited this opportunity [hydro-
industrialisation cheap bulk electricity supply] and is no longer in a 
position to attract major industries for which low cost electricity is a 
principal criterion. This era of development is now complete and a 
new direction is required for Tasmania's electricity industry. 
Bass/ink offers the opportunity to take Tasmania into a competitive, 
dynamic national market that will provide a new set of benefits to 
Tasmania's hydro-electric system and to Tasmanian consumers. 
Further, this option will finally allow the state to substantially lower 
the set of risks, both physical and financial, that have been a feature 
of Tasmania's hydro system (Office of Energy Planning and 
Conservation 1997:48). 
The Hydro has been keen to pursue Basslink because it suits its business imperatives. 
It increases the value of its assets as well as allowing for expansion with a greenhouse 
gloss. The reality is that, at most, compliance with the mandated two per cent 
requirement under the Renewable Energy Act 2000 will be achieved, and even this 
will be at significant cost. If one includes the cost of Basslink as well as the cost of 
the proposed wind farm (described as mutually dependent), the business case looks 
doubtful in terms of economic as well as environmental values. If Basslink is 
justifiable on other grounds,, the wind farm scenario might be seen as viable in 
greenhouse and cost-efficiency terms. During the pinnacle phases of hydro-
industrialisation, the Hydro successfully managed a tight symbiotic relationship 
between government, industry and itself, suiting the interests of three core socio-
economic functions: politics (electability); bureaucracy (expansion and growth); and 
industry (buying cheap electricity). Now. though, the new energy paradigm of retro-
fitting, wind farms, Basslink and natural gas is not being presented in the interests of 
national, state or community wellbeing, but instead in greenhouse terms — and even 
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then from a narrow perspective. In reality these projects suit entrenched expansionist 
policies. The Hydro's desire to be a player in the renewable energy game is driven by 
Basslink, rather than the other way around. It is not necessarily in the public interest, 
and Basslink can be seen to fulfil the same function as new dams in earlier phases of 
hydro-industrialisation; indeed 'the new phase of the energy strategy ... builds heavily 
on the first phase — it is about value adding from the initial investment by the people 
of Tasmania in the current hydro infrastructure' (Office of Energy Planning and 
Conservation 1997). With this in mind, it is worth considering some of the enviro-
political associations that have been touted as negative consequences of Basslink: the 
impacts of transmission lines crossing the mainland state of Victoria; and that once 
Basslink is in place there can never be a viable justification for the draining of Lake 
Pedder, so that that environmental disaster could never be undone. 
Given these problems, the elements of EM that are identifiable in the case of the 
Hydro are of questionable substance. In the greenhouse sense, this becomes even more 
clear when we look further afield to the state's push to bring natural gas and 
associated infrastructure ashore. One would have thought that with the development of 
natural gas there would be problems selling the notion of Basslink. To date however, 
this does not appear to be the case. Of the fossil fuels burned to produce energy, 
natural gas is the least carbon-intensive. This provides a strategic EM advantage to 
both government and industry. However, in a state which claims to be an overall 
greenhouse sink, the importation of new non-renewable energy sources has to be seen 
in light of their contribution to the state's overall greenhouse profile. Natural gas in 
Tasmania, if described as a greenhouse friendly option, is very much a development-
oriented, business-as-usual EM-characterised initiative. In very much an EM style, 
Duke Energy, the company responsible for the natural gas project in Tasmania, claims 
greenhouse and wider environmental compatibility: 
Duke Energy is committed to building a diverse, secure, reliable energy 
business. We believe it is the best approach for promoting 
environmental benefit in accordance with our values regarding cultural 
sensitivity, economic development, resource conservation and 
facilitating quality of life improvement (Duke Energy 2001). 
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While a number of other renewable energy projects have been mooted in Tasmania, 
these tend to display weak EM, in that they also represent a 'development-as-usual' 
approach wrapped in a veneer of sustainability. An example is the solid waste 
incinerator proposed for southern Tasmania: 
The first new city garbage incinerator project in Australia has 
gained an economic boost with the passage of the country's 
renewable energy legislation... under which electricity retailers must 
source two percent of their power from renewable sources by 2010. 
City solid waste and native forest wood waste have been written into 
the bill as eligible sources... (ENS Dec 12 2000:1). 
There is little evidence to suggest that this or other renewable energy projects (such as 
forest residue steam generators) are based on a genuine attempt to improve the 
impacts of energy generation on the environment (or, strong EM principles). 
Furthermore, they tend to be improbable proposals based on markets that have yet to 
materialise or on the hope that Basslinic will provide such a market. 
In concluding this section it is worth noting a paradox which challenges both the ethos 
of the environment movement and highlights the contradiction of EM business and 
policy initiatives. The Greens have displayed internal conflict over their position on 
existing renewable infrastructure. The Green member for Parliament stated in 
Parliament that the Greens: 
... would prefer Tasmania... to remain a State that bases its energy 
supply on renewable energy that is environmentally clean and 
ecologically sustainable.., looking at the existing hydro system 
plus some small-scale new hydro from an environmental point of 
view.., to supply energy without adding to pollution or the 
greenhouse effect or destroying environments 21. there is a real 
market advantage for Tasmania in establishing itself as a supplier 
of that type of green energy... together with our image of being 
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clean and green, of having pristine wilderness areas that people 
can actually locate their industry and their manufacturing here, on 
the basis that they could then swear to the world that they only use 
these extremely ecologically friendly means of supplying energy 
as part of that production input.., for decades Tasmanians have 
been paying inflated prices for electricity in order to subsidise the 
cheap electricity that is going to the bulk-power users... (Putt 
2000). 
Within a new EM and greenhouse-oriented discourse, hydro-electicity has been 
repackaged to an extent that has not only confused proponents and policy makers, but 
has also confounded the environment movement (discussed below). 
I have shown that Tasmania's existing renewable energy assets and industry structure 
are are not well placed to gain competitive greenhouse advantage, despite the 
discourse and perceptions that these are 'green'. Clearly, those aspects which EM 
theory targets for analysis have assisted to create such a picture. In 1998 a Labor 
Government was elected in a landslide victory, primarily on the promise that 
Tasmania's monopoly public hydro-electricity utility would not be sold. The 
community generally, and despite their history of conflict with it, the Greens 
specifically, view public ownership of the Hydro and 'clean' water-powered electricity 
as positive. 
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The desire to retain the Hydro in 
public hands probably emanates from 
the significant role it has played in 
forming modern social and political 
history in Tasmania: it has been the 
most important conduit for a migrant 
workforce; and the most important 
conduit for government spending and 
large engineering projects. It is also 
the key generator of the 
environmental controversies that led 
to the emergence of a potent green 
politics; and the 'clean 
environmentally friendly' energy it 
generates, based on a lake system 
which has tourism potential, are also 
possible sources of support for a 
public sector Hydro. 
There may also be other more 
profound connections to notions such 
as Dryzek's 'tidy household' (see 
Chapter 2), in which little real change 
at home in domestic consumption (as 
long as products are labelled 'dolphin 
friendly') needs to occur for people to 
feel they are promoting a sustainable 
future. In this case, consumption of 
hydro-electricity can be comfortably 
assimilated as environmentally 
benign, and any impetus for energy 
conservation conveniently ignored. 
'WE'LL TAKE NUCLEAR 'POWER OVER 
BURNING FORESTS' - NSW PUBLIC 
The NSW community would prebr nuclear energy to 
energy sourced from wood fired power stations, 
according, to a poll conducted by the State's leading 
environment groups. 
The Roy Morgan 'Poll revealed that almost 90%cL  
respondents opposed the burning of native forests to 
provide energy, with fewer believing it to he 
renewable (8%) than nuclear power (1 2:'o). 
The poll was commissioned by The 	erne. s 
Society on behalf of the State's leading environment 
groups, including the Nature Conservation Council of 
NSW (Na..), the Coking Foundation and the I otal 
Environment Centre JECt, 
According to conservationists, the future of schemes 
designed to attract more people to renewable energy is 
being tarnished by (Ito image of the States forests 
going up in smoke. 
"We are being told that hwmng forestswet 
'clean, green energy and that simply besot been  
accepted by the public." said . NrCC executive officer. 
Kathryn Ridge. 
"The Government has been strong in encouraging 
people to choose cleaner, more renewable energy 
sources, but burning our tbrests for energy is not 
clean, not efficient and certainly not renewable. If this 
'clean, green' line about biomass continues to be sold 
to the public it isn't going to wash and it anglo take 
the whole clean energy market dt . n.vn with it 
When asked, three quarters of the respondents e:id  
they would choose. solar energy and the second most 
popular option was wind power. 'these are truiy 
renewable energy sources and they are the future ol 
responsible energy generating". 
"People are understandably concerned about this issue 
and I don't think they will buy into a scheme that has 
such a big question mark over it," Ms Ridge said. 
Other findings of the Morgan Poll include: 
87% of respondents would choose solar power 
over all other forms of energy If cost were not a 
factor; 
More people regard energy from coal fi red power 
stations as renewable than wood fuelled energy; 
and 
Environment groups are the preterred source of 
information about renewable energy (42%). over 
energy companies ( .293%9. power generators 
(28.6%) and govemment (17.1%) 
Nature Conservation Councii 01 NSW (2001) 
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Yet, it has been shown here that Tasmania's significant renewable hydro-powered 
energy resource may be 'clean', but it is not necessarily 'green'. Its utility is not 
extended through efficiency measures. Post hoc, the environmental devastation caused 
by dams significantly challenges attempts to exploit opportunities through EM 
rhetoric and a greenhouse-derived economic advantage. This brown status is 
confirmed in national policies that will not permit environmental premiums to become 
a profit basis, because national policies recognise that Tasmania invested in its hydro-
infrastructure for monetary, not environmental, reasons, and having done so, consider 
that the state should not be in a position to benefit. 
5.3 Conclusion and EM Discussion 
In the Foreword to Lupton's historical account, Sir Allan Knight, HEC Commissioner 
from 1946 to 1977, encapsulates the ecological modernisation process while at the 
same time highlighting the weaknesses an EM rhetoric gives to a genuine ecological 
discourse: 
It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that Tasmania has been denied the opportunity 
to develop the power resources of the Lower-Gordon as originally planned. 
Perhaps when the non-polluting value of water is more fully appreciated, wiser 
counsel will prevail (2000:7). 
The EM implications of these comments are that the possibility of damming the Gordon-
Below Franklin could one day be re-considered, but this time on environmental grounds. 
This position should not be underestimated, for it has been demonstrated here that 
greenhouse politics provides potential means to such possibilities. My framework 
provides three sites for analysing the competitive environment in which the 
contemporary Hydro operates. It is a framework in which to assess the extent of 
institutional learning, and thus elaboration of these issues. 
The first site is that of the Tasmanian Government, mana igng a state in a manner 
characterised by persistent 'desperation' when it comes to economic policy, and retaining 
a political will to seek for projects similar to the major engineering projects of the past. 
124 
There are questions about how it has attempted to fill the hiatus left by the demise of 
hydro-industrialisation. How genuine is the shift from a view of hydro-power as a cheap 
source of energy to one of a clean and environmentally beneficial energy source? How 
does this fit with the Basslink and natural gas proposals, and other 'green' energy 
proposals? To what extent have the traditional political parties successfully marginalised 
their Green rivals while borrowing a minimal amount of their ideas and discourse in 
order to do so? 
The second site is that of the Hydro itself. Questions here include: how has the 
restructuring within the Hydro itself (for example the demise of the Power Engineering 
Branch, and the replacement of hydro-engineers with financial and accounting managers) 
altered the way that hydro-electricity is viewed? What are we to make of the Hydro 's 
reaction to the greenhouse issue in terms of its attempt to maximise the benefits for its 
renewable energy and its interest in developing new renewable energy sources? And 
what of its participation in engineering opportunities presented by new developments 
such as natural gas and Basslink? 
The final site is the environment movement. A number of dilemmas highlighted in this 
chapter are similar to the dilemmas pointed out by critics of EM as an ideology. The 
ascendancy of the greenhouse issue and the ambivalence on the part of the environmental 
movement over Tasmania's hydro-electric assets is demonstrated by the latter's late 
advocacy of a new economic 'vision' for the state based on promotion of the state's 
clean, green image and embracing its hydro assets as the basis of that new image, while 
some sections of the green movement continue to press for a roll back of past hydro-
electric developments (Pedder 2000). Ironically Harries notes: 
As an alternative to further hydro-electric development, many 
environmentalists supported the thermal option, justifring this on the 
grounds that a coal-fired power station would not pose a pollution 
problem since the emissions from coal-fired station all occurred 
naturally in the atmosphere in large quantities and were therefore 
innocuous (Johnson 1972:76). The HEC ridiculed the environmentalists 
support for a coal-fired  plant by adopting the slogan 'HEC: Power 
125 
without pollution'. Environmentalists parried with their own 1-IEC: 
Power without Purpose' (Harries 1996, Appendix 1:23). 
This chapter has demonstrated the tension that is the legacy of past environmental 
campaigns against large hydro-schemes, with such schemes now tainted as 'third class' 
or 'brown' renewable energy. Policy-makers and consumers pursuing -the GreenPower 
schemes and the two percent measure appear to be wanting to divorce themselves from 
hydro-electricity. This is tied in with the shift in discourse and terminology from 
'renewable energy' to 'sustainable energy' to 'green energy'. It remains unclear how 
environmentalists regard Tasmania's hydro-electric energy within this spectrum, and if 
they regard it as 'not so clean and green', what are the implications for its use as a 
marketing strategy and for demanding green premiums? This lack of clarity as to the 
environmental status (based on `renewableness', 'cleanliness', or `sustainability') of 
large dams and 'existing' large dams, in particular, may be attributable to ambivalence 
within the environmental movement. 
EM provides a position from which to describe discourse and policy issues. It also 
highlights that the hydro-industrialisation ethic may have changed in character (because 
of restricted opportunities for large scale dam development), but it still thrives. 
Underpinning all the greenhouse rhetoric is a strong echo of hydro-industrialisation from 
the past. The general energy policy context which the government is pursuing 
demonstrates this: 
Natural gas could spark an economic boom in Tasmania... the boost 
could be similar to the early days of hydro-industrialisation 
(Mercury 2001). 
The natural gas and Basslink projects have profound implications for future economic 
development in Tasmania, as well as the state's greenhouse profile and the role of the 
Hydro within this. The disaggregation of the Hydro described earlier in this chapter has 
been advocated by many and diverse political camps, including the Greens. One 
interesting incentive for the government to break-up the Hydro is to improve the 
potential for its sale (either as a whole or in part). The notion of selling off public 
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utilities has many converts, and as a target to aim for in both policy and planning, a 
number of strategic steps can be taken to make assets attractive to the public investor. 
Competition, markets and the role of other utilities is critical in such a strategy. 
During the 1980s-1990s the sensible political position was one of scepticism towards 
Tasmania ever achieving a natural gas system, or state-based green-field energy source 
(such as a new hydro scheme or coal-fired generator). The most likely project on the 
books was the Basslink interconnector, which could dramatically increase the value of 
the Hydro and its assets. I submit that there were two fundamental reasons for the 
Basslink project; one is that it would facilitate participation of the Hydro in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) and thus encourage competitive prices in Tasmania (generally 
regarded as haying high electricity prices to those not privy to past hydro-
industrialisation agreements); the second is that in preparation for selling the Hydro, a 
justification to the public is that as a state we have reached our sustainable maximum 
generation capacity and may come up short in the future. With this in mind, the state 
had two plausible options: Basslink or gas. While other options such as wind and coal 
were touted, they were double the cost (approximately 8c KW/h compared to 4c KW/h 
for the electricity supplied from natural gas or Basslink). Added to this, there needed to 
be a fall back or insurance position in the event of a major industrial leaving the state. 
Basslink was preferred as it would allow a small increase in the electricity load and 
avoided the traditional problem of oversupply linked to new capacity. Conversely, if 
load fell as a result of a major customer closing, hydro-generated electrons could be 
exported to Victoria. 
With the Basslink project now progressing as a reality, it is interesting that during the 
project development natural gas has become a reality as well. The problem for the 
government became how to sell gas and Basslink instead of gas or Basslink. For 
obvious reasons, the Hydro would be keen to pursue Basslink because it suits them to do 
so: it would increase the value of its assets while also allowing for expansion (a new 
lifeblood for the old engineering branch). Much of the Koject announcements and 
institutional changes are couched in greenhouse terms, but the reality is that meeting the 
national two percent measure will come at a high cost to Tasmania. On the one hand it 
is said that the development of a wind farm is dependent on Basslink, and on the other 
1 27 
that Basslink is viable only if both import and export of energy occurs, because without 
Basslink there is said to be no capacity to sell the energy generated from the wind farm. 
Thus, it follows that if one is to include the cost of building Basslink as well as the cost 
of building the wind farm, the economics are dubious and the greenhouse benefit 
_ marginal. However, if Basslink is in place for various other reasons it can be argued 
that the wind farm project could be justified on greenhouse reductions. 
In the early phases, hydro-industrialisation moved from strength to strength based on 
potent symbiotic relationships between government, the Hydro and industry that suited 
the interests of all three parties: politics; bureaucracy (its own expansion, as well as the 
potential for industry attraction); and industry (buying cheap power). The parallel now 
with the wind farm and other 'green' pursuits is that it is not the interest of the nation, 
the state or the community that is driving change. The greenhouse justification is 
convenient and used only from the narrowest perspective. The real benefit for 
developing wind resources, chasing the mandatory target and encouraging Basslink, is 
that it fits the same development ethic that lay behind hydro-industrialisation. The 
Hydro's decision to be involved in the renewable energy game is driven by Basslink 
rather than the other way around. Thus, current 'green' initiatives in the present 
arrangements of the Hydro evidence, at most, elements of weak EM. 
Two negative aspects about Basslink can be observed, particularly in an EM context. 
The proposed transmission lines across Victoria will impact on environmental, 
social/cultural values. And the cable once in place would undermine potentially 
'greener' initiatives such as the draining of Lake Pedder or the restoration of the 
ecological damage of historic dam sites. From a green ethical perspective, therefore, the 
environmental disasters of the past in Tasmania could never be undone. 
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6. Conclusion 
Sustainability and EM terminology are both characterised by optimism concerning the 
prospects of a greener capitalist future. This paper has used Tasmdnia as a case study 
to compare this optimistic picture with what happens on the ground. It has done so by 
looking at what constitutes a greenhouse industry and then using this to analyse the 
assets that the Tasmanian government has at its disposal to market itself as clean and 
green, particularly from a greenhouse perspective. 
At first glance, a study of Tasmania suggests that Hawken et al's future progress 
toward a natural capitalism can call on a positive competitive advantage (1999) - the 
state has large tracts of wilderness and forest estate, as well as significant renewable 
energy assets. When one digs deeper, however, by analysing what is likely to 
comprise a 'legitimate' greenhouse industry, cracks begin to appear in the optimistic 
picture. Central to 'legitimate' greenhouse activities are the requirements of 
exhaustive measurement, baseline establishment, verification of emissions and 
sequestration - all of which require particular circumstances, a coherent time scale and 
a technical capacity to interpret and rigorously account for change. The two 
greenhouse cases used in this study have shown that, despite a dominant ethos of 
developmentalism, Tasmania actually lacks exploitative greenhouse opportunities, due 
to the limited amount of cleared land and post-1990 tree planting, together with an 
infrastructure of renewable energy assets that are excluded from renewable incentive 
programs and policies. In addition to this, it has been shown that the rules and 
definitions of greenhouse measurement and monitoring are at the mercy of 
international and national politics, whilst, on top of this, there is even the possibility 
that the core greenhouse driver, the Kyoto Protocol, will never be ratified now that the 
US has indicated that it does not intend to be a signatory. In this case, the 
environmental learning and rhetoric that FT and the Hydro have tried to take 
advantage of will have been to little or no avail. 
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The picture which emerges thus differs from the opportunistic one presented by 
government, industry, and most commentators. The environmental transition that 
appears to have occurred in both case studies is therefore questionable. The extent of 
its genuineness is in doubt, and it appears to be characterised by weak EM. While an 
environmental discourse has been learned, it is undermined by the lack of guarantees 
on multiple fronts: development of renewable energies is contingent on Basslink; to 
obtain any benefit for the state, government may need to accrue carbon credits and use 
these to retain the state's industrial processes (or as a drawcard for new businesses); 
the ability to acquire carbon credits, is however, constrained by the lack of land for 
sink development; and a reliance on further renewable energy exposes the state's 
energy system to drought-induced shortages or failures due to lack of wind. The state 
has two options: one is to attract forestry investment by enabling external interests to 
accrue carbon credits, as well as privatising energy management entities to an extent 
that their competitiveness does not allow them to guarantee one another the benefits 
of renewable certificates generated here; whilst the other option that the state could 
take (but has not considered) is to retain all credits from its forest and energy activities 
in order to attract clean industries or retain existing industries that may hurt when an 
emissions market evolves. This option is, admittedly, complicated by the question of 
who would accrue any RECs or carbon credits. In any case, the government has 
already chosen its option, and this provides further evidence that the EM that appears 
to be taking place is either not real, or is critically weak. 
Proponents of EM would argue that the ecological learning is genuine. This is based 
on the belief that environmental care becomes critical to competitive advantage and is 
increasingly a requirement for global market participation. But perhaps EM attempts 
to reconcile the irreconcilable: 
'Environmentalism' and 'industrial capitalism', are thus discourses 
competing at a more fundamental levei of meaning... The green 
discourse is a complex interaction of ideas and.,values that flow from 
first principles... [and not economic efficiency]... (Hay 1994:109). 
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Despite this fundamental discord EM has significant collective support, and as a 
theory it has enabled this study to frame greenhouse development opportunities and 
associated discourses. However, on application it fails to effectively account for 
conflicting political and economic forces in small, economically strained economies. 
In effect, EM theory overlooks the degree of weakness in its weak versions. There is 
a need to look at how the specific characteristics of local economies will affect the 
relationship between economy and the environment. Without such local adaptation 
EM is too crude an analytical tool to apply successfully to such places as Tasmania. 
Tasmania has, in fact, been chosen partly because it represents an extreme case that 
allows weaknesses in EM theory to be thrown into such sharp relief EM theory 
implicitly assumes the typical 'Euro-Americo developed economy'. It does not fit 
Tasmania, and there are likely to be many other situations, less 'extreme' than 
Tasmania, for which EM theory is also unable to take accurate account. In fact, it is 
the developed economies assumed by the theory that may be the 'extreme', with a 
majority of countries not fitting the mould, in which case EM theory is based on a 
minority of conditions that are not generalisable, and thus not adequate to provide a 
base for general theory. 
The Bush Administration has also shown EM to be tenuous even in the strongest of 
developed economies. By refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol the US government 
has demonstrated that non-implementation of environmental poiicy critical to EM is 
indeed a real risk — yet this risk is never acknowledged by proponents of EM. While 
there remains no definitional consensus, Christoff (1996) argues that EM is being 
applied to technological adjustment; policy discourse; belief systems and deeply 
embedded, ecologically self-conscious forms of cultural transformation. Such 
ambiguity, he warns, 'may serve to legitimise the continuing instrumental domination 
and destruction of the environment' (Crowley 1996:627). Similarly Welford notes 
that: 
A common characteristic amongst businesses is only to do as much as 
they perceive to be absolutely necessaiy. At the same time, what they 
do is often given an extraordinarily high profile. For example, it is 
increasingly common for businesses to draw up an environmental 
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policy. As such that is a good starting point but all too often one 
hears 'that's our policy, we've got one — it shows we are doing 
something'. Even those companies who produce environmental 
reports (and they are sometimes produced from veiy dubious reasons) 
still operate as if the environment were an add-on to give them a 
competitive advantage... [but]... fails to deal with the real -challenge 
facing industry: to do things differently (Welford 1997:33). 
Welford (1997) critiques academic proponents of EM on the ground that their trust in 
a theory determined by discourses created by industry rather than by real events is 
damaging to environmentalism and will ultimately prolong a business-as-usual 
approach and the destruction of the environment. True enough, but Welford himself 
fails to appreciate that what EM actually helps highlight is 'insight into itself' as a 
phenomenon. Revisiting the notion of EM as having prescriptive and descriptive 
bases (outlined in Chapter 2), the extent of the former can be tested by applying the 
latter. Prescriptive EM establishes a set of rules as to what might constitute strong or 
weak environmental performance and ecologically-based cultural transformation, and 
observation of its application in the real world can be tested by description through 
case studies. This provides a sound opportunity to expose environmental problems in 
contemporary economic activities, including: identifying evidence of policy shortfalls; 
or as this thesis has demonstrated, to describe scenarios from various positions to shed 
light on policy debt and rhetorical discourse. Welford appears to imply this positive 
aspect of EM, but without elaboration: 
The ecomodernist approach sees the .future as being a product of what 
went before. Environmentalism, it asserts, must therefore be embedded 
in what is here and now. The postmodern perspective, which would 
see the environmental debate more associated with a break from the 
past, is largely ignored and the usual approach taken to environmental 
strategies is therefore largely imegrationist. In other words, 
corporate environmental management is integrated into (or worse, 
bolted on to) business as usual. The most significant question 
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therefore revolves around the importance attached to 
environmentalism (Welford 1997:32). 
But even if EM implies integration with business-as-usual and a watering-down of 
genuine environmentalism, it nonetheless provides a sound platform for critical 
discourse analysis. Though EM is a crude theoretical tool, it has been shown that it 
does provide useful insights. The real problem, theoretically (as opposed to EM in 
practice), is that it does not take into account the new environmental imperatives of 
different economies and situations, and certainly misses the target when it comes to 
more marginal and remote economies such as Tasmania. Theoretically, therefore, EM 
provides a starting point from which to analyse supposedly enlightened environmental 
activity. In the first instance it can be observed as it ostensibly takes place in a variety 
of situations. Observation of activities provides the basis of description, but 
description alone does not provide the necessary attributes to evaluate what is taking 
place. Analysis of behaviours observed against a set of criteria is required to 
informatively assess change or reform. EM provides two dimensions (strong and 
weak), but does not drill down in either case - this is particularly evidenced by EM's 
inability to really explore the environmental implications characteristic of the weakest 
versions of it. As Frijins et al. conclude: 
If ecological modernisation theory L, to be used to outline a feasible 
path of environmental reform, [as opposed to methodological 
approaches to academic analysis] it has to he refined... to .fit the 
specific local conditions and institutional developments of 
industrialising countries (Frijns et al. 2000:1). 
The Tasmanian case studies presented here demonstrate that EM is prescriptively 
unsatisfactory not only in industrialising countries, but it is equally suspect in its 
application to struggling industrial economis. Such economies are not 'abnormal' 
but are in the majority. Even at the centre of technologically advanced capitalism EM 
seems precarious at best, as evidenced by President George W. Bush's latest stance on 
energy availability and generation. We are now, it seems, much better placed to 
respond to Sonnenfeld's questions: 
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Together, such technological/material objectives, mechanisms and 
institutional dimensions of ecological modernisation provide a useful 
starting point for evaluating the applicability of the theoty to 
particular cases ... [and] analysis addresses two questions: to what 
extent have [particular activities or behaviours] 'ecologically 
modernised' in recent years? [And] how have these changes taken 
place? (Sonnenfeld 2000:237) 
We have indeed observed EM occurring in two cases, placed observations in historical 
context, and questioned the extent of these changes. The latter, however, generates 
still more questions rather than providing an informative policy trajectory. Our two 
case studies have highlighted the fact that greenhouse reducing incentives such as 
emissions trading (when combined with micro-economic reforms, including 
privatisation) leaves the government in a lose-lose situation because its ability to 
retain credits or guarantee actual emissions reduction is removed. Added to this, if 
Tasmania as a state is to benefit from its clean green, and carbon sink status, the 
government and economy will be beholden to external expertise to verify emissions 
and sequestration simply because, the state does not presently have appropriate 
expertise. Therefore, if verification has to be paid for, it is likely that benefits gained 
(from 'environmental credits'), woulc be countered by accounting costs. Credit 
markets are developed to incenti vise business behaviour, making environmental 
stewardship subservient to bottom-line business efficiency. The creation of artificial 
commercial incentives to 'clean up' the environment by 'rewarding' environmental 
stewardship and penalising business-as-usual, however, institutes a dilemma. 
Conformance to such policies can come at very high cost which can create perverse 
incentives — this in turn undermines core EM assumptions such as eco-efficiency, and 
hence a propensity to continue environmentally destructive behaviour. To further 
muddy the waters, it has been shown that 'good jobs' are not always seen as 'green 
jobs' and that Tasmania is doing little or nornina to pf,omote any benefits associated 
with eco-friendly work. More broadly: 
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There are formidable obstacles to the implementation of a 
comprehensive and broadly effective environmental policy. These 
obstacles stem not from the nature of liberal democracy but also from 
the nature of environmental quality as something that is hard to 
effectively legislate for: such characteristics as the ubiquity of 
environmental decline; the insidiousness of environmental problems 
(or the absence of immediately apparent cause-consequence 
relationships); the problem of 'death by a thousand cuts' as 
environmental degradation accumulates by concentrating the 
seemingly unimportant consequevces of innocent private decisions 
taken by individuals at a sub-policy level; and the problem that policy 
is only as effective as government's capacity to monitor and regulate, 
this latter an important emergent problem as the very potency of 
government as an institution goes into decline... (Hay 1994:119). 
When exploring these case studies from an EM perspective, there is evidence that 
corporate and governmental rhetoric is used to beguile the public through a 
repackaging of old policies in environmental (in this case, greenhouse) discourse. It 
also shows that there may be, in parts of the commercially-tooled bureaucratic 
commercial structures, some genuine attempts on the part of some actors to redirect 
their organisations down more environmentally benign business paths. This is partly 
because such activities constitute good public relations - and partly because such 
initiatives are genuinely deemed to be eavironmentaily sound and socially responsible. 
However, exploration of the cases has shown that the actual capacity of businesses to 
go down this path can be severely constrained, with considerable confusion over the 
degree to which the organisation can actually benefit from taking such a route 
(particularly, in this instance, because the relevant global policy regimes, as we have 
seen, are still in a state of flux). The combined effect of the EM agenda and 
greenhouse policies has induced an over-optimism in regard to the extent to which 
Tasmanian government business enterprises can profitably embrace greenhouse 
development opportunities: 
... there are issues as to who owns the emission reductions. It is possible 
that the emission reductions achieved by increasing the energy efficiency 
of a home could be claimed by the homeowner, by the company selling 
energy efficient appliances or by the company undertaking the retrofit. 
While this broadens the list of companies with the poteritial to profit from 
emission reduction activities, it increases the uncertainty for companies 
investing in emission reductions (Rolfe 1999:15). 
It is likely that the constraints revealed in the case studies presented here will also 
apply in other small resource-oriented capitalist economies. The Tasmanian case 
generally becomes one of risk taking, where the endeavours of governments and 
businesses are likely to collapse, because they will be seen by future investors, and 
society more generally, to be embarking on an ecologically weak and rhetorical 
exercise, in which the so called 'green' initiatives are without substance. As a 
discourse, then, EM has some validity as a tool to aid description; as prescription 
however, it may merely involve an exercise in sleight of hand, aimed at promoting an 
appearance of change while leaving essentially unchanged the tried-and-failed realities 
of an old paradigm: 
...a paradigm resting on axiomatic assumptions concerning the 
inevitability and rightness of a timeless human progression set upon the 
conjoined pillars of unalloyed human reason and scientific method... 
[where]... environmental policy also suffers in the weighting ofpriorities 
by virtue of environni ental integrity'.s status as a public rather than a 
private good — at a time when human wellbeing is increasingly seen as a 
private rather than public quality (Hay 1994:119). 
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Appendix: Environmental Industries — Elaboration of 
Categories and Extended Definition as Proposed by the OECD 
and Eurostat 
1. Core Activities 
A. Environment Goods 
Production of equipment, technology and specific materials for: 
I. Air pollution control 
1.1 Air-handling equipment 
1.2 Catalytic converters 
1.3 Chemical recovery systems 
1.4 Dust collectors 
1.5 Precipitators 
1.6 Incinerators, scrubbers 
1.7 Odour control equipment 
2. Waste water management 
2.1 Aeration systems 
2.2 Chemical recovery systems 
2.3 Biological recovery systems 
2.4 Gravity sedimentation systems 
2.5 Oil/water separation systems 
2.6 Screens/strainers 
2.7 Sewage treatment 
2.8 Wastewater reuse equipment 
2.9 Water handling goods and equipment 
3. Solid waste management 
3.1 Hazardous waste storage and treatment equipment 
3.2 Waste collection equipment 
3.3 Waste disposal equipment 
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3.4 Waste handling equipment 
3.5 Waste separation equipment 
3.6 Recycling equipment 
3.7 Incineration equipment 
4. Remediation/cleanup of soil and water 
4.1 Absorbents 
4.2 Cleaning-up 
4.3 Water treatment equipment 
5. Noise/vibration control 
5.1 Mufflers/silencers 
5.2 Noise deadening material 
5.3 Vibration control systems 
6. Environmental monitoring, analysis and assessment 
6.1 Measuring and monitoring equipment 
6.2 Sampling systems 
6.3 Process and control equipment 
6.4 Data acquisition equipment 
6.5 Other instruments/machines 
B. Environment Services 
Provision of services for: 
7. Air pollution control 
8. Waste water management 
8.1 Sewage treatment systems 
8.2 Wastewaxr reuse systems 
8.3 Water handling systems 
9. Solid waste management 
9.1 Emergency response and spills cleanup 
9.2 'Waste handling -- collectioq, transport and disposal 
9.3 Operation sites 
9.4 Recycling 
9.5. Operation of recycling plants 
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10. Remediation/cleanup of soil and water 
10.1 Cleaning-up 
10.2 Water treatment equipment 
11. Noise/vibration control 
12. Environmental contracting/engineering 
12.1 Engineering designispecification/projeCt management 
12.2 Biological and ecosystem studies 
12.3 Environment impact assessment, audits 
12.4 Water treatment 
12.5 Environmental planning 
12.6 Risk and hazard assessment 
12.7 Laboratory and field services 
12.8 Environmental economics 
12.9 Legal services (environmental law) 
13. Environmental research and development 
13.1 Environmental knowledge 
13.2 Environmental protection aspects 
13.3 Environmental management 
14. Analytical services, data collection and analysis 
14.1 Measuring and monitoring 
14.2 Sampling 
14.3 Process and control 
14.4 Data acquisition 
14.5 Others 
15. Environmental education and training, information 
15.1 :Environmental education and training 
15.2 Environmntal information searching service 
15.3 Environmental data management and analysis 
2. Non Core Activities 
A. Environment Goods 
Production of equipment, technology for: 
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1. Potable water treatment 
1.1 Potable war.er treatment 
1.2 Water purification systems 
2. Other recycling systems 
2.1 Other Recycling systems 
3. Renewable energy plant 
3.1 Solar 
3.2 Wind 
3.3 Tidal 
3.4 Geothermal 
3.5 Other 
4. Heat /energy management 
5. Cleaner/efficient processes 
6. Cleaner/efficient products 
7. Alternative agriculture/fisheries 
8. Sustainable forestry 
9. Others 
B. Environmental Services 
Provision of services and construction for: 
10. Other recycling/recovery plan 
10.1 Ocher recycling systems 
11. Renewable energy plant 
1 I Solar 
11.2 Wind 
11.3 Tidal 
1.4 Geothermal 
12. Amenity/conservation 
12.1 Soil and water conservation 
12.2 Pest control 
12.3 Potable water supply and distribution 
12.4 Wildlife and natural habitat 
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13. Alternative agriculture/ fisheries 
14. Sustainable forestry 
14.1 Reforestation 
14.2 Forest management 
15. Eco-tourism 
16. Other services (e.g. industry associations) 
source: OECD (1996b) 
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